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ABSTRACT 
My dissertation makes two key interventions in the fields of cosmopolitanism 
and contemporary American literature.  First, I define cosmopolitanism as a way of 
organizing sociality in terms of affect, through how individuals pay attention to the 
world.  Interactions with people and texts evoke affects and socialization trains 
individuals how to respond to them through the formation of feelings for particular 
forms of community.  Rather than a set of actually existing conditions or some common 
identity, cosmopolitanism, as a potential outcome for ongoing processes of socialization, 
is one means of politicizing affect within political institutions like the nation, which 
remain grounded in material conditions and particular identities.  Cosmopolitanism is 
not some state of affairs that our actions or intentions bring into being; it remains 
abstract and outside the present in the form of appeals to a nostalgic past or utopian 
future.  For example, nationalist literature deploys the idea of cosmopolitanism as a 
reality or possibility to reconsolidate the political effects of affect around the nation-
state.  Second, I argue that recent literature about America reconceptualizes the nation’s 
cultural and political value through appeals to cosmopolitanism as if it were a set of 
conditions or common identity that readers can use to construct a positive self-identity.  
This rhetorical move justifies a simultaneous vision of expanding cultural, political, and 
economic influence that accompanies American texts’ visions of America as the center 
of cosmopolitan humanitarian or ethical interventions.  Literary appeals to America as 
the center of cosmopolitan solidarity manage the formation of the nation within global 
space by encouraging readers to feel positively for their global presence.   
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The dissertation presents detailed readings of texts concerned with the identity of 
America rather than those emerging from it as the object of its inquiry to show how 
global literature situates the affective experience of America within a cosmopolitan 
sociability stratified across a number of solidarities including race, class, gender, and 
nationality.  Analyzing texts by David Foster Wallace, Hari Kunzru, Joe Sacco, 
Aleksandar Hemon, Jonathan Safran Foer, Karen Tei Yamashita, and Dave Eggers, I 
elaborate on critical and philosophical deployments of cosmopolitanism as justifications 
for the management of communication, human rights, and aesthetic production alongside 
literary analogs that situate critical struggles to realize cosmopolitanism within America. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION: AFFECT, ATTENTION, AND THE COSMOPOLITAN NATION 
One of the most widely discussed media events of 2012 was the publication and 
viral explosion of Invisible Children’s short film, KONY2012.  The thirty minute film, 
which has seemingly redefined activism for the internet age, presents the organization’s 
co-founder Jason Russell appealing to a presumably American audience to make Joseph 
Kony famous (or infamous) around the world by becoming aware of his actions, with the 
aim of inciting a U.S. military intervention against his organization within Uganda.  He 
does so by first documenting the ordinariness of his own family life and then capturing 
the emotional reaction of his five year old son to a simplified account of what a bad man 
Kony has been and of a Ugandan youth responding to Russell’s promise to rescue the 
country.  The video addressed what nearly all commentators judge a worthwhile cause, 
to put an end to the decades-long reign of terror of Kony and his Lord’s Resistance 
Army, even if evidence suggested that neither were currently active in Uganda at the 
time of the video’s publication.1  Despite a general consensus on Kony’s criminality and 
the need to act against him, the video sparked predictable outrage for its 
oversimplification of Ugandan politics and its blatant move to characterize Africans as 
helpless victims in need of rescue from an evil villain by benevolent American viewers.2  
Still, many commentators were compelled by the effectiveness of a simple video to 
arouse the public to any form of action in what they characterized as an age of mass 
media information saturation, even if that action was only to register concern through the 
click of a mouse, or “slacktivism.”  
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On a very basic level, Invisible Children’s appeal suggests they understand their 
video as having real political and material effects on Joseph Kony by compromising or 
otherwise altering the quality of social and cultural capital associated with his name and 
face.3  Paying attention to Kony’s existence in this way does not have any particularly 
profound effect on his own capacity to convert social capital into financial resources or 
political power, though.  Instead, the disgust viewers feel at his ongoing reign of terror 
accrues an unwanted form of social capital to U.S. policymakers, to whom the video 
appeals for military intervention.  They have not lived up to their role as guarantors of 
human liberty in the past, the video accuses, and if they fail now to respond to the 
publicity Invisible Children generates, they will lose credibility in the face of those it 
outrages.  As viewers’ frustration erodes confidence in the efficacy of the state to ensure 
the quality of life they expect, it also transfers social capital and political power to NGO 
charities and other extra-national policy groups.  Its ability to command the abstract 
resource of attention leads to a consolidation of more tangible forms of power. 
As a call to claim individual entitlement to global diplomacy, KONY2012 
redraws America’s boundaries as coextensive with its viewers’ capacity to feel for 
others.  In it, our feelings for others extend to what media renders visible, the whole of 
humanity, making America the hub of a cosmopolitan world of shared affect.  The 
video’s humanitarian appeal was not to a sense of compassion for others but personal 
empowerment, through the idea that the act of mere attentiveness is what bestows a 
figure, cause, or concept with value, and that the act of generating such value entitles 
those laboring individuals to a right over the formation and content of the objects of their 
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attention.  Because the Africans in KONY2012 made them feel badly, its viewers claim a 
right to remake their world for them just as they might also claim the right to develop an 
interpretation of a painting that evokes feelings of discomfort or to develop a 
neighborhood fallen into poverty.  Like urban gentrification, its aim is not only a world 
in which children are not abducted and murdered or all people are equal, but one in 
which everyone is continually visible in order to maintain a state of constant affective 
scrutiny that minimizes the risk of global consumers’ exposure to the pain of empathy.  
After all, to have feeling for others is to extend them some degree of community, and 
how we feel about them determines the character of that community.  Ensuring that 
others evoke only positive, empowering feelings in ourselves limits the extent to which 
we become financially or politically liable for them and justifies neoliberal calls for 
others’ self-reliance.  Under such watchfulness, Africans no longer pose the threat of 
upsetting the bliss of daily American life because they no longer appear imperiled, and, 
consequently, also appear capable of bearing the consequences of their living conditions.   
The message of the video is clear enough: as an innocent American child, Gavin, 
Russell’s little boy, should not have to hear what he did.  The threat KONY2012 evokes 
is our distress at the deformation of his innocent vision of the world and the potential 
malformation of patriotic national identity our sight of his confusion might cause.  To 
look upon Gavin’s hurt is to question the basis for one’s pride in the nation.  The viral 
body of viewers the video encourages to question the value of the nation makes it in the 
state’s best interest to adopt Invisible Children’s policy recommendations.  The film’s 
Africans, through their suffering, make Americans feel uncomfortable with their lives.  
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The film defines pain as the shared occasion for the sentimental activism it elicits, in the 
form of Gavin’s distress first, then the sight of benighted Ugandans, and finally in the 
empathy of viewers, which mirrors Gavin’s own feelings.4  Doing so, KONY2012 creates 
the image of a unified world in which all people share the capacity for pain that demands 
America’s intervention into its management.  The cosmopolitanism of its appeal 
generalizes Gavin’s pain, which hurts viewers’ feelings with the possibility that he could 
be their own child.  The potential to suffer is what we have in common and is what 
motivates political action, but the film’s rhetorical structure also positions its Ugandan 
victims in an antagonistic relationship to its American viewers.5  By not addressing a 
duty to alleviate pain, by giving one’s attention in the form of views or likes to the work 
of Invisible Children, viewers allow not just Kony, but, more immediately, the Ugandan 
children he kidnaps and murders to threaten their own emotional well-being.  Children, 
not Kony, are the cause of viewers’ distressing empathy.  
The children Invisible Children makes visible and their effect on viewers are the 
problem the organization’s intervention must resolve to an equal degree as the actual 
violence it describes.  KONY2012’s call to “cover the night” to make Kony famous in 
America claims the world in the name of an American right to positive feelings.  Its 
deployment of cosmopolitan interest in the lives of others forms the ground for a 
reconsolidation of power within the nation in dematerialized terms of affect and 
attention value that displace older forms of domination like economy and manifest 
destiny.  As it does so, the film participates in what Lilie Chouliaraki calls the 
“neoliberal commodification of solidarity” (“Cosmopolitanism as Irony” 78).  Tellingly, 
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Invisible Children’s concern is to make Kony, and not his victims, famous, and it does 
by enabling an army of empathetic youth to imagine themselves as champions of global 
justice when they spread the word.  KONY2012’s viewers become empowered to 
regulate the production of emotion within a cosmopolitan world by witnessing the 
effects the suffering of others may have upon them.  Their views create a public space in 
which America is responsible for the well-being of the world.  By making viewers feel 
as if their fulfilling actions do make a difference in the world, while disguising the 
ongoing conditions that contribute to the need for wealthy individuals to become the 
humanitarian guarantors of basic conditions worldwide, projects like KONY2012 
produce a quiescent and self-satisfied public devoted to the production of a nation with 
global sovereignty. The video’s call for cosmopolitan attentiveness actually risks 
producing a less cosmopolitan public. 
While it is easy to dismiss KONY2012 as naïve and short-sighted, I do not 
believe Invisible Children acts in bad faith.  Its action points clearly serve American and 
personal interests primarily.  However, the organization’s investment in broadening 
Americans’ awareness of the world, even if it fails to produce equality, does indicate a 
yet unrealized potential for cosmopolitanism in the very instability of affective bonds it 
so effectively mobilized.  The tens of millions of views the video attracted in a matter of 
days suggests a different way of organizing political action that does not correspond to 
any set of tangible boundaries, but that rather emerges and dissipates according to need, 
sensation, affect.  This dissertation takes up the link between affect and cosmopolitanism 
in order to examine how literature manages the social and political value of America and 
 6 
 
defines its boundaries as flexible and action-based during the post-Cold War era.  In it, I 
argue two major points.  First, I define cosmopolitanism as a form of attentiveness that 
shapes our ongoing production of sociality.  The production of sociality, in turn, gives us 
a sense of those solidarities that position us within the world, whether as part of a family, 
nation, or global community.  All forms of socialization have within them a degree of 
cosmopolitan sociability.  Second, I argue that recent literature reconceptualizes America’s 
cultural and political value through appeals to cosmopolitanism in order to justify a 
simultaneous vision of its expanding cultural, political, and economic influence.  What I 
focus on in the chapters that follow is how the assumption of America as the object of attention 
in literary works, including fiction and nonfiction, written words and images, affects the 
production of cosmopolitan attentiveness and how the understandings of what it means to be 
cosmopolitan influences the sorts of solidarities they envision.  Thinking of cosmopolitanism as 
a mode of attentiveness directed toward the production of sociability allows me to critique the 
means by which world literature partakes in the extension of American liberal values to global 
space without devaluing the experience of American identity by individuals, either in the U.S. or 
abroad.   
Cosmopolitanism, Affect, and Attention 
Cosmopolitanism has a long and contentious history.  While everyone has a 
general sense of what the term means, no one agrees on the range of its application.  
Beginning with Diogenes the Cynic, who proclaimed himself a citizen of the world, 
there has been disagreement about what cosmopolitanism involves.  Many critics have 
interpreted Diogenes’s words pessimistically, as a refusal of one’s responsibilities in 
favor of self-indulgent invention.6  In the modern era, beginning with Kant, 
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cosmopolitanism’s association with shared reason and identity comes to prominence.  
Kant’s cosmopolitan vision of a world united under shared space introduces an ethical 
component to the term in the form of demands for and limits to hospitality (105-114).  
More recent discussions of the term defend its relevance by qualifying its scope and 
purpose with a seemingly endless array of modifiers.  Some follow Kant’s ethical and 
rational imperative, and theorize cosmopolitanism as an ideal toward which humanity 
works.  Most notably in this camp are the much-decried patriotic, even nationalistic, 
cosmopolitanisms of Martha Nussbaum and K. Anthony Appiah.  Nussbaum frames 
cosmopolitanism as a project of self-enlightenment in which by reading, individuals 
come to understand themselves as the center of a shared humanity.  This realization 
burdens them with the responsibility of bringing the rest of the world to a similar state of 
enlightenment by helping them to shed attachments to irrelevant local values (9).  
Likewise, Appiah treats cosmopolitanism as a pleasant adventure in which the world’s 
privileged consume images of foreign difference through real or imagined travel 
(“Cosmopolitan Reading,” 202-208).  The result of Nussbaum’s and Appiah’s liberal 
cosmopolitanisms is that, too often, cosmopolitanism is reduced to a celebration of 
universal identity at the expense of local conditions, beliefs, and practices as well as the 
historical conditions that have produced them.  Taken in such directions, 
cosmopolitanism becomes a means to reach and sustain consensus in the face of 
difference.  The problem with their cosmopolitanisms is not that they identify some 
common toward which humanity ought to work in the name of peace and mutual 
understanding.  Instead, it is that they adhere to the assumption that their own sense of 
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the world is unassailable, forcing the outside to bend to its beliefs to reach an 
understanding of them. 
Pheng Cheah objects that cosmopolitanism is conflated with neoliberal 
imperialism through the liberal tradition on the grounds that critics excited by 
cosmopolitanism’s potential to unify humanity and to usher in an era of global harmony 
make the indefensible assumption that because their own circumstances enable them to 
extend the boundaries of human community to people everywhere, people elsewhere 
must also entertain similar feelings.  To these utopian proclamations, he counters that 
material reality does not support notions of universal equality.  To Cheah, “the ethico-
political work that nationalism and cosmopolitanism can do at any given moment 
depends on how either formulation emerges from or is inscribed within the shifting 
material linkages and interconnections created by global capitalism at a particular 
historical conjuncture” (31).  American writers’ cosmopolitan claims to transcend the 
oppressiveness of corrupt national regimes and cultures are the product of U.S. stability 
in the global economy, and the strength of their vision of humanity is the product of the 
dehumanization of those whom they hope to address.  This is especially the case at the 
intersection of humanitarianism and cosmopolitan literature.  Concern for 
humanitarianism is important given the direction America’s nation building work has 
taken on the global stage since the end of the Cold War.  Chouliaraki argues that 
humanitarianism is split between appeals to solidarity as salvation from inhumane 
conditions and as calls to revolutionary action that address the underlying conditions of 
inequality (The Ironic Spectator 10-15).  Humanitarian cosmopolitanism, she suggests, 
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typically, and lately increasingly, falls to the side of salvation-styled appeals in which 
the Kantian recognition of common reason or the kernel of universal humanity of liberal 
theories justifies intervention, as it does in the case of viewers who feel moved to 
demand action on behalf of Ugandans when they witness how Gavin suffers when he 
learns of humanity’s potential for cruelty.  At the same time it emphasizes the 
humanitarian’s feelings over issues of justice, Chouliaraki argues, “by unequally 
distributing the quality of humanity across the globe,” between sites of pity and sites of 
empathy, cosmopolitan humanitarian discourse “perpetuates the historical relationship of 
the powerful West and the developing world, under the guise of cosmopolitan solidarity” 
(“Cosmopolitanism as Irony” 79).   
As a politics of consensus, liberal cosmopolitanism serves the interests of 
hegemonic neoliberal capitalism at the present, a point Timothy Brennan is quick to 
note.  He argues that “cosmopolitanism … can be understood as referring to the national 
specificity of the United States in which a New World pluralism adapted from 
nineteenth-century Latin American liberation movements joins a fledgling U.S. imperial 
project” (216).  Concern regarding collusion between American patriotism and 
cosmopolitan utopianism also motivates Bruce Robbins’s recent work on pragmatic 
cosmopolitanism.  In Perpetual War, he proposes that although cosmopolitanism once 
was an idealistic philosophy determined to find some point of solidarity unifying 
humanity, it has strayed from this mission in U.S. discourse.  In the midst of a culture 
driven by an escalating tendency to “organize the world of nations, often with great 
subtlety,” according to the outlook he memorably summarizes in the phrase “I’m great, 
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you stink,” cosmopolitanism has become yet another casualty of patriotism (Perpetual 
War; 4).  Cosmopolitanism, as a project for which America should be concerned, can 
either detach “Americans from their nation” in its current atmosphere of patriotic 
nationalism, or “it is not worth getting very excited about” (2).  His provocative claim 
invites the conclusion that far from being over, cosmopolitanism has yet to begin 
properly.  Yet, the exciting departure from the usual impediments to America’s 
cosmopolitanization that Robbins finds is the film Three Kings (1997), which shows the 
first Iraq war as pointless and devastating while also depicting American soldiers as 
“decent” because they are capable of empathizing with the Iraqis whose suffering they 
have caused (1).7   While not quite the absolutism and inflexibility of extreme patriotism, 
the cosmopolitanism Robbins champions in the film means neither a detachment from 
identification with the nation nor a departure from the American exceptionalism.  
Instead, it aims to use positive feelings situated in our critical valuation of America’s 
actions abroad to restore a differently patriotic feeling for the nation.  The film redeems 
national pride through a cathartic recognition of shame – the war was unconscionable 
but its American soldiers have good hearts and viewers can be proud Americans to feel 
bad about what is done in the name of the nation.  The film creates feelings of 
cosmopolitan solidarity tied to nationalist politics.  A cosmopolitan outlook makes for 
loyalty one can stomach, actually restoring the grounds for exceptionalist narratives. 
While there certainly is some truth to Brennan’s conclusion that 
“[c]osmopolitanism is the way in which a kind of American patriotism is today being 
expressed,” given Robbins’s inability to escape the linkage between the two projects, it 
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is not the case that what he describes is the limit or spirit of cosmopolitanism (227).  As 
Peter Sloterdijk points out, Diogenes’s declaration of world citizenship should be read as 
a willful and subversive abstention from the life of the polis and the protections it offers.  
This does not, however, equate to an absolute and anti-social rejection from social life 
itself.  For him, Diogenes’s cosmopolitanism means that “[one] is no longer a narrow-
minded citizen of a random city-community,” whose “melting pot of absurd customs” is 
really only “a hollow political mechanism” to begin with.  Until the impossible moment 
when the global actually does coincide with the local, it is the duty of the cosmopolitan 
to “remain the biting conscience of every dominating self-satisfaction and the affliction 
of every local narrowing” (164).  Diogenes’s decision to identify with the anarchic world 
rather than the ordered city-state that could guarantee his rights meant for him a life of 
intense vulnerability, exposed to absolute precarity, in order to draw attention to the 
ways in which the false inclusiveness of the city, another form of cosmopolitan 
universality, reduced human diversity to homogenous identity.  Diogenes’s words, far 
from the care-free and irresponsible declaration of self-centered detachment from local 
commitments or a desire to play freely with his sense of self that they are often taken for, 
founds cosmopolitanism as a mode of continuous, and agonistic political dissent 
opposed to facile declarations of humanity’s common identity.  Cosmopolitanism is an 
act of critique and a form of protest rather than a vision for an efficiently managed 
world.  It is a posture of attentive curiosity toward that which is given little repute in the 
official order of things within the city, an insistence upon paying attention to humanity 
in ever shifting and expanding ways.  Cosmopolitanism is an attitude of continually 
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refashioning those forms by which we take the measure of our relationship to others and 
determine the boundaries and limits to our loyalties.  It is in this spirit that I develop my 
own critique of cosmopolitan discourse in literature concerned with America’s place in 
the world today.   
I understand cosmopolitanism as an always yet-to-be-realized potential to 
conceive sociality in differently inclusive ways rather than as something that is or is not.  
It is a particular way of ordering attentiveness that can become associated with any 
number of forms of solidarity.8  It does not actually exist but does exert a pull over how 
individuals understand themselves and their situation within temporally and 
geographically fluid worlds.  As a form of attention, cosmopolitanism is one basis by 
which individuals continuously process affect into sociability in order to establish their 
relationships with others.  Nationalism can feel cosmopolitan without producing a 
political system that unifies humanity across the globe, just as people can work together 
for a common cause without feeling loyal to a shared identity.  Any political structure 
transforms sociality from the potential to organize into organization itself, and as it does 
so, moves through the exercise of power according to principles of exclusion and 
difference, implicitly setting the limits of humanity.  Cosmopolitanism is instead what 
might emerge from a particular way of attending to feeling.  It has an effect on how we 
organize and live in the world without being reduced to a manifest state or condition.   
Likewise, an emotion is not something that has an objective existence.  Instead, 
emotions are means of transforming affect into symbols that we can then manage.  Take 
the common experiences of feeling troubled but of remaining uncertain as to why or of 
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feeling something but being unable to determine what.  The purpose of analysis or 
therapy is often to enable the production of signs linking affect to objects or experiences 
in order to resolve such situations.  When we do manage to give a name, like remorse, to 
whatever troubles us, we can resolve the tensions such a feeling or experience is likely to 
cause by connecting them with social traditions explaining their source, but we also 
reduce the effects of whatever we name to those commonly associated with whatever it 
is we decide to call it.  Affect is the unnamed sensation producing the compulsion to 
name the relationship between experience and its psychological effect upon us is affect.  
The transformation of affect into emotion is highly dependent upon socialization and 
marks the influence of others on the ongoing and always incomplete process of 
individuation.  The sensation of affect indicates our potential to form a sociality 
otherwise than what exists.  Cosmopolitanism is one particular way of attending to affect 
and organizing its potential into social structures within a specific and limited time and 
space.  A particular instance of cosmopolitanism becomes visible politically through its 
circulation within public space as the object of attention.   
One becomes cosmopolitan, “the kind of person who chooses” which affiliations 
define one in public, as Rebecca Walkowitz puts it, through investing attention in a 
particular style of expression (40).9  Cosmopolitanism attains social capital as a valid 
way to organize the world through its circulation within an economy of attention.  Hardt 
and Negri describe the process by which feeling takes on meaning and establishes the 
basis for sociability as “affective labor” (292-293).10  The work involved in the 
transformation from sensation to affect to feeling and finally to sociality constitutes 
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affective labor (Empire 292-3; Terranova “Attention, Economy and the Brain 10).  Prior 
to such work, an affect has no communicable content.  Instead, it provokes labor that 
does make content that we can then attribute back to affect, as in the phrases “it made 
me feel this way,” or “I feel this way about it.”   
Paying attention to how an object affects us sends that object circulating in public 
space as the signs we know as feelings.  Sara Ahmed defines affect as economic because 
what we know as feelings reside neither in us nor beyond us but come into being through 
labor as we transform unrepresentable affects into communicable signs.  A moment of 
contacts leave those party to it with a trace she defines as “stickiness.”  Stickiness marks 
the effort of a transition from inside to outside, a binding of public and private (Cultural 
Politics 10).  In a similar way, Bernard Stiegler argues that “attentive forms” make up 
the intellectual scaffolding developed as we engage with collective experience, finding 
points of identification in others and using what we find in others as the materials of 
ongoing individuation.  According to Stiegler, the act of communicating private 
experience renders bits of information subject to generalization; communication always 
becomes evidence for some sort of social rule for others.  As individual experiences are 
stylized, they become socially visible as what Stiegler calls “external memory.”  
“Culture,” he explains, is “the intergenerational transmission of attentive forms invented 
in the course of individual experience which becomes collective because psychosocial 
memory is technically exteriorized and supported” (4).11  At the same time, private 
experience is the result of internalizing educational experiences, others’ attentive forms.  
What we define as most intimately interior is the product of our absorption of the 
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outside; the local and unique we feel as such because of our continual and cosmopolitan 
traversals of the boundaries we have given them.  In order to be understood, we attach 
some object to the sticky points movement and contact leave, and in doing so, define that 
object as the source of our feeling.  Doing so makes it, as a mediated object of private 
experience, an attentive form out of which others continually reconstruct sociality.  For 
example, the sight of Gavin crying is a sticky point that becomes the site of affective 
labor resulting in redrawn political boundaries within KONY2012’s viewers that locates 
individual security in humanitarian intervention in the name of the nation.  Interaction 
with his pain trains viewers how to pay attention to the pain of others and what value the 
sight of pain has for politics.  Likewise, Robbins recalls the unpleasant feelings we 
associate with the ubiquitously familiar images of Abu Ghraib to amplify positive ones 
from the accessible but less familiar Three Kings in order to redirect his readers’ 
attachments toward an affectively renovated nation.  In both cases, by making the 
consumer of the text feel, these works transform sociality.  Attention is affective and 
affect functions economically.12  Cosmopolitanism is a way of symbolizing affect’s 
circulation within global economies of attention. 
It may be second nature to think of one’s attention as a private resource, as the 
faculty by which an individual consumes experience in order to produce a sense of self.  
While it is the case that attention does this, individuation is not its sole function.  In 
addition to what our attentions produce on our behalf, they also produce abstract 
speculative value for others to whom we pay attention or who elicit our attention in the 
form of a promise of social prestige, political influence, or financial investment.  In any 
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mediated presentation of another person or people, that other can be either the author or 
source of the text or the subject represented in it.  A principal investment of attention in 
some product or idea is often necessary to its economic success.  We evaluate the way 
attention is paid to a subject according to a complex hierarchy to determine its net 
attention value.  Georg Franck suggests that one way we determine attention’s worth is 
in terms of “the duration and concentration of its expenditure” (“The Economy of 
Attention”).  Sustained focus is significant, but attention also becomes valuable as a 
result of the object toward which it is directed, from “our own esteem for the person 
from which we receive it.”  If a cause or good can secure enough of the right kind of 
attention, its success is all but guaranteed.  Franck argues that in the current economy, 
the attainment of power is not dependent on birth, talent, or material wealth.  In attention 
economies, according to Franck, one becomes powerful through prominence and 
prominent through nothing more or less than “somehow finding one’s way into the 
media.”  By his analysis, “everything increasing the medium’s attention income will be 
promoted, published, and cultivated by it,” and anything garnering such attention from 
the media itself is “by definition prominent.”  So, while media attention does convey 
power to its objects, it does so only within the economic context of that object’s 
exponential reflection of attention back onto the broadcasting medium and its interests. 
  What a medium makes prominent must promise a good return to hold its place 
in the public eye.  To do so, it must command a degree of power.  This holds true across 
all media.  Unlike material wealth, attention is continually consumed as it becomes 
available; it cannot be stored or reinvested.  As Richard Lanham explains, “Art is the 
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attention that makes stuff meaningful” (43).  The act of aesthetic production directs its 
consumers’ attentions upon an object in order to transform it continually into something 
that speaks value.  Art facilitates the economic utilization of attention for politics.  
Individual works of art create what Lanham alternately calls “attention fields” and 
“attention traps.”  The expectations we bring to a text, informed by experience, 
knowledge of the subject matter, author, or genre, determine how we understand the 
sorts of labor we are meant to work upon it in order to extract from it the correct form of 
meaning.  Art tells us how to evaluate the value of those to whom we pay attention.  
“The more commonplace and physical the object teaching the lesson,” which is taken to 
an extreme degree in cosmopolitan literature, in which people different from oneself are 
the objects of art, “the more [the art-object] taught the final insignificance of physical 
objects” (43).  Being the object of extensive mass-media attention effectively guarantees 
the abstract productivity of its subject, which, in theory, can radically redefine one’s 
political, social, and economic standing, but the lesson these objects seem to teach is that 
humanity resides all around us, devaluing any individual’s humanity, and especially 
those placed on display.    
Attention is the means by which affect produces sociality and sociality, as the 
basis for political power, is the value-product of our consumption of works of media as 
they circulate within public space.  In the case of KONY2012, the attention of viewers 
appears suspect and childish to its critics because the video’s valuation of this attention 
challenges corporate and class-based political structures that govern the international 
economy with a radical new model centered on the feelings of individual consumers.  
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The new attentive form by which it communicates also implies a new process through 
which social and cultural capital convert to economic capital and political power.  The 
appeal to feelings rather than ideas, productions, or actions diverts attention from one 
channel of distribution to another.  At the same time, the video invests its challenge in 
renewing exactly those sites of power that its most likely supporters have compellingly 
identified as sources of global inequality, racism, exploitation, and imperialism.  It 
represents a moment of the potential for difference, which I argue is cosmopolitan, one 
that is reincorporated immediately into existing structures of power upon its realization 
as a social action capable of mobilizing economic capital.     
While America is not becoming cosmopolitan, in the banal sense expressed in 
phrases like “we’re all just human,” in either reality or representation, Americans and 
American institutions do desire to make both appear as such.  In order to change its 
image, America must first change those feelings individuals tend to attach to it.  This 
process can occur through textual consumption.  In Imagined Communities, Benedict 
Anderson argues that the novel became the dominant form of narrative precisely as the 
modern nation came to prominence.  Anderson proposes that a community is defined in 
terms of the way it interacts with media.  His print capitalism created a network of 
cultural consumption that was regulated according to a particular bounded space.  A set 
of people interacting with a shared set of texts will likely share the perception that they 
share a set of values, or an identity, that may or may not actually be expressed in what 
they collectively read.  The novel could serve as the primary means by which the nation 
was imagined as endowed with particularity and boundedness because it enables the 
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circulation of specific ways of encoding affect within a circumscribed population and 
norms that population’s affective response to specific events in time using those codes it 
renders legible.  As the “imagined” of Anderson’s title suggests, the commonality that 
emerges from consumption is not objective, but rather exists only within an individual’s 
perception.  Likewise, the content of a community, or its identity, is not static, but rather 
changes in accordance with whatever makes an individual feel in a particular moment.  
Solidarity is a response to affective stimuli within a set of texts that are, or are perceived 
to be, shared.   
My understanding of cosmopolitanism as dependent upon sustained attention 
relies upon a key distinction between a public and an identity.  Identity has what Michael 
Warner calls “manifest positive content” (75).  As such, its legibility relies upon its locus 
of production more than any attention paid to it by those who claim it.  Identity is not a 
matter of circulation.  Whatever an identity’s content may be is determined and given 
fixed value through the power of some independent institution (75).  Identity is the 
currency of social capital.  One has identity regardless of individual attention or activity.  
Identity transfers from an institution to an individual.  A person either is or is not a 
particular race and a nation “includes its members whether they are awake or asleep, 
sober or drunk, sane or deranged, alert or comatose” and, we might add, willing to 
belong or not (87).  One does not acquire identity through effort or devotion but the 
possession of an identity does provide an individual with a source of social capital.13  A 
public is a different matter.  As Warner explains, to belong to a public requires “active 
uptake.”  Publics are a matter of attention.  They exist only “by virtue of address” (87).  
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A public is a “virtual entity” that commences “with the moment of attention ... and 
cease[s] to exist when attention is no longer predicated” (88).  A public generates 
cultural value through attention; it has no value of its own.  As such, membership to a 
public does not normalize an individual’s sense of self.  Instead, one becomes a member 
of some public by bringing into proximity those attentive forms and private experiences 
that define oneself with those of others through paying attention to specific discourse 
communities. 
One reason cosmopolitanism has become a topic of interest recently may be that 
our attention has shifted from the novel and other forms of print media, along with the 
sorts of publics they sustain, to more widely and rapidly transmitted digital media.  
These new media redraw the temporal and spatial boundaries within which expressions 
hold currency.  With the emergence of new media, which circulate across different 
networks, it makes sense that individuals committed to the novel would also express 
concern for the nation that, to some extent, is its project.  While not all contemporary 
American novelists use the novel to defend the traditional identity or purpose of the 
nation, the future of the nation is a topic of constant attention in recent literature.   
Cosmopolitanism, unlike Anderson’s nationalism, is not bound to a place or 
time.  As such, cosmopolitanism is not a condition materialized according to easily 
regulated circulation of cultural artifacts.  Following Tiziana Terranova’s articulation of 
network culture, I define cosmopolitanism in terms of a set of principles useful for living 
within a multiplicity of provisional cultural networks.  The technology in which media is 
encoded or distributed is not what matters to the organization of community or culture so 
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much as a shift in our perceived relationship to those media.  What I would like to 
suggest here is that we are more frequently utilizing texts as a way to gauge our 
relationship to others, in terms of how we feel about them, their conditions, their 
histories, and their ideas, rather than as a source of information about their and our own 
identities.  Terranova gives a useful example of the significance of this shift using a 
contrast between journalism and marketing.  A journalist wants to know his or her 
subject in order to create an accurate and comprehensive, ethically responsible 
representation, whereas a PR rep handles the same content in a way designed to generate 
maximum affective response.  While our gut reaction may be to side with ethics and 
journalism over sleazy marketing, and while this feeling is largely justified on the basis 
of marketing’s monetization of any and all content, Terranova points out that in order to 
create the journalistic, objective portrait, one must impose stasis upon the social and 
political scene and claim the power to generate knowledge about the other.  To the 
contrary, a subject in motion cannot be known as such.  Its meaning can only be 
captured by creating an artificial vantage point.  Journalistic representation, then, only 
depicts what Terranova calls life on a macro-scale, or averages, generalizations, and 
stereotypes that cannot account for the dynamic connectivity of life.  The guise of ethical 
sensitivity, within a networked society, is a justification of an unacceptable regulation of 
the formation of culture.   
The perspective indicated in PR addresses a provisional relation that does not 
aim for comprehensive knowledge of the other.  It is attuned to shifts, changes of state, 
and the “constant reinvention of life” (Network Culture 37).  It does not capture a single 
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point, but traces the development of relationships in order to anticipate shifts in the 
social environment.14  As a further example, Terranova considers the effect of the 
Internet upon politics.  A critical perspective identifies digital networks as imposing 
homogeneity upon humanity (a form of negative cosmopolitan identity) because it 
enables the global distribution of an information set.  This conclusion is the logical 
extension of Anderson’s thesis regarding print capitalism and the modern nation.  
Terranova objects that the Internet subverts such efforts to produce macro-scale images 
of life because it is not a homogeneous global network, but a “network of networks … 
entailing the interoperability of heterogeneous systems” (53).  In it, people can come and 
go, take on new personas, change locations, add and modify content, and all nearly 
instantaneously.  It is a set of principles guiding an ever-changing set of dynamic 
interactions without having to reduce such interactions to an exhausting quest for 
knowledge.  The Internet never materializes into a static thing, or a place where 
relationships are firmly established.  It is, instead, a model for a continually becoming 
cosmopolitan sociality.15    
Every society has its own paths to individuation, or attentive forms, and the value 
of any bit of information or potentially sticky sign, when circulating globally, 
communicates differently depending on the attentive forms cultivated at its site of 
reception, not its site of production.  Signs legible as cosmopolitan, or pertaining to any 
other subject position, take on social value not by merit of the ideas they convey, their 
information, but by the fact of their capacity to attract and hold attention.  If our 
individual acts of attention are what give particular narratives about belonging their 
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social capital, they form the basis for a globalized attention economy.  The sociability 
that is the ultimate good of work involving human contact and care  enables Empire, a 
metaphor for neoliberal capitalism, to regulate populations within an abstract, 
deterritorialized system.  What Empire accumulates, Hardt and Negri argue, is not 
material commodities, but rather attentions, which alter fundamentally as a result of their 
direction upon a particular object.  This seems to hold true for Invisible Children’s 
interventions into U.S. affairs and Ugandan sovereignty.  The accumulation of biopower 
through attention is not imperialistic, Hardt and Negri suggest, because as networked 
power expands, the sovereignty deriving community from it “does not annex or destroy 
the other powers it faces, but on the contrary opens itself to them, including them in the 
network,” just as KONY2012 builds a cosmopolitan network by inviting viewers to feel 
for the world (166).  However, the decentralized network of Empire appears more as a 
way of dematerializing the image of imperialistic management than as any meaningful 
redistribution of power.  The way attention accrues value within the immaterial economy 
Hardt and Negri describe also operates according to the logic of identity.  Attention to 
information cements the link between individual experience and externalization.  Their 
affective labor effaces the economic inequality underlying globalization; it enables an 
object to seem as if it were the source of a feeling that circulates globally just as ordinary 
commodification involves the effacement of ordinary labor.  Empire appears other than 
imperial only because its expansion is the product of labor performed upon a text at the 
site of its reception.  What Empire represents, then, is not a norming of identity or 
values, but rather, and more insidiously, of the attentive forms that allow values to take 
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shape through affective labor.  Further, as Terranova observes, one consequence of 
conceptualizing attention as a scarce economic resource is the cognitive impoverishment 
of those who bestow value upon information through their affective labor (“Attention, 
Economy and the Brain”13).  For example, by paying attention to American mass media, 
global consumers are hypothetically unable to attend to local culture and American 
consumers cannot notice global media.  This is another common objection to 
KONY2012’s methods.  Instead, the economic results of attention, “sociality as such,” 
cannot be regulated (10).  To the contrary, localized acts of attending to American 
cultural texts transform them into something different than whatever message they might 
have created in any other context.  Paying attention is the ongoing process of 
individuation that gives people a sense of self, however unstable that may be.  The act of 
paying attention brings to bear the subject’s myriad attachments and loyalties upon any 
text within a complex matrix of social values.    
Take a final example from Robbins, this time, in his “Introduction” to 
Cosmopolitics.  There, he suggests cosmopolitanism involves our actual material 
connections with people around the world.  The fact of my ownership of a television 
produced in Asia constitutes this sort of cosmopolitan network.  I think, to the contrary, 
that this is not quite the case.  The error he makes is in reducing the presence of the TV 
in my living room to a sign of a single social network that establishes a stable 
relationship upon which I can then erect something like cosmopolitan or global culture 
by becoming aware of it.  My personal act of awareness solidifies my place in the world, 
anchoring it upon the also solidified place of the imagined third-world worker who 
 25 
 
becomes an iconic sign for whatever affects prompt my production of cosmopolitan 
sociality on his or her behalf.  This invisible sign of the worker burdens me with the 
responsibility to make that relationship one I can feel good about.  I agree with Robbins 
that the television and its presence in my life do inspire a moment of attentive 
awareness.  However, what makes the phenomenon Robbins identifies a cosmopolitan 
moment, and not merely “actually existing cosmopolitanism,” is my recognition, or 
laboring, within it that a life that exists or existed had a hand in something that is now a 
part of mine, along with the empathy that occurs when I pay attention to the human 
means by which objects circulate in this way.  The TV does not radiate 
cosmopolitanism, as if it were an appeal to a particular mode of political organization.  
My understanding of the TV as cosmopolitan indicates my internalization of a specific 
structure of attention and subsequent production of social value in a particular direction.   
The way I pay attention to the TV’s presence in my life informs how I situate 
myself within a complex global community.  My reading of the TV as an indication of 
cosmopolitan possibility indicates a particular interpretive strategy.  My interpretation of 
its presence in my life does not have to result in cosmopolitanism, but it can.  Likewise, 
my attentiveness may produce a variety of cosmopolitanisms in response to the TV in a 
number of moments or may begin as cosmopolitanism and then become something else.  
The work of being attentive transforms my understanding of a global sociality, 
effectively producing a state or relation contingent not only upon the continuation of my 
attentiveness, but also of the affective tenor of that attention.  Cosmopolitanism does not 
transcend the moment it makes perceptible, but is endlessly remade according to 
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different affective needs through our attention to real or imaginary others.  Even when it 
feels most substantial and efficacious, a cosmopolitanism does not constitute an identity 
or something out of which people can construct an historicized sense of solidarity.  
Instead, cosmopolitanism is an effect of intentionality and attentiveness to a specific 
cause and its temporality.  Being cosmopolitan in Robbins’s example of the television 
means not simply possessing a good that has moved across the world; this is an indicator 
of global economy and requires nothing of the person in front of the TV.  Instead, it 
means having a feeling regarding distant peoples and places as a result of how one has 
stylized life.  It is an action directed upon the organization of sociality in response to 
affect.  Cosmopolitanism enables moments of potential solidarity produced through the 
work of feeling.  This feeling makes visible those structures whereby the exercise and 
movement of political power and economic capital link affective labor and attentiveness 
to immobile forms of cultural capital like nation, race, or ethnicity to produce solidarity.  
Cosmopolitanism is a form of attentiveness to power that calls into question the 
production of loyalty to identity from affective labor as well as loyalty as the basis for 
ethical sociality.  It does not necessarily mean a turn from those forms of solidarity that 
become the objects of its interest in the movement of power. 
Thinking of cosmopolitanism from the perspective of affect and attention allows 
me to approach my second point, that American literature is renegotiating its place 
within a globalized world along cosmopolitan lines by recasting affective responses to 
its public image.  The texts I consider reterritorialize American claims to power 
previously invested in narratives of manifest destiny, American exceptionalism, and 
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superpower status that have become unappealing with the popularization of post-
modernist and post-colonial critiques of economic globalization and identity.  As this 
process of negotiation is born out in literature, and as the example of KONY2012 shows, 
cosmopolitanism, despite its historical connotations, does not necessarily suggest 
progression towards or realization of material or political equality.  Instead, it indicates 
movement toward a society in which all people are potentially in contact with all others 
at any given moment, even if that contact occurs largely at the level of fantasy through 
interaction with carefully staged narratives and images.  Cosmopolitanism of this sort 
may or may not actually result in a more open or equal society and may or may not 
involve actual challenges to how the boundaries of the world are drawn.  
Cosmopolitanism, from this angle, is more concerned with the sources of identity, their 
political and economic management, and the potential value of identity as it moves 
across space and time than with the conditions it may or may not actualize, at least in the 
short-term.  The texts and authors I consider are invested in the ongoing value of 
America as an identity both nationally and globally relevant, its ongoing maintenance 
through shifting media contexts, and its justification as the basis for international affairs.  
In Chapter 2, “Nationalist Cosmopolitanism, Mediaphobia, and Attention’s 
Forms,” I argue that while the production and distribution of texts does condition the 
limits in which individuation occurs, individual acts of consumption bring to bear an 
indeterminable multiplicity of factors upon a text such that consumers always 
appropriate the materials of mediated networks to unpredictable ends.  Particular media 
are not responsible for specific types of individuals or communities, but do affect the 
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limits within which both are elaborated.  Theoretical speculation on the effects of 
particular media upon our capacity to pay attention and on the relationship between 
specific attentive forms and forms of sociability and solidarity limits individual 
attentiveness to its potential to contribute to local political economies.  It does so by 
managing public discourse about acceptable feelings for nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism and by positing a causal link between media consumption and socio-
political habits.  Tracing the concern for media’s forms, attention’s forms, and society’s 
forms across philosophical and literary texts, I reveal how critical discourse on attention 
and the effects of its various forms consistently theorizes attention in terms of its 
potential to produce economically quantifiable effects that are linked to specific forms of 
solidarity.  Because individual thinkers consistently prefer one form of attention over 
others, these discussions neglect the potential for subjects within mixed economies of 
attention, or of cosmopolitan attentiveness, to restructure productively the relationship 
between national and global solidarity as cosmopolitan.  My critique of the debate 
between N. Katherine Hayles and Bernard Stiegler demonstrates how their production of 
a hierarchy within attention’s forms, linking what Hayles calls deep attention to reading 
and hyper attention to electronic media, identifies emergent forms of attentive labor as 
qualitatively different from existing or normative forms, treats that labor as a threat to 
the affective basis of the imagined community of the nation, and attempts to 
reincorporate affective and attentive labor performed upon new media within the nation.  
I suggest this process is analogous to the overtly nationalist concern David Foster 
Wallace expresses in his essays, which similarly relate the emergence of television and 
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the internet to a perceived decline in civic virtues.  By contrast, Hari Kunzru, who claims 
Wallace as an influence, engages with the transnational cinema to show how deep 
attention, the flip-side to Hayle’s hyper attention, is equally problematic for the way it 
filters out the world’s unique contexts and depreciates the value of difference. 
Chapter 3, “Humanitarian Interest and Interesting Humans,” turns from issues 
related to specific forms of media and their role in making the boundaries of America to 
rationalizations for American representations of its own involvement in global conflicts.  
Working with a mix of ethical philosophy, especially the work of Emmanuel Levinas, 
critical theory, novels, and comics journalism, I argue that humanitarian discourse 
operates within a complex attention economy founded on the production of human 
interest in foreign bodies whose labor must reward American readers who pay attention 
to representations of their suffering.  The economic dynamic of human interest creates 
an impossible demand for the cosmopolitan writer, who must both exhibit self-conscious 
awareness of embeddedness in uneven political relationships, attempt to overcome 
political or cultural differences, and exploit representations of conflict and poverty to 
inspire the economically productive feelings in readers.  Where the Levinasian ethical 
encounter is based on what Chouliaraki describes as humanitarianism of “salvation from 
inhuman conditions,” I argue that Palestine, Joe Sacco’s first work of comics journalism, 
sets up a complex meta-journalistic critique of American and humanitarian journalistic 
production of human interest as a means of attracting consumer attention.  The interest 
aspect of journalism determines the character the represented world may or may not take 
as it appears in American journalism.  While this critical stance is evident in Sacco’s 
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work, he also ends up replicating its structure through his very attempt to steer clear of 
typical journalism by creating a more intimate portrait of ordinary, real-life Palestinians.  
He does so by reducing them from figures of violent political spectacle to bearers of 
everyday life for whom readers may take sympathy, and consequently feel affinity.   I 
contrast the humanitarian dynamic at work in Sacco’s graphic narrative with a reading of 
Aleksandar Hemon’s novel, The Lazarus Project.  Hemon’s work concerns a Bosnian 
American attempting to cope with the trauma of missing out on the experience of civil 
war while also struggling to make a space for himself in America.  Where Sacco cannot 
but make his Palestinians interesting on behalf of American readers and potential 
responsibility-takers, Hemon’s Brik needs nothing so much as to escape the notice of 
American philanthropists who demand he perform to their expectations of a refugee.  
Human interest, by my reading of Hemon’s work, is an attempt to manipulate relations 
of power for individual purposes.  From my comparison of the ethical construction of 
representation and intervention, I suggest that cosmopolitan solidarity inevitably requires 
some sort of ethical grounding, but, as is the case with its political formation, becomes 
ethically unjustifiable the moment it shifts from a case of abstract potential for 
representation or interaction to either in concrete flesh. 
My final chapter, “American Fiction, Testimony, and Cosmopolitan Trauma,” 
engages further with trauma theory, humanitarian discourse, and novels by Jonathan 
Safran Foer and Karen Tei Yamashita.  In it I argue that humanitarian literature’s turn 
toward sentimentality, in an effort to effectively position itself within a globalized 
attention economy, redirects the attentiveness it elicits from calls to act on political 
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conditions sustaining transnational inequality toward moments of pleasurable self-
reflection that confirm the value of the nation to a pitiable world.  My central claim in 
this chapter is that by incorporating the authority and appearance of nonfiction to 
fictionalized accounts of U.S. concern for international atrocity, American fiction 
represents global sites that feel autonomous but remain dependent upon American 
affective infrastructure to decode history.  Foer and Yamashita package their texts as 
fictional, lowering the stakes of their works’ interventions into the representation of the 
Holocaust and Japanese immigration policies, respectively.  Nonetheless, both texts 
make strong affective claims about their geopolitical and historical subjects and do so in 
order to elicit political reactions from American readers.  By making a fictional account 
something for which American readers can feel equally moved as direct encounters with 
foreignness, these texts circumvent Americans’ need to pay attention to the world in 
order to feel a part of a cosmopolitan society.  I argue that Foer’s and Yamashita’s 
deliberate blurring of the difference between fact and fiction, historical record and 
personal feeling allows them to manipulate the mechanisms through which affect adds 
value to specific forms of solidarity that align the feeling of cosmopolitan solidarity with 
a politics of American exceptionalism. 
Notes 
1 As Josh Kron and J. David Goodman noted in the New York Times, “Not until halfway 
through the film does Mr. Russell mention that “the war” he describes is no longer 
happening in Uganda, where he sets the documentary.”  In fact, as they explain, “The 
Lord’s Resistance Army left the country years ago, migrating to more fragile nations like 
the Democratic Republic of Congo,” which receives no notice in the video, and thus no 
benefit from KONY2012’s viewers.  Dayo Olopode goes as far as to suggest that the 
“Kony video is a … distraction” from the problems Ugandans are actually concerned 
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with and Mark Kersten of Salon condemned the video as encouraging a bland variety of 
“slacktivism.” 
2  Its many and vocal critics readily noted the organization’s participation in what was 
frequently described as an emerging “White Savior Industrial Complex,” citing its 
imperialistic discourse and Invisible Children’s use of donations for executive salaries 
and media production rather than direct investments in the community it claimed to help.  
Jamilah King elaborates on this trope in her article, “There’s Money in the White Savior 
Complex.” 
3  Social and cultural capital are concepts first developed by Pierre Bourdieu in “The 
Forms of Capital.”  Cultural capital is value that one possesses as a result of personal 
cultivation, emblematized in the conferral of official educational titles.  Social capital 
results from an individual’s more or less permanent ties to institutionalized forms of 
visibility.  Both depend on the individual’s embodiment and are generally expressed in 
terms of race, class, gender, and nationality (243-255).  Bordieu argues that the exclusive 
basis by which we evaluate life according to economic capital depends on economic 
capital’s ability to present cultural and social capital as disinterested.  Doing so effaces 
the extent to which an individual’s opportunities to accumulate economic capital are 
largely conditioned by his or her possession of class markers.  Social and cultural capital 
facilitate the production of economic capital and the work of paying attention to 
embodiment is what sustains the value of particular forms of social capital.  
Consequently, attention is a productive, economic activity with wide-ranging political 
consequences. 
4  This dynamic is what Hannah Arendt describes as a “politics of pity.”  A politics of 
pity divides those who suffer from those who do not, and, as Luc Boltanski explains, 
identifies the sight of suffering, or images of suffering, as the source of pity (3).  A 
politics of pity calls viewers to feel moved by what they see whereas an opposed politics 
of justice calls them to take action.  Boltanski suggests “the urgency of the action needed 
to be taken to bring an end to the suffering invoked always prevails over considerations 
of justice” (5). The result of pity is the production of unpleasant emotions and any action 
arising is motivated by the need to resolve them.  Humanitarian action is a means to 
eliminate the power of the image of the other to produce negative affects in oneself and 
to return from a state of agitated discomfort to one of passive contentment. 
5  Luc Boltanski describes this paradigm of humanitarian appeal, following Hannah 
Arendt, as a “Politics of pity.”  I engage with Boltanski’s use of this term at greater 
length in chapter 4. 
6  Rebecca Walkowitz observes that by the twentieth century, cosmopolitan had become 
a derogatory term, simultaneously implying “a lack of positive identity” that comes from 
rooted citizenship and “a surfeit of abject identity” associated with the Jewish diaspora.  
Further, for the national, cosmopolitanism posed a threat that “foreigners were passing 
as locals” and worse that “foreigners might become locals by learning to be natural or by 
changing the conditions of nature.” (35).  Where Walkowitz’s emphasis on 
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cosmopolitanism’s potential for inventiveness frees the cosmopolitan subject from the 
limitations of birth, Bruce Robbins describes Diogenes’s cynical brand of 
cosmopolitanism as a refusal of “particular political obligations … declaring loyalty 
instead to a more universal common, however hypothetical” (Perpetual War 11).  As 
Robin Hard explains, such negative readings of cosmopolitanism are largely tied to 
Renaissance England’s “rediscovery” of cynicism and the interpretation at the time of 
Diogenes’s performances as outright misanthropy rather than the political critiques they 
were (ix-x). 
7  Ulrich Beck argues that globalization evokes developments without consequences for 
first world residents while cosmopolitanization involves neoliberal capitalism’s forced 
inclusion of people around the world in its globalizing vision and emphasizes globally 
distributed effects.  To clarify, Beck describes Europeans who purchase organs from 
Third World “donors.”  Their literal inclusion of Third World bodies within their own 
constitutes cosmopolitanization (643-5).  Cosmopolitanism is a set of ideals describing 
global unity that serves as the vehicle for a nationalist tenor within appeals centering the 
nation within globalization.  Cosmopolitanization reflects the material reality of 
interconnectedness, whether acknowledged or not.  Departing from Beck, but retaining 
his useful terminology, I prefer to think of cosmopolitanization as requiring an active 
investment of attention to the ways in which one incorporates or is incorporated into 
translocal and global forms of community. 
8  If Robbins’ effort to redeem American nationalism by cosmopolitanizing it 
characterizes one variant of cosmopolitan discourse, then another is that of Dipesh 
Chakarbarty, Homi Bhabha, and Walter Mignolo, whose critical cosmopolitanisms put 
the term to work to produce post-colonial solidarities.   
9  Walkowitz argues that we should think of cosmopolitanism as a style.  There are many 
advantages in thinking of cosmopolitanism as a style rather than a state of things.  A 
style has no set content, but is a sign we use to signal our participation or interest in 
particular fields of discourse.  If we think this way, cosmopolitanism becomes something 
with which to accessorize oneself in order to express affiliation with or feeling for some 
cause, belief, or way of being in the world.  Like any style, what makes a particular way 
of adorning oneself legible as cosmopolitanism depends upon the ways in which the 
public attends to an individual’s expressions.  As such, cosmopolitanism, like language, 
is transformed through the individual’s act of paying attention to it, of elaborating a style 
of expression, but also exists both prior to and beyond the individual.    To achieve the 
status of stylization, however, a way of being need only attain legibility.  One makes 
expressions legible by trafficking in institutionalized signs that create a pragmatic 
stability.  We find a telling example of the shortcomings of style as the basis for 
conceptualizing cosmopolitanism, particularly as a form of action, once again, in the 
KONY2012 video.  In addition to spreading its message through word of mouth, the 
video’s major action plan encouraged viewers to purchase and wear its red rubber 
wristbands and t-shirts with a distinctive inverted pyramid logo, which would signify 
insider knowledge of its policy points.  The problem with this technique is that 
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transforms action into membership and defines membership in terms of stylistic choices 
that require the viewer/wearer nothing beyond the construction of a message-bearing 
surface: the message becomes directed toward the purchase of clothing rather than 
changing international policy.  It does attract attention, which is the impetus for forming 
a public, and even converts attention to material value, but does so without focusing 
either, or their attendant affective labor, on political action. 
10  As Hardt and Negri understand it, affective labor now forms the pinnacle of capitalist 
production within a networked information economy.  Michael Goldhaber makes a 
compelling case that the reverse is more accurate.  As he writes, “economies are 
governed by what is scarce, and information ... is not only abundant, but overflowing.”  
Instead, he proposes the attention paid to a particular object of information is what holds 
value within the system of immaterial labor Hardt and Negri describe. 
11  By technically, Stiegler means it is supported through the technology of mediation, in 
our era, in the form of the printed word. 
12  In The Transmission of Affect, Teresa Brennan goes so far as to suggest we think of 
attention as a rough synonym for love (32). 
13  Cultural capital is a matter of maintaining identity-based power structures.  As 
Ghassan Hage explains, “[the] field of national power is …  a field where people’s 
position of power is related to the amount of national capital they accumulate” (61).  
This national capital is defined in terms of racial markers like skin color, ethnicity, and 
more mutable attributes like accent and beliefs.  Within any social space there are a 
variety of bases for cultural capital, existing within hierarchies of relative power and 
prestige, ranging from dominant to aspirant.  For Hage, “while the naturalisation of the 
dominant capital works to undermine the legitimacy of any other aspiring capital, the 
naturalisation of the privileged hold the dominant group has on the dominant capital 
aims at creating symbolic barriers to its accumulation by the less capital-endowed 
groups” (62). 
14  Brian Massumi makes a similar claim in Parables for the Virtual.  He argues that 
within a framework of identity, one can only occupy a set, predetermined array of static 
positions, each of which is always-already ideologically determined. While one can 
change points of identification systemic change is invalidated by identity’s emphasis on 
stable starting and ending points of meaningfulness.  From this perspective, a project like 
vernacular cosmopolitanism goes about the underlying causes of the issues of injustice 
that cosmopolitanism generally seeks to address from the wrong angle because, while it 
does validate the indeterminacy of identity and emphasize its fluidity, it does so by 
simply substituting a different set of possible points amongst which individuals may 
move (3-8). What Massumi would have us consider in place of identity is instead the 
ongoing process of becoming that he compares with physical trajectory.  Becoming 
constantly changes in light of ongoing events in the surrounding environment but is also 
informed by its current and previous locations.  At the same time, a present location 
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exists only as a convenient abstraction for information gathering.  It can only be gained 
by ignoring the movement itself. 
15  Paulo Virno makes a similar case for the way people are organized in the world under 
post-Fordist capitalism, in what he calls the multitude.  For Virno, the multitude exists in 
opposition to the state, which reduces a plurality of individuals to one unified political 
will.  Unlike the state, a multitude is a many upon which individuality is continually, and 
provisionally, elaborated.  In the multitude, he argues, “the distinction between ‘public’ 
and ‘private’ is in no way validated,” because the two are mutually productive and 
reliant upon a general capacity for becoming (25).  What comprises the common of the 
multitude is not a determinate or specifiable quality that could form a clear boundary 
between individual and community, but rather a capacity Virno refers to as “general 
intellect” (40-41).  In making his claim for the flexibility and expansiveness of the 
multitude, Virno draws upon Gilbert Simondon’s theory of individuation (78-9).  
Simondon argues that individuation is an always partial, never completed process that 
undergoes continual change in response to shifts in social and environmental milieus.  
Further, he suggests individuation emerges as an elaboration of what he refers to as the 
pre-individual.  He gives the example of molding a brick from clay (Combes 5-6).  
Where we tend to think of the mold either as bringing out the clay’s inner brickness or of 
the clay becoming a brick through the act of being molded, Simondon argues we are 
wrong.  Instead, he proposes that the clay “takes form in accordance to the mold” (qtd. in 
Combes; 5).  As Muriel Combes explains, its matter “is never naked matter, any more 
than form is pure; rather, it is as a materialized form that the mold can act on matter that 
has been prepared” (5-6).  Individuation, Simondon suggests, is similar.  Under his 
system of individuation, the subject is the result of careful attention to an ever-changing 
environment.  People share the common capacity to learn and shift through attention, but 
are not reducible to an identity that solidifies them politically, as in the Hobbsean state.  
We might define the common capacity to pay attention to localized and constantly 
shifting expressions of what it means to be human at the heart of Virno’s multitude as 
cosmopolitan. 
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CHAPTER II 
NATIONALIST COSMOPOLITANISM, MEDIAPHOBIA, AND ATTENTION’S 
FORMS 
In my introduction, I challenged the idea that a community’s form, which is 
affected by networks of cultural distribution, can be regulated solely according to 
systems of production and from the side of distribution rather than consumption.  My 
own claim is that while the production and distribution of texts does condition the limits 
in which individuation occurs, individual acts of consumption bring to bear an 
indeterminable multiplicity of factors upon a text such that consumers always 
appropriate the materials of mediated networks to unpredictable ends.1  Given the global 
circulation of texts, people’s feelings for a community, like the nation, are cosmopolitan, 
and not regulated by a central authority or limited to a clearly defined tradition.  
Particular media are not responsible for specific types of individuals or communities, but 
do affect the limits within which both are elaborated.  These limits exist in a complex 
and fluid networked relation rather than a linear or bounded structure.  By focusing on 
issues of media and individuation in this chapter, I trace the ways that speculation on the 
effects of particular media upon our capacity to pay attention and on the relationship 
between specific attentive forms and forms of sociability and solidarity limits individual 
attentiveness to its potential to contribute to local political economies.  It does so by 
managing public discourse about acceptable feelings for nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism, posing a division between the two, and by positing too direct a link 
between media consumption and socio-political habits.  I argue that because writing on 
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attention and the effects of its various forms consistently theorizes attention in terms of 
its potential to produce economically quantifiable effects that are linked to specific 
forms of solidarity and because individual critics consistently prefer the value produced 
through engaging in one form of attention over others, these discussions neglect the 
potential for subjects within mixed economies of attention, or of cosmopolitan 
attentiveness, to restructure the relationship between national and global solidarity as 
productively cosmopolitan.   
Where critical discussion becomes mired in false dichotomies between national 
and global solidarities, old and new media, and various forms of paying attention 
associated with each, literary texts take up the concerns these relationships express in 
more complex ways.  To show the centrality of critical concern for attention’s 
vicissitudes and the role of media upon them to larger conversations about the state of 
America and its role in the cosmopolitanization of global spaces, I analyze texts by 
David Foster Wallace and Hari Kunzru.  Both authors are intensely preoccupied with the 
ways in which America and American media structure the possibilities for individuation 
within a global attention economy.  Like the critics I consider in the chapter’s first 
section, Wallace’s texts play off the fear of uncertainty and the belief that America’s 
diversification of attentive possibilities, or what N. Katherine Hayles calls “hyper 
attention,” dilutes the potency of Americans’ sense of civic responsibility.2  New media 
and the new ideas and peoples to which it exposes national consumers, 
cosmopolitanizing their visions of the world, are a plague to Wallace’s nation.   By 
contrast, Kunzru engages with transnational cinema and contract laborers to show how 
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deep attention, the flip-side to Hayles’s hyper attention, is equally problematic for the 
way it filters out the world’s unique contexts and depreciates the value of difference.   
I understand the work of the critics and authors I discuss as negotiating between 
Jacques Rancière’s concepts of consensus and dissensus.  Each allows for media and 
consuming individuals to make visible ideas about humanity across varying ranges of 
geopolitical space.  From Rancière’s perspective, there is no natural means by which one 
person can claim the authority to rule over another.  Democracy is the rule by those who 
have no qualification to rule and politics is the constant practice of disrupting given 
distributions or partitions of the social, according to which people and their capacity to 
express voice are given value (Hatred of Democracy 40-41).  Consensus is the 
termination of politics through a reduction of the political to the policing of a normal or 
natural state of things that prevents a particular distribution of the sensible from coming 
under question.  For example, one of my aims is to challenge the idea that the nation is a 
body unified by a coherent circuit of textual distribution and consumption.  The idea that 
it is such prevents critical observations to the contrary, which note the influence of 
cosmopolitan and chaotic sources upon trans-individuation, from gaining cultural value.  
Consensus assumes the natural right of an order of power in which some have the 
capacity to produce effects upon others, i.e. that American authors should define the 
conversations in which America gains its identity by merit of their birth or citizenship.  
These ideas about natural identity are also caught up with race, gender, class, and 
sexuality.   
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Dissensus denies the validity of any foundation upon which a particular order of 
power or distribution of the sensible is grounded.  It is not, Rancière explains, a simple 
insistence upon engaging in discussions of conflicting interests, or of the antagonistic 
democracy of Laclau and Mouffe, but in a more complex way, examining developing 
oppositions “between logics that count the parties and parts of the community in 
different ways” (“10 Theses on Politics” 35).  Dissensual politics challenge the 
institutional basis for forms of social capital and social capital’s linkage to individuals’ 
potential to earn economic capital and to enjoy basic rights.  Democracy, Rancière 
argues, is a paradoxical institution of politics.  On the one hand, democracy represents 
the anarchic potential for rule by those with no particular qualification to do so.  In the 
Greek polis, democratic representatives were chosen by lot.  Their values or positions 
were not taken into consideration.  Any citizen had equal possibility of speaking for the 
community and this prevented the regulation of political representation by institutional 
power.  On the other hand, we claim to spread democracy precisely by exerting the 
power to regulate its first manifestation.  Recent neoliberal discourse characterizes 
democracy as a well-ordered society, free of conflict, but achieves this end through 
predictable succession within parties.  The radical democracy Rancière envisions is not 
committed to any particular order or identity, even those of the oppressed, poor, or 
otherwise marginalized, as he qualifies.  Instead, democracy is for the demos, whatever 
portion of humanity power excludes.  As such, democracy represents a constant 
refashioning of the social according to provisional renderings of the human.  In the 
readings I develop in this chapter, I trace the way each author moves from a recognition 
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of media’s democratic potential for dissensual politics toward consensus, starting with 
the recent work on attention by Hayles and Bernard Stiegler and moving to Wallace and 
Kunzru, through the evaluation each makes of the politics of American commercial 
media and the value of various forms of paying attention. 
Mediaphobia and Attention’s Forms 
 The main trend I am concerned with is the tendency to associate the proliferation 
of media with a transformation of people’s psychological capacity to process reality 
within processes of individuation and the subsequent assumption that particular attentive 
forms exist in tension with one another within an ongoing struggle to determine the 
character of larger political bodies.  In her influential article, “Deep Attention and Hyper 
Attention,” N. Katherine Hayles elaborates upon this paradigm shift, providing the 
vocabulary I adopt for the remainder of the chapter.  Stiegler also takes up Hayles’s 
terms as he develops a phenomenological account of the role media plays in the 
production of structures of care that I described in the Introduction.  I argue he mobilizes 
his theory of structures of care in ways that restrict humanity’s development to 
established forms of communication and in the interests of traditional values associated 
with particular classes and national traditions.  I situate Hayles’s terms and Stiegler’s 
methods within the context of an economy of mixed attentive forms in order to entertain 
the possibility of new media and new attentive forms as a form of cosmopolitan and 
democratic critique.  Their strategies for integrating and managing emergent media 
according to the formalization of attentive strategies within an abstract economy is 
analogous to the literary concerns for the nation within globalization I identify in both 
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Wallace and Kunzru.  While the comments both critics make on the value of particular 
forms of media, which are the materials real people use to make meaningful selves, are 
not necessarily always or directly tied to devaluations of particular types of persons, 
each invariably ends up making such appeals at some level.  As the appeal to identity 
underlying these critiques shows, discussions of how to manage the effects of new media 
upon a community advance a politics of consensus (which according to Rancière is not 
technically politics anymore).  Hayles’s and Stiegler’s theorization of attention as a 
community’s economic resource in need of careful management creates a false dilemma 
between forms of political organization that is played out in polemics about forms of 
attention or types of media.  This does not have to be the case.  It is more productive to 
consider how the fluidity of the relation between media and the environment, the mind, 
and their end result of individuals and societies could ever be effectively managed by 
constraining individuals’ consumption of particular forms of media.   
As Hayles reports, recent studies in the fields of psychology and neuroscience 
suggest that people’s brains are structured differently on a physiological level according 
to their childhood exposure to media environments (192).  The kinds of media we 
consume does have an effect on how we interpret reality and the sorts of connections we 
form.  Whereas traditionally we think of education as the pathway to maturity through 
the cultivation of what she calls “deep attention,” or, the capacity to focus one’s 
consciousness on a single set of stimuli over a sustained period of time without 
experiencing boredom, today’s youth are coming of age in a distracting environment 
commanding a new paradigm of “hyper attention.”  Deep attention has the advantage, as 
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its name suggests, of depth of focus, but does not effectively process the richness of a 
dynamic environment, whereas hyper attention flits between constantly moving appeals 
from numerous and relatively superficial sources of stimulation to sustain a more 
flexible, mobile awareness (188, 194).  Hyper attention is roughly what Jameson earlier 
referred to as postmodern schizophrenia. 
The contrast Hayles sets up between attention’s forms implies a connection 
between deep attention and political structures like the nation, which depend on 
deliberately cultivated institutional knowledge and bodies of tradition, and hyper-
attention and provisional structures like cosmopolitanism, which encourage flexible 
attachments to unstable cultural sources.  A community’s form may be an effect of 
economic structures, as for example Benedict Anderson argues when he links the 
modern nation to print capitalism, but the development of new media economies result 
from biological changes in human composition arising from new forms of consumption; 
the two exist in tension with one another.  The important thing to note is that for Hayles, 
the plasticity of the human mind is determined by the media it witnesses.  The individual 
may labor upon media to form interpretations and impressions, but ultimately the 
presence of a dominant media structure determines the ontological results of this labor.  
Media that sustain attention for greater duration produce individuals with greater depth 
of commitment and those that require more varied focus result in fickle and shallow 
attachments.  Such an orientation has profound implications for the political relationship 
between media and community, situating the latter as dependent upon, and thus bound to 
constrain the elaboration of, the former.  However, as Hayles notes, the two forms of 
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attention always exist side by side in the mind, and the form a community takes on as a 
result of textual stimuli is a matter of balancing each rather than a simplistic binary 
opposition between the competing modes of socialization.  The aim of her examination 
is to propose the incorporation of new modes of hyper attention into traditional models 
of education, thus including the sorts of subjectivity they produce in traditional political 
structures rather than dismissing one type of medium, attentiveness, or person as 
illegitimate.   
The expansiveness of Hayles’s consideration of the validity of new ways of 
being human in relation to media within her theoretical discussion of deep and hyper 
attention is, broadly conceived, cosmopolitan.3  However, her practical application of 
inclusivity incorporates the cosmopolitan potential of the hybrid attention economy she 
documents within a national politics by maintaining the ultimate inadequacy of hyper 
attention as a basis for identity or political value.4  She proposes that students 
accustomed to a lifestyle of hyper attentiveness learn the value of deep attention in 
courses whose assignments begin “with hyper attention and [move them] toward more 
traditional objects of study” (196).  To do so, she has students write Facebook updates as 
Henry Adams and compare Faulkner’s themes to those of more recent computer games 
like Riven (196).  The purpose of these exercises is to teach students that deep attention 
is just as fun and rewarding as the hyper attention to which they are accustomed, but 
they do not actually address how differing forms of attentiveness produce qualitatively 
different forms of observation.  Rather, the assignment sequence is concerned with how 
observations are converted into publically circulating goods that produce economic or 
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cultural capital.  Deep and hyper attention, so it goes, produce different insights and 
consequently lead to different views of the world and political structures to support 
them.  They are different modes of gathering and evaluating the significance of 
information.  They do not by necessity require different modes of representation.  A 
Facebook post can be the product of either deep or hyper attentiveness just as a long 
paper or book can cover broad or narrow subjects and can do so in insightful or banal 
ways.  The teleology she builds into the course she describes treats the two forms of 
attention as if they were of entirely differing economies, as if the goal of education is to 
make productive workers rather than informed or empowered citizens.  Why not 
encourage students to take Facebook feeds as the subject of inquiry rather than the 
stylization for a deliverable product?   
Where Hayles’s incorporation of hyper attention and its attendant forms of 
sociality within a hegemonic deep attention economy and the nation state is relatively 
inclusive of hyper attentive subjectivity, Stiegler interprets her understanding of 
attention’s forms according to a more explicitly nationalist appeal to the well-being of 
future generations.5  Stiegler develops a philosophical approach to individuation through 
education that draws upon the formative role played by attention.  The core of his 
thought is a three-tiered phenomenological system of retentions moving the individual 
from biological awareness of existence into an ongoing process of individuation, which 
always occurs across individuals and is a matter of trans-individuation.6  Awareness of 
our possession of senses, or attention, comprises the primary level.  The mind processes 
primary retentions, or sensation, which then become secondary retentions.  
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Communication, which is made up of secondary retentions that individuals desire to 
express to others, is the domain of tertiary retention.  These in turn circulate as bits of 
received wisdom or indirect experience and become the materials for subsequent 
secondary retentions that complement the primary.  Tertiary retentions are continually 
folded back into the secondary, whose constant, shifting negotiations encompass the 
individual’s ongoing psychic individuation.  Stiegler refers to the pedagogical social 
context in which tertiary retentions circulate and individuals learn to evaluate them as 
“structures of care.” 
The interdependence of the three levels of Stiegler’s retentions means that 
structures of care are the product of chance encounters with the environment and 
individual labor upon conscious experience on both conscious and unconscious levels.  
The effect of a particular text or medium upon an individual and consequently, the 
social, depends upon how the individual works upon that text or medium within the 
ongoing process of individuation (Taking Care of Youth 24).  From this, we should 
conclude that a particular medium is neither bad nor good, but can serve a variety of 
purposes just as the cosmopolitanism possible within a turn toward hyper attentiveness is 
ambivalent.  It is surprising, then, that Stiegler is so deeply concerned with the negative 
effect television has on society’s ability to produce inter-generational structures of care, 
and especially, that he characterizes television as exerting a necessarily demoralizing 
influence on its viewers.  Stiegler’s critical framework provides a useful means to 
challenge depictions of consumers as passive receptacles for the ideological content of 
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broadcast media; however, his application of his own framework attempts to depict them 
as wholly powerless.   
To do so, he explains that structures of inter-generational care are transmitted 
exclusively through the patient cultivation of deep attention, which foregrounds the 
relationship between the social and the individual with its long-term investment in a 
single object of inquiry like the family or nation.  The long-form print works that were 
hegemonic in the past did not pose the same threat to stable communities as does TV 
because the effort reading requires of consumers to extract meaning and value from a 
text cultivated deep attention, or what I prefer to think of in this context as tunnel vision.  
This argument suggests that although media are the problem, they are so because of the 
way they interact with the process of nation building rather than any particular values 
they may express.  The late twentieth century individual faces an existential crisis 
because technological development has disrupted the smooth transmission of fragile 
deep attentive forms between tertiary and secondary retentions.  Such disruption can 
now occur, Stiegler offers, because television encourages restless acts of browsing 
among stimulating channels that must compete for our attention in order to make cultural 
knowledge valuable.  TV produces sociality without engaging essential inter-
generational structures because it promotes short-term interest in ever-changing 
landscapes of cultural reference.  It can do so successfully, according to Stiegler, 
because television operates under the assumption that if it can capture attention it can 
bypass the formative influences of primary and secondary retentions, injecting its own 
commercially motivated tertiary retentions directly into the psyches of its viewers.  If 
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this were the case, the tertiary would overwhelm the primary in the production of 
secondary retentions driving psychic individuation and the formation of desires.  The 
result, as Stiegler sees it, is a generation of passive consumers.   
In Taking Care of Youth and the Generations (2010) Stiegler gives an example of 
his claims in action through a reading of a French advertising campaign for Canal J, a 
TV station marketed toward young viewers.  The ads present images of children 
embarrassed by older men, presumably fathers or grandfathers, along with the slogan 
“They deserve better than that” (3).  The children and adults depicted in each of the ads 
are white and the adults are always male.  According to Stiegler, the advertisement 
suggests that older generations are not capable of preparing youth for today’s dynamic 
environment and substitutes for them a corporate voice.  This move, he laments, 
delegitimizes the authority of traditional family figures as the source of an inter-
generational educational structure of communication that produces mature, civically 
minded adults capable of responsible self-care.  The advertisement undermines a 
community’s capacity to sustain education as such by placing an unreasonable burden 
upon older generations to reshape their desires according to what youth desire, to stay 
cool, rather than teaching the youth to look to their elders for models of responsible 
living.  TV, Stiegler concludes, makes “children the infantilizing definers of adults” and 
children subject to a morally disinterested, vacuous culture industry (14).  And because it 
operates according to a constantly shifting principle of hyper attention, television, which 
now occupies the site of education for Stiegler, radically destabilizes the nation-state 
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without investing in any alternative long term social structures or systems of care that 
could replace it. 
 According to his own logic, TV cannot exhibit the power of control he attributes 
to it.   TV may come to dominate the cultural field by merit of an overwhelming 
presence, but, because media consumption does not constitute the entirety of an 
individual’s experience and neither does an individual’s consumption of media come 
from a single source or occur within a static homogenous context, the secondary 
retentions produced through interaction with various circulating tertiary retentions of 
commercial media do not inhibit the possibility of either deep attention or inter-
generational structures of care.  Instead, Stiegler’s hyperbolic critique of the culture 
industry is a sublimation of his concern for the shifting racial and gendered makeup of 
the nation and a general anxiety regarding the reality of change.  The advertisement he 
attacks undermines the authority of white men to define the foundations of society with a 
new, more cosmopolitan set of pedagogical models.  In Stiegler’s reading, though, the 
media become a homogenous figure embodying both a threat to the nation and of 
provisional values, positing a link between commercialism and cosmopolitanism on the 
basis of the moral difference between deep and hyper attention.  The production of this 
link allows him to frame his critique as directed toward a compassionate expansiveness 
that protects defenseless children against a cosmopolitan media whose own 
expansiveness and disorder pose fundamental threats to the health of the individual, the 
family, and the nation-state.  This move effaces the extent to which the crisis of inter-
generational formation through education is as much the result of immigration and shifts 
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in the racial and ethnic makeup of France during the late 90s and early 21st century as it 
is children who watch TV instead of listening to their grandparents’ stories.  What it 
really takes aim at is the influence changing media networks, including those involving 
face-to-face interaction, have upon the character of his inter-generational structures, 
which because of the very fact of constant transmission never had any sort of static 
identity to begin with. 
According to Catherine Malabou, neuroscience shows that the brain develops 
according to a roughly standard pattern.  All people use the same regions of the brain to 
process the senses, to regulate bodily functions, and to perform other basic vital tasks.  
However, once these structures are in place, the individual brain unfolds according to a 
plastic process of “progressively effac[ing] the significance of originary structures in the 
elaboration of the self” in response to unique environmental stimuli (12).  Structures that 
appear intergenerational are, in fact, the result of improvisation.  At first glance, her 
observation seems to confirm Hayles’s and Stiegler’s contentions that media’s forms 
condition attention, which in turn produces the unique difference of an individual.  
However, Malabou makes a compelling political distinction between cybernetic 
metaphors of mental formation and regulation and neoliberal capitalism.  Cybernetics, 
which understands the brain as a centralized structure of control, deploys a concept of 
flexibility in order to maximize an individual’s mental output and to produce socially 
and politically efficient subjects, as in the case of Hayles’s classroom.  Flexibility, for 
Malabou, entails a tendency to accept a given form out of necessity.  Flexibility is a 
posture of docility, of mental receptiveness lacking political capacities for subversion 
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and invention (12).  Under neoliberal capitalism, individuals attempt to maximize the 
flexibility of their identities because to do so also maximizes their mobility and 
employability.  Flexibility, rather than a cosmopolitan expansion of human interest in 
difference, is a subordination of personal commitments to a given state of affairs.  
Flexibility is the adaptation of the self to a state of overwhelming consensus.  Plasticity, 
by contrast, is dissensual in that it implies both the capacity of the mind to continually 
take on new forms, but at the same time, a constantly active, explosive resistance to any 
and all constituted forms it might receive in the process of consumption.  The crisis that 
occupies both Stiegler and Hayles is precisely that new media initiate a shift in the way 
people produce social capital through the work of attention.  With multiple viable 
possibilities, individuals can become plastic, rather than disciplining themselves 
according to the demands of an economy that values only one set of products associated 
with deep attention because it is economically necessary.  Another way to put the issue 
is that we are becoming more interdisciplinary in our inquiry.  The potential for 
individuals to refuse received inter-generational structures clearly poses a threat to the 
political structures governing the financial economy along with long-standing social 
institutions, but the opportunity to make of them something different does not, as 
Stiegler laments, mean that people are no longer engaged in valuable or worthwhile 
activity.  Rather than dismiss new media and new forms of attending to the world as 
inherently destructive, I consider them a way of cosmopolitanizing its makeup. 
Thinking of the brain as plastic brings the problem of the media for the nation 
into the foreground.  The nation relies on its capacity to sustain a state of flexible 
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interpretation in which it remains the center of people’s sense of well-being.  A set of 
patriotic texts ought to produce a common core of political values.  By becoming a 
subject of the nation, an individual reader obligates him- or herself to conform 
interpretation to the demands of the nation.   This is not a sustainable premise given the 
global circulation of texts within digital networks, if it ever was under any other form of 
distribution.  Individuals who recognize the brain as plastic are not as readily subjected 
to demands for flexibility, becoming something more like cosmopolitan in their 
formation.  What remains is the possibility that individuals identify with the nation, as a 
much more pragmatic object, as a means of actualizing individual desires.  The idea of 
the plastic brain suggests the mass cultural tertiary retentions of Stiegler’s system are 
much less pernicious than he claims because they never correlate directly to new 
secondary retentions, but always pass through the primary, taking on unpredictable and 
locally specific shades of individuality.  Structures of intergenerational care exist across 
the media spectrum and come into being regardless of the form of attention.  Sometimes 
they may change shape more quickly than others, and sometimes that change is driven 
by factors beyond the control of those in whose image such structures are traditionally 
communicated.  Perhaps an occasional explosion within processes of social formation is 
not always the end of humanity as we have known it.  For America and American 
writers, plasticity means letting go of the belief that the nation is a good we can protect, 
nurture, or manage through literary production.  To hold onto such notions, as I show in 
my reading of Wallace, is to deny the democratic potential of emergent media in favor of 
narcissism, xenophobia, and hopelessly outdated visions of America as the boundless 
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and homogenous face of the world. 
David Foster Wallace’s Anxiety of Attention: American Fiction, American 
Television, American Cosmopolitanism    
The unease Stiegler feels for television and his impulse to represent it as the 
agent of cataclysmic social degeneration are fairly common responses to what Leo 
Bersani describes as the “experience” of being modern (47).  Change is an inescapable 
facet of identifying one’s own time as modern that by definition positions it in contrast 
with a lost past and an uncertain future.  Stiegler’s fear, although reactionary, is plastic 
in that it attempts to refuse to acquiesce to the changes he identifies.  Instead, he sets out 
to redeem the present.  As Bersani explains, the culture of redemption, of which Stiegler 
is a part, operates according to the assumption that “a certain type of repetition of 
experience in art,” Stiegler’s intergenerational structures within deep attention, “repairs 
inherently damaged or valueless experience” (1).   Like Stiegler, David Foster Wallace 
feels his claim to the nation’s identity slipping away from him.  America is in a state of 
unprecedented political and moral decline, he opines, because its youth, immersed as 
they are in a commercial culture of ironic detachment (which detachment should alert 
use to the problem of national and cosmopolitan commitments), have lost the capacity to 
care genuinely for anything requiring complex thought or sustained energy, and the most 
immediate consequence is a population of self-obsessed, short-sighted narcissists.  TV, 
of course, is to blame: stereotypical descriptions of Generation X apathy, Wallace 
clarifies, merely highlight a “’90s’ version of frugality” brought on by a devastating and 
misleading perception that “attention [is] our chief commodity, our social capital” (E. 
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Unibus Pluram 64).  For him, the increasing viability of an idea like attention economy 
is an important indicator that  American society is coming to believe that individuals 
consuming television do not solely make their own identities; who they are is in part 
made by the culture in circulation around them.  Television is so pernicious for Wallace 
because it influences cognitive structures responsible for the formation of the private self 
and public civic institutions by fulfilling its commercial mission of pleasing viewers 
rather than edifying them.  Television not only hijacks the process of individuation here, 
it does so by desensitizing viewers to human experience and enslaving them to its own 
centralized channel of political value and affective stimulation precisely by defining that 
experience in terms of sensual pleasure.7  The U.S. television audience’s “attention span 
and appetite for complexity have naturally withered a bit after years of high-dose 
spectation” (57, emphasis added).  A society dominated by a television monster of its 
own making is doomed to failure because it feels for and through television alone and 
television keeps them watching by telling them they should feel good about themselves.8 
Faced with this grim assessment of the state of American mass culture and 
politics, Wallace burdens the prose writer with the monumental task of rewiring the 
American psyche.  His writer redeems a fallen America addicted to commercial 
television through a willingness to “sort of die in order to move the reader” to look at 
one thing long enough to care for it deeply (McCaffery 149).  The writer’s mission is to 
subvert a dominant tendency of TV to excite hyper attention with a return to boring deep 
attention.  Many critics have received Wallace’s challenge to make Americans feel as a 
broadly cosmopolitan appeal to compassion for humanity in all its forms, for generosity 
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toward the world’s suffering, and for attentiveness to those most frequently overlooked 
in the hectic marketplace of global capitalism.  To describe Wallace as a modern-day 
saint of compassion and a champion for diversity in American politics and culture is to 
misread the intent of his work.  Instead, as the very messianic language with which he 
discloses his own understanding of writing reveals, Wallace feels himself a martyr for 
the cause of a besieged culture of which he is the figurehead, hoping through his self-
sacrifice to remake the American world in his image.  The sensitivity toward pain that 
has garnered such positive responses from his fans is consistently grounded in Wallace’s 
personal feelings of alienation, misunderstanding, and loss.  His appeal may be 
superficially cosmopolitan, in that it challenges us to feel more for others, but the 
direction of our expanded feeling is always toward and for the benefit of Wallace 
himself.  Those people who do not feel properly are on a global periphery, living in a 
state of irony-induced detachment, in need of a return of focus toward an American, and 
Wallace-based, center.  It is a pragmatic cosmopolitanism serving the interests of a 
homogenous and singular identity.  
 Consider the following statement Wallace describes as a letter he liked to 
distribute to African-American students in his writing classes: 
I don't know whether anybody's told you this or not, but when you're in a college 
English class you're basically studying a foreign dialect. This dialect is called 
‘Standard Written English.’ [...] From talking with you and reading your essays, 
I've concluded that your own primary dialect is [one of three variants of SBE 
[Standard Black English – my addition] common to our region]. Now, let me 
spell something out in my official Teacher-voice: The SBE you're fluent in is 
different from SWE in all kinds of important ways. […]In this country, SWE is 
perceived as the dialect of education and intelligence and power and prestige, and 
anybody of any race, ethnicity, religion, or gender who wants to succeed in 
American culture has got to be able to use SWE. This is How It Is. […]  African 
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Americans who've become successful and important in U.S. culture know this; 
that's why King's and X's and Jackson's speeches are in SWE, and why 
Morrison's and Angelou's and Baldwin's and Wideman's and West's books are 
full of totally ass-kicking SWE, and why black judges and politicians and 
journalists and doctors and teachers communicate professionally in SWE. […] 
And [INSERT NAME HERE], you're going to learn to use it, too, because I am 
going to make you. (Lobster 108-9) 
Wallace seems indifferent to the fact that Standard English is only standard because of 
the dominance of specific national, racial, and cultural traditions that might differ from 
those of his students, or that there exist such things as cultural violence tied to linguistic 
traditions.9  By making the issue one of Standard Written English versus Black English 
Wallace defines the confrontation he initiates with students as one of racial ownership of 
national identity.  As the white instructor, Wallace claims entitlement to define how the 
student may experience reality as part of the instructional experience he embodies 
because he also identifies America with his own white sense of self.  The student can 
either conform to Wallace’s description of American significance or fail both to pass the 
course and to become a person of value.  Given the obvious hostility evident in 
Wallace’s condescending tone when he addresses African-American students in a 
college classroom as if they were extraterrestrials, it is not surprising, although it is 
disappointing, that he confesses his surprise that “a couple of the students I've said this 
stuff to were offended — one lodged an Official Complaint — and that I have had more 
than one colleague profess to find my spiel ‘racially insensitive’” (109).  
Wallace clearly means the letter to vindicate his outrage that political correctness 
and the tolerance behind it continue to cause unreasonable hardship on progressive 
individuals like himself.10  The attitude the letter exposes hardly corresponds to an 
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aching desire to move readers to a greater love for humanity at any personal cost.  Quite 
the opposite, Wallace actually threatens his students’ right to a freely determined sense 
of self worth when they do not meet to his expectations.  As Sally Robinson argues of 
conservative male writers more generally, Wallace’s petulant behavior is an attempt to 
redefine the terms of identity politics in a way that makes his painful awareness of racial 
and gender marking something in which he can feel pleasurably outraged rather than 
only victimized (55).11  What Wallace is concerned with in the classroom at this moment 
is not the well-being of his student or the expansiveness of that student’s understanding 
of human culture or ability to feel for others, but that this student obediently give care to 
a particular set of cultural values institutionalized in Standard Written English.  He 
wants to maintain the legitimacy of intergenerational structures of care underlying the 
long-term consistency of national identity.  He will allow his students to attend to 
outliers like King or Baldwin (but not writers who were about changing America’s 
idiom, like Zora Neale Hurston or Alice Walker), but only on the condition that they 
dutifully translate the fruits of their efforts back into those structures of care Wallace 
recognizes.  Although couched in terms of race and stylistics, the issue, at its heart, is 
one of how individuals pay attention to the surrounding world, and roaming hyper 
attention is of little value for Wallace. 
The racial politics of Wallace’s classroom management policies fail to make a 
compelling case for his expansive civic vision.  His critique of television, for which he is 
known, is marginally more successful.  It is more persuasive because where the letter 
overtly targets a powerless and traditionally marginalized category of person, in his 
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engagement with commercial culture as the source of American decline Wallace attacks 
an impersonal force.  Blaming television, Wallace also attempts to shift readers’ 
attention away from the implications of his dismissal of TV culture for those individuals 
represented within it and who have built meaningful identities upon its circulation of 
texts.  His appeal includes all readers in an audience unified against a divisive, 
infantilizing, and cosmopolitan TV, ironically given the reality that of all new media, 
television is most exclusively distributed and consumed along national lines and 
continues to represent straight white middle class men as the normal face of America.   
In the case of both TV’s natural degradation of its viewers’ cognitive functioning 
and his own redemptive turn from commercial culture, Wallace implicitly adopts the 
assumption that the substance of an identity, its social capital, is based in affect and is an 
abstract product of the work of paying attention.  As the product of our attention to texts, 
the sorts of identity for which Wallace feels concern are what Michael Warner calls 
publics, “space[s] of discourse organized by nothing other than the discourse itself” (67).  
A public “exists by virtue of being addressed,” meaning it forms a point of affective 
density around which people can congregate simply by circulating among a particular 
body of people.  Individual identity and the values of public society are equally products 
of performance, and performance takes the appearance of necessity through the 
individual’s belief in the efficacy of what is observed, felt, and enacted.  We feel 
ourselves to be a part of a public, as if that public objectifies our affective experience of 
embodied life, through our devotion of attention to the narratives surrounding that 
public, by paying attention to what it has to say about itself.  One can attend to a 
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character on TV or to a person sitting in the park.  To be a part of a public, one needs 
only hear its message, or interpret its body as projecting some message subject to 
interpretation.  As Warner explains, “by coming into range, you fulfill the only entry 
condition required of a public” (88).  Taking this definition of public space, TV, instead 
of seducing individuals away from other traditional or more stable political 
communities, simply is more efficient at distributing its message to a wider audience.  
The medium has no pre-determined value.  TV can reinforce the white male hegemony 
with which Wallace associates, or it may contest normativity with pluralistic visions of 
humanity.  It is supplanting long-form print fiction because it places fewer restrictions 
upon who can obtain meaning from its address.  It offers a more expansive form of 
community in which individuals can believe themselves to be.  The openness of the TV 
model of textual distribution makes it more cosmopolitan relative to the singular, closed 
one Wallace associates with fiction and the nation. 
Wallace’s critique addresses a problem of the relative value of social capital 
produced by people immersed in minority discourse communities, whether TV viewers 
or African-Americans.  Ghassan Hage describes this kind of attitude toward the nation as 
“good white nationalism,” or discourse that generally admits the need for a multicultural 
society, but under the assumption that the identity of society remains the object of white 
concern.  We see this assumption in Wallace’s thinking when, for example, he laments 
that TV increases “the number of choices and options” toward which people may direct 
their precious attention but does not provide them with stable “guides to why and how to 
choose among experiences, fantasies, beliefs, and predilections” and does so in an 
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economically self-interested way (75-6).  Television is a threat to Wallace’s position 
within a homogenous, normative America because it effectively undermines the ability 
of any single authority to regulate channels of cultural distribution and consumption.  It 
does so by constantly interjecting new images into popular discourse, changing the terms 
by which cultural capital negotiates its value, such that no single image, narrative, or 
source of either gains an established hold on the long-term direction of public discourse 
by becoming an inter-generational structure.  Television institutes multiple legitimate 
publics within national space.  The threat of its pluralism to a writer like Wallace is of a 
society that can choose between a highly diverse body of texts that dilutes the potency of 
structures of care transmitted through deep attention exerted upon a static canon.  With 
such a variety of stimuli, the individual author runs the risk of having his pain go 
unnoticed. 
Cosmopolitan consumption, or the hyper attention TV watching cultivates, 
devalues the currency of Wallace’s social capital only so long as people like Wallace 
understand the relation between themselves and others as oppositional.  He describes 
emergent TV culture as stripping Americans of their ability to produce or retain social 
capital of any sort rather than simply expanding the register of what we know as 
valuable.   If this is the case, then people are not responsible enough to enjoy the 
pleasures of freedom and instead do need to be told what to attend to in order to protect 
the viability of American culture.  Fiction becomes a way for Wallace to make a quasi-
fascist authoritarian appeal to a racialized and gendered nationalism without making 
explicit overtures to racial or gendered violence.  He does by comparing the state of 
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American culture he feels he has inherited (and thus owns) from writers of the 60s to a 
rowdy high school party also in need of some firm guidance.  At first, immature partiers 
find the newness of the experience pleasurable, but the absence of parents and their 
ability to enforce boundaries upon behavior within the household and to limit entry at 
the door quickly becomes overwhelming.  As a writer, responsible for the moral 
direction of the nation/party, “you're the host and it's your house too,” despite the 
presence of drug-dealing party-crashers, “and you gradually start wishing your parents 
would come back and restore some fucking order in your house” (McCaffery 150).  The 
problem with the party begins when those not invited begin to feel at home in its space. 
As a metaphor for cultural production, this suggests immigrants, women, subversives, 
and any other non-normative voice.  They are unwanted distractions, noise within the 
transmission of structures of care.  While recognizing the feeling motivating his desire 
for order, Wallace intervenes to demasculinze feeling as such, arguing, “what's wrong 
with us? Are we total pussies? Is there something about authority and limits we actually 
need?” (150).  In this way, he makes his appeal for fascist cultural nationalism a 
masculine imperative.  To be a man and an American means to come to terms with the 
thought that “we're going to have to be the parents” who kick out the uninvited guests, 
foreigners and women, and to take responsibility for how others shape what is legible 
within the nation as a valid expression of humanity (150).  
The xenophobia and misogyny latent in Wallace’s description of television’s 
effect on America come out more openly in his militaristic description for how it 
structures its viewers’ attention.  By paying attention to TV, Wallace suggests, “it is not 
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I the spy who have crept inside television’s boundaries,” but the reverse (32).  TV, he 
complains, “has become my – our – own interior” (32).  TV’s content in itself is not an 
issue.  Instead, Wallace is concerned that TV, as a public outlet, has effects upon its 
viewers he cannot control.12  When TV is consumed in the massive quantities Wallace 
cites, a daily average of six hours whose excessiveness he repeats obsessively, the 
performance of naturalness it puts on display, even if it is not understood as transparent 
or natural, comes to occupy an influential place within the symbolic structure by which 
viewers evaluate their own selves and construct the “real world” (EUP 22, 24, 26, 29, 
34, 37, 39, 41, 44, 53, 57, 64).  It inevitably makes publics by merit of the volume in 
which we permit it to address us.  He feels violated by the thought that it influences how 
others might understand him, a sentiment echoed in his frustration at his students’ 
offense rather than attempting to understand or change his practice.  Their ability to 
voice their concern at his behavior, and the fact that their concern is taken seriously, 
marks a boundary between two publics.  The very existence of multiple publics reveals 
Wallace’s own position as constructed and requires him to justify his exercise of power.  
If he can successfully make TV into a foreign invader, a threat reuniting America’s 
multiple publics fractured by multiculturalism and political correctness, then its 
diversifying effects lose all rightful place in public discourse.  It becomes a threat to the 
public’s capacity to actively shape its own formation; complaints about the loss of power 
or capacity to assert voice on the part of the sorts of subject it might represent are simply 
treason.  Any effect it has upon viewers, the American public, is the result of its abuses 
of power, the irresponsible way it naturally reconfigures attentive forms.   
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The loss of a general ability to feel for others is the stated cause of Wallace’s 
intervention, but it is not feeling as such he aims to restore.  Rather, he advocates a 
restricted range of emotion, notably centered on pain, focused on the production of 
personal social capital.  Wallace, as the rightful emissary of American identity, feels 
entitled to set the direction of public discourse and processes of individuation founded 
thereon.  Since he cannot both claim to be a credible voice on culture and dismiss the 
value of different cultural perspectives out of hand, he is forced to blame the medium 
through which difference circulates most prominently.  And, since an economic interest 
in social capital drives Wallace’s analysis, he must treat television as if its conditions of 
production, distribution, and consumption are fundamentally different from those of 
prose fiction.  The corner into which he paints himself results in a number of glaring 
inconsistencies that further reveal the narcissism of his argument.   
It is not just TV that is the problem, but because TV forms the foundation for 
Americans’ perception of reality, non-fiction in any genre as well.  In his introduction to 
the 2007 volume of Best American Essays, Wallace explains that as he understands it, 
nonfiction is a reflection of “the seething static of every particular thing and experience,” 
of a reality “both numbing and euphoric, a kind of Total Noise” (xiv, xiii).  Although it 
is written and requires the reader to engage in sustained deep attention, non-fiction puts 
that deep attentiveness to the service of advancing the passivity of television culture by 
making the seething static of its hyper attentive restlessness appear more legible and 
humane.  Nonfiction is a product of global capitalism’s material realities and the 
influence of commercial culture upon American society.  This leaves prose fiction as the 
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only redemptive medium, the exclusive source of healthy attentive forms, because it is 
spontaneous and individual.  It “comes out of nothing,” as if the fiction writer lived 
entirely apart from popular culture and public life.  Fiction counterpoises an abyss of 
“silence” to nonfiction’s noise (xiii).  The heroic fiction writer, as we should expect, is a 
person a lot like Wallace.  Similarly, he imagines his readers are “people more or less 
like me” (McCaffery 128).  Fiction writers and Joe Briefcase, Wallace’s name for the 
average American consumer, “covet a vision of themselves as witnesses” while at the 
same time feeling an equal dislike of “being objects of people’s attention…. being 
watched” (“EUP” 21).  People are, in a word, voyeurs.  Wallace claims that watching 
people when they don’t know they are being watched and cannot strategize the 
appearance their behavior exhibits creates a space in which an individual can freely and 
deliberately create in fiction the symbolic structures that somehow result in healthy 
social behavior when they are consumed according to reading’s deep attentive forms.   
In order to illustrate the difference between suspicious TV viewing and laudable 
voyeurism, he argues that the latter, while “creepy,” is more ethical than the former, 
because the voyeur’s action is somehow transparent, or sincere – they just want to see 
what someone else is really like (23).  “The only illusion in true espial,” Wallace offers, 
“is suffered by the voyee, who doesn’t know he’s giving off images and impressions,” 
and this is for him not merely harmless, but beneficial (23-24).  He attempts to sanitize 
voyeurism by calling it the “fiction research” by which a writer faithfully reproduces 
espied moments for the consumption of the reader (22).  Since the voyeur takes care to 
maintain the secrecy of his violating gaze, Wallace assumes no violence or exploitation 
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occurs.  According to the same logic, Nike hurts no one so long as American consumers 
do not realize their shoes are manufactured by underpaid third world children.  The 
writer’s sincere, economically disinterested reproduction of moments of vulnerable 
activity is what enables the reader of fiction to produce the generalizations of affect 
(although he only mentions suffering) that form the foundation of Wallace’s ethical 
sociality in which readers are restored their capacity for feeling in general by first feeling 
for the author.13   
For Wallace, the interaction between TV and individuals must again be entirely 
unlike the nourishing, redemptive voyeurism of fiction and the understanding of social 
conventions its readers form through seeing people in moments of unstructured natural 
behavior.  Where readers and writers are voyeurs, party to something unmotivated by the 
pressures of observation, TV watchers are merely “viewers,” because “television is 
performance, spectacle” (23).14  The result of our extensive consumption of TV is to 
“confuse fiction research,” interaction with people or “peeping-Tomism” with “a weird 
kind of fiction-consumption” divorced from active contact with others (26, 23, 26).   
This is bizarre given that we watch TV in groups, often socializing to produce running 
commentaries on live shows or live-tweeting them, whereas reading is almost 
exclusively solitary.  The only distinction is in the form in which the consumer’s 
attention is commodified, which divides neatly along Hayles’s categories of deep and 
hyper.  It is also important to point out that voyeurism is an entirely private fantasy that 
affords little of the actual contact with people that is the stated aim of Wallace’s fiction. 
 Instead, it keeps the other of the gaze at a safe distance from which it cannot disrupt the 
 65 
 
voyeur’s production of knowledge upon the body of the other and in which the watched 
has no say in the production of the political out of their image.  
If television is morally negative because it actively structures the reality of 
passive viewers, Wallace argues it is morally positive to watch people in moments of 
passivity, because this passivity is not actively scripted, and thus sincere.  In order to 
sustain the qualitative distinction between the bad passivity of the television viewer, 
which we should not emulate, and the good passivity of the voyee, which we should, 
Wallace also has to, although more implicitly, treat differently public and private 
behavior.  A person alone is who he or she is, but in society, that “sincere” self becomes 
obscured by individual desire for recognition.  However, Wallace has already explained 
that the problem with television lies in the way it isolates viewers.  Fiction is supposed to 
remedy this state of affairs by nurturing subjectivity beyond narcissism.  It is important 
that for Wallace fiction guarantees not just healthy individual lives, but the very life of 
the nation, which ensures the legibility of his identity and its members’ empathy with his 
pain.  What fiction offers is not health, per se, but rather the guarantee, through the 
policing of the moral contours of life, that a particular kind of life retains social 
currency.  Wallace feels the potential for the pleasure of public recognition of his project 
of self-building as good and valuable through his gift of loyalty to those power structures 
inherent in the reproduction of fiction as the vehicle of national identity.  The feeling 
that inspires pain is an individual experience, and the sensation of being incapable of 
communicating it fully is alienating.  However, the way an individual knows that feeling 
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is pain, even if he or she cannot fully symbolize it, is not entirely private and does not, as 
Wallace suggests, doom the individual to a solipsistic existence (McCaffery 143-4).  
Within his aesthetic, the core of pain remains intact beneath whatever affective 
sensations readers produce in themselves in order to feel an identification with the 
writer, who becomes emblematic of pain in general.  Wallace’s writer can possibly 
address a reader, but this address only occurs within the reader’s imagination, as a result 
of a particular, limited affective orientation toward the text.  Only by coming to a belief 
that one holds the same values or experiences the same emotions as the writer, by 
becoming the object of the writer’s desire, does the reader accomplish the painful work 
of aligning him or herself with the writer in address.15  By adopting the writer’s 
presumed affective structure as one’s own, the reader allows the writer to speak through 
the transformation reading enacts on his or her own sense of self.16  The effect of the 
reader’s empathy with Wallace’s pain is the transformation of himself from writer to 
Author, with all its Foucauldian implications.17  By contrast, Wallace believes, TV 
prevents both sincerity and empathy, offering viewers a shortcut to pleasurable 
recognition by including them in its hyper attentive shifting appeals to consumerist 
trends.  TV addiction, or the desire for a certain kind of community, Wallace’s argument 
suggests, is the source of the detached stasis he describes as plaguing contemporary 
American culture.   American viewers are passive because they are subject, as are all 
humans, to this addiction.  Addiction, as Wallace deploys it, is a universal response to 
the sensation of pleasure.  Pleasure, although satisfying, is for Wallace an affect that 
depresses the sensation of other emotions.  Politically speaking, Wallace characterizes 
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pleasure as a totalitarian affect.  It mutes all other feelings.  The suspension of feeling 
that results from pleasure is also what Wallace suggests defines depression, so to be 
addictively pleased is to suffer depression.   
In Infinite Jest, Wallace defines depression as  
 
a level of psychic pain wholly incompatible with human life as we know it.  It is 
a sense of radical and thoroughgoing evil not just as a feature but as the essence 
of conscious existence.  It is a sense of poisoning that pervades the self at the 
self’s most elementary levels.  It is a nausea of the cells and soul.  It is an 
unnumb intuition in which the world is fully rich and animate and un-map-like 
and also thoroughly painful and malignant and antagonistic to the self, which 
depressed self It billows on and coagulates around and wraps Its black folds and 
absorbs into Itself, so that an almost mystical unity is achieved with a world 
every constituent of which means painful harm to the self. (695-6) 
 
The reason the pain of depression is so especially unbearable is that it is impossible to 
“ever even begin to make someone else understand what clinical depression feels like, 
not even another person who is herself clinically depressed,” because the depressed 
person “is incapable of empathy with any other living thing” (696).  He or she is 
consumed with feeling the effect of his or her own feelings.  Fiction becomes redemptive 
for Wallace because it offers a way out of the isolation of depressive thoughts by way of 
his ability to imagine a reader struggling with his words on the page and sharing in the 
burden of feeling. 
The narrator of Wallace’s novella-length story “Westward the Course of Empire 
Goes its Way” explains the redemptive function of sincerity as sustained in fiction 
through an analogy to hostage taking.  In the story, Ambrose, a creative writing 
instructor and compelling charlatan based on John Barth, tells his students that “People 
read fiction the way relatives of the kidnapped listen to the captive's voice on the captor-
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held phone: paying attention, natch, to what the victim says, but absolutely hanging on 
the pitch, quaver, and hue of what's said, reading a code born of intimacy for interlinear 
clues about condition, location, outlook, the likelihood of safe return” (293).  While the 
figure of Ambrose is the object of both criticism and intrigue in the story, his 
comparison is an apt description for what Wallace hopes to attain through his own 
creative endeavors, especially in terms of how his own experience of depression 
influences his politics.  When he discusses what fiction does, he explains it as a way of 
giving structure to the reader that verifies something or someone beyond the individual. 
When people speak of Wallace as a writer of compassion and sensitivity, it is this 
desperate search for life beyond oneself to which they attend.  In a simplistic way, such 
descriptions are accurate: Wallace does very much want all people to cultivate a 
sensitivity for the feelings of others and is fiercely committed to the idea that one’s 
private feelings are not reducible to common memes, but must be dealt with in difficult 
and unique ways.  The reason Wallace thinks of fiction in terms of an author giving 
voice to the reader in a sincere, or absolutist, way is that if the voice of the author can 
come across the text intact, then it proves the existence of the outside world.  Sincerity 
promises Wallace’s experience can be externalized.  This is important to him because his 
interior world is one determined by the constant pain of depression.  The substance of 
the subject is self-evident to itself, so only the outside conveyed in fiction matters.  
However, for the depressed person, living inside of oneself is the most refined 
experience of pain.  This perception of the self is a product of Wallace’s depression.  All 
he wants is to get out of himself.  By finding a way to enter someone else in fiction, he 
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can temporarily escape the world of his mind.  Fiction offers relief from the torments of 
depression by at least temporarily (by distracting the attention) rewriting the structures 
of the self according to those of the author.  These must be conveyed in an authentic or 
sincere way, because if not, then what the reader constructs out of the act of reading 
becomes no more than yet another private fantasy, which, in Wallace’s case, will lead 
inevitably to the renewal of depression’s pain.  Because only an author taken as sincere 
offers genuine relief from the pain of isolation and depression, the reader becomes the 
attentive hostage to the text, scanning with something more than just active interest, that 
bears on addiction, in order to extract from it some form of temporary relief and to fulfill 
an ethical burden to mitigate the author’s suffering through empathy. 
If to be pleased is really to feel depressed, a fact we fail to register because we 
passively accept TV’s description of depressing consumerism as exciting, and if 
depression is the apotheosis of pain, then writing that induces pain and evades addiction 
is the most substantially pleasurable, even if it doesn’t feel that way.18  We feel pleased, 
Wallace offers, when we sense a state of homeostasis in our environments, another odd 
paradox given that we want true pleasure and to avoid numbing stasis.  Existing within a 
homeostatic environment, individuals tune out potential stimuli in order to maintain 
balance and order.  Homeostasis is the prerequisite for the cultivation of deep attention’s 
singularity of focus.  However, homeostatic individuals, Wallace suggests, are unlikely 
to engage in political activity, with its often discomforting and even painful 
consequences.  Pleasure is always debilitating and always an involuntary response 
(remember, TV naturally saps viewers of the ability to form complex thoughts) to 
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external stimuli.  It ends in stasis, Wallace explains, because the individual is not capable 
of processing the diversity that evokes pleasure in the act of consumption.  The solution 
to civic stasis, as he sees it, is to eliminate the distraction of that which is immediately 
pleasing.  This requires an attitude of total ascetic restraint.  Abstention from global 
streams of cultural exchange, according to this logic, results in vibrant cultures and 
politically engaged individuals.  All we need to break free from the pain of cultural stasis 
is to eliminate any outside voices competing for our precious attention.  Fiction, in 
Wallace’s reading, is democratic and compassionate because it forces upon readers a 
sensitive orientation toward the pleasurable pain of tuning out the pleasures of the 
present.  Unfortunately it does so by treating anything feminine or racially different as a 
source of painful pleasure.  In the end, Wallace proposes we overcome the entropic 
forces of pleasurable diversity, which are destroying the civic foundations of American 
life, with an all-encompassing sacrifice of self-interest on behalf of a pre-determined 
long-term collective identity, or consensus.  This consensus is encapsulated in Wallace’s 
famous appeal to sincerity, a “childish” return to “backward, quaint, naïve, and 
anachronistic” commitments to “singe-entendre principles” (“EUP” 81).   
A recent, and ironic, trend in Wallace scholarship is to characterize his work as 
the triumphant arrival of an ethically sound “new sincerity,” the vanguard of a new 
America that frees both writers and readers from the corrupt power structures of ironic 
postmodern life and commercial media to enjoy the fullness of American democratic 
freedom.19  Exemplary among these critics is Adam Kelly.  Kelly surprisingly argues 
that sincerity, while being of fundamental significance to the political and aesthetic 
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meaning of a text, is not a quality possessing actual content or substance.  Instead, he 
clarifies, sincerity exists as a contract of honesty inferred from a literary work by the 
reader that solidifies the writer’s persona in opposition to ironic manipulations of affect 
that exploit the political outcomes of consumption.20  By believing in the honesty of the 
writer’s depiction of values in a text, the reader transforms the trace of the writer into 
authorial presence.  The operation of sincerity makes the author into something for 
which the reader now has real feelings (The New Sincerity” 133-145).  Aside from the 
critical uselessness of rendering all texts sincere, Kelly’s definition of the term, which I 
understand as a fair appraisal of Wallace’s critical intent, also invokes a mode of 
authority that severely limits the democratic potential of reading.  Considering that 
sincerity is opposed to irony and that sincerity is taken as a sign of moral superiority, for 
the reader to refuse to recognize sincerity within a text and its author’s intent is 
tantamount to refusing the validity of both as human.  Either the reader must accept 
wholesale that Wallace is sincere, forgiving any violence, racism, or shortsightedness 
contained within the text, or take responsibility for exerting violence against him and his 
right to engage in the liberal project of self-narration.  The political aim of Wallace’s and 
Kelly’s sincerity is not to free up discursive conventions or to allow individuals the 
freedom to feel themselves as real but to force the unification of a body of readers 
through the affectively norming figure of the Author.  Sincerity mandates consensus in 
order to avoid facing unpalatable epistemological violence, or what might otherwise be 
called difference internal to identity narratives.     
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The experience of sincerity that Wallace wants fiction to sustain differs from TV 
viewing along with ordinary aesthetic experience.  While it does encourage readers to 
come to an awareness of a new and more sensitive outlook on the world, Wallace’s 
fiction is not democratic, because it attempts to force the production of that ensuing 
world upon its readers.  His art belongs to the ethical regime, as Rancière defines it, of 
works with no autonomy, “to be questioned for their truth and for their effects on the 
ethos of individuals and the community” (Corcoran, 15).  Fiction is good because it 
produces a therapeutic effect while TV is bad because it encourages self-indulgence.  
Since a particular kind or work of art has a set ethical value, it also has a set effect on 
consumers, who the artist subsequently tends to view in terms of passive consumption or 
spectatorship.  By creating a context in which people consume a work, the artist shapes 
the ethical and political direction of the community.  So, while Wallace’s fiction may be 
his means of provoking readers to think for themselves and to evoke a state of genuine 
empathy, his work is not democratic or compassionate because he sees it as a way to 
make his readers react in a specific way to specific stimuli.  In democratic art, or under 
the aesthetic regime, Rancière argues,  
 
the spectator who experiences the freeplay of the aesthetic in front of the “free 
appearance” enjoys an autonomy of a very special kind.  It is not the autonomy 
of free Reason, subduing the anarchy of sensation.  It is the suspension of that 
kind of autonomy.  It is an autonomy strictly related to a withdrawal of power.  
The “free appearance” stands in front of us, unapproachable, unavailable to our 
knowledge, our aims and desires.  The subject is promised the possession of a 
new world by this figure that he cannot possess in any way. (“The Aesthetic 
Revolution” 117) 
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The aim of sincerity is to force the production of a world through art’s seizing the 
reader or spectator.  It is about authorial control.  The lack of control over television is 
what Wallace dislikes so much about it (he claims to dislike it because it must please its 
viewers out of commercial necessity, but fiction is no different).  It is compelling; it does 
effectively traffic in the affect Wallace so desires to cultivate.  Television, seemingly 
without effort, causes viewers to feel strongly for its images.  Its endless choice offers 
the reader the freedom to feel for whatever of its many stimulating texts they may desire 
without hurt or loss.  The author has no such luxury.  If the reader loses interest, she does 
not flip to a new chapter or page, generally speaking, but puts down the text.  Sincerity 
demands the cognitive flexibility of the reader, who must conform his or her modes of 
reading, along with forms of attention, to those commanded by the text.  This demand in 
turn forces a strict linkage between textual medium and political form that enables 
Wallace to call his elitist and narcissist critique of mass culture a defense of American 
democracy.  
The flip side of a morally bad dependence upon television, with its seemingly 
endless variety of short-term and immediate pleasures, and its ensuing structures of 
hyper attention, is a sustained appreciation for boredom.  In his final, unfinished novel, 
The Pale King, one of Wallace’s unnamed narrators prophetically declares that “the 
world of men as it exists today is a bureaucracy,” and the key to life within it is “the 
ability to deal with boredom,” that with immunity “to boredom, there is literally nothing 
you cannot accomplish” (439, 440).  In the selection of his working notes that 
accompany the novel, Wallace remarks that the way to true pleasure in modern life he 
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has discovered and wants to convey to readers likewise lies “on the other side of 
crushing, crushing boredom.”  This boredom is one that “one must first embrace.”  “Pay 
close attention,” he says “to the most tedious thing you can find … and, in waves, a 
boredom like you’ve never known will wash over you and just about kill you” (548).  
Rather than divert one’s attention to passing stimuli that might tempt the bored 
individual, for Wallace, it is essential to persevere in scrutinizing the singular object 
through the pain of deep attention because eventually this boredom will transmute to 
“constant bliss in every atom.”  What is interesting in Wallace’s description of the 
production of infinite happiness from the discipline of boredom is that he understands its 
cause as a function of our awareness of time itself.  Redemptive deep attention is boring, 
he suggests, because what one attends to never changes.  This is also a fair description of 
the relationship of Stiegler’s individual to inter-generational structures of care.  They 
learn to change their desires in accordance to what does not.  What boredom entails in a 
very basic way is a highly conscious awareness of the ordinarily unconscious sensation 
of our existence within fluid time.  Our capacity for attention in any one moment is 
limited, but this capacity is always engaged to the full.  We feel satisfied when our 
attentions are occupied nearly to the full with a single aim we perceive as useful and 
attainable.  We have enough remaining attention to have an awareness of the opportunity 
cost of our investment of deep attention in a particular inquiry, but not so much that we 
feel we are wasting our time working on a meaningless project.  Too much stimulation 
produces the stressful sensation that the world around us is doing something more 
important than whatever it is we are stuck with; too little, our attention begins to take in 
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unimportant and uninteresting minutia.  The in-depth study of deep attention can be 
highly satisfying; this is because the object of its energy feels productive when we link it 
to larger systems of meaning.  The inquiry of boredom is not.  The more our attention 
becomes siphoned off during boring moments, out of a need to fill our capacity to pay 
attention, the greater our awareness of the great, empty stretches of uneventful time, of 
the crushing homogeneous monotony of existence.  Deep attention only becomes boring 
when we fail to find meaning in it.  What Wallace encourages is for readers to find 
themselves meaningful in any environment.  This is redemptive and a laudable aim.  
However, he does so at the expense of that environment, which he characterizes as 
posing an absolute obstacle to the production of structures of self-care, as if taking an 
interest in the passing world meant losing the opportunity to cultivate the infinite bliss of 
immersion in deep attention. 
What Wallace finds in the expansion of every moment to infinity is an absolute 
equivalence of all possible moments.  His retreat into boredom is the ultimate cultural 
safety measure in a world filled with global communications networks and the constant 
noise of living.  It is because it attempts to equate the restless stimulation of hyper 
attention or cosmopolitan consumption with the controlled focus of deep attention in 
order to restore focus and control to individuation.  If one can derive the sense of 
satisfaction associated with stimulating difference in an endless iteration of the same, 
there is no need to look beyond oneself, beyond an otherwise empty landscape for the 
materials of self- and world-making.  Each moment of individual, isolated self-reflection 
already contains the world.  The perfection of boredom is the exercise of complete 
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control over how others, including media, may stimulate and influence one’s individual 
and political composition.  In surpassing boredom, Wallace devalues entirely the need 
for curiosity, interaction, movement, and change.  In the end, the total extension of deep 
attention, of loving care for the mundane, promises a completely fulfilling stasis free 
from the risk of immersion within chaotic streams of life.    
In a discussion of his views on pedagogy, Rancière suggests that revolutionary 
art, work like Wallace’s, fails to achieve its emancipatory ends because it continues to 
insist on a hierarchy of knowledge that institutes a permanent gap between artist and 
audience (The Emancipated Spectator 8).  This proposition certainly is the case with 
Wallace’s assessment of the plight of American TV viewers with its insistence on 
passive viewers and active writers.  For Rancière, knowledge is not a thing passed from 
teacher to pupil or writer to reader, but rather a habit of inquiry, a recognition that all 
intelligence is a process of translating one form of sign into others.  “[E]ach intellectual 
act,” he writes, “is a path traced between a form of ignorance and a form of knowledge, 
a path that constantly abolishes any fixity and hierarchy of positions with their 
boundaries” (11).  The position of the emancipatory “ignorant schoolmaster,” capable of 
addressing gaps between persons differently situated, is one Wallace is incapable of 
occupying because he speaks out of a belief that there is a profound need to recuperate 
his readers from a flawed, ignorant perception of their status as a community emerging 
from their collective, though isolated, participation in TV watching.   
Because Wallace is continually redeeming America from the stupidity and 
laziness of its consumption decisions, he can never allow that Americans might reach a 
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point of equality in communication from which they could enjoy the sort of human 
contact he desires.  His moral message is not emancipatory precisely because it attempts 
to restore people to their proper place in relationship to art and politics.  It tells people 
what it can mean to be a human being and places limits beyond which people cannot 
responsibly or respectably pass.  In the end, Wallace’s efforts to liberate readers from 
their addictions ends up caught in the feedback loop he sees them trapped within, 
because he does not want to allow for the transformation of information through the 
operation of human knowledge upon it.  Moralities and the communities they represent 
are not static goods.  What goes into a community in the form of representation does not 
come out intact when it is received by an audience.  The art a community collectively 
views may indeed structure them, but it does not do so in a programmatic or uniform 
way.  Instead, each viewer enacts upon consumed art a profound transformation as he or 
she applies unique knowledges of being human to it.     
The Vanishing Individual: Plasticity and Chaos in the Cosmopolitan Vision 
of Hari Kunzru’s Transmission 
What I want to consider as I turn from Wallace’s work is a potentially different 
relationship between author and readers, text and public.  Where Wallace’s appeal to 
feeling for others normalizes its expression within white America, deploying 
cosmopolitanism as discourse of exceptionalism, Hari Kunzru’s novel, Transmission, 
uses appeals to American commercial culture in order to destabilize the nation as the 
center of a coherent identity.  People may have common feelings and interpretations of 
the significance of events or values, but what connects them is not an institutionalized 
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site of cultural production.  Instead, the constant movement of texts, in conjunction with 
entirely unpredictable events, allow people everywhere an unprecedented level of free 
play as they conceive notions of personal loyalty and make claims upon the value of 
political affiliation.  Kunzru’s chaotic play with global media follows Bruce Robbins’s 
efforts to move cosmopolitanism away from projects linked to the production of identity 
and from affect, which Kunzru’s work suggests is too intimately bound with processes 
of institutionalization and exploitation.  We are cosmopolitan regardless of how we feel 
or with what we identify.  In Ulrich Beck’s terms, people are connected because the 
consequences of lives, as well as those of uncontrollable natural events, do not 
correspond to artificial boundaries.  The consequences of the shift from a 
cosmopolitanism of inventive will power to one of material conditions are not limited to 
the global risks associated with disaster or to transnational economy.  Treating 
cosmopolitanism as a material condition of global economy also affects psychic 
individuation as texts transmitted within digital networks instantaneously cross 
international boundaries.  Kunzru’s depiction of appeals to nationality within global 
space helpfully questions the explicit link between a particular attentive form and 
ensuing forms of community.  The idea that the novel, for instance, produces the nation 
presumes that the consuming individual who comes to feel for the community known as 
the nation does so free of local influences, in a way that does not tear him or her apart in 
myriad directions and that feeling for the nation results in some meaningful form of 
solidarity rather than frustration and exclusion.  The chaotic global flow of texts at the 
present helps make plain that even if someone comes to feel exclusively in terms of 
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nationality, to do so is already a way of addressing affect that circulates globally.  It is to 
choose to ignore the world at large pressing in on oneself.   
Transmission tells two interdependent stories, one of Arjun Mehta, an Indian 
computer programmer, who attempts to live the life of an Indian-American immigrant 
character he sees in a Bollywood romance, and the other of Guy Swift, a hyper-
privileged British marketing executive, who meets his downfall through a disastrous 
plan to brand the EU’s border police.  Although their lives never intersect directly, their 
individual actions have profound effects on one another.  Guy’s business is the source of 
the sort of branding that enables Arjun to live within fantasies about immigration to 
America, and the computer virus Arjun creates in a last-ditch effort to prove his value to 
the American anti-virus software firm employing him erases Guy’s identity in European 
security databases just as the EU begins an immigration sting Guy has helped 
popularize.21  As the two set narratives of identity circulating beyond their control, and 
anyone can claim to feel aligned with narratives, values, or affects originating from any 
physical or cultural location, narrative itself loses its ability to ground a meaningful 
sense of self on identity.  Each character embodies a new sort of community that fulfills 
the other’s desire for recognition, but at the same time inadvertently undermines the 
other’s ability to claim exactly the sort of identity they desire.  What emerges in the 
novel through Guy’s and Arjun’s mutual experience of subjective erosion is a form of 
cosmopolitanism in which systems of textual production and distribution do affect the 
shape and effect of communities upon real individuals but cannot regulate how such 
effects take shape or transform as they circulate within the public spaces that make them 
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meaningful. 
Kunzru takes the same premise as Wallace, that television consumption and its 
meta-discourse of brand identity have effects on how we imagine ourselves and our 
communities, but situates the cosmopolitanism of globally circulating media within an 
overarching discourse of radical democracy.  The uncontrollable movement of 
information across transmission disrupts the policing of identity in Transmission and 
defines cosmopolitan communication as the site of dissensual politics.  Kunzru deploys 
cosmopolitanism in two directions within the novel.  His chaotic cosmopolitanism 
redefines community as shared implication in global events instead of affect, political 
affiliation, or identity.  The devaluation of identity as the basis of politics that globally 
circulating texts accomplish also creates a different set of possibilities for 
cosmopolitanism, with its continual transformation and plasticity of meaning, to 
reconfigure political action on a global scale.  The effacement of identity within 
Kunzru’s cosmopolitanism is not a threat to identity qua sense of self; instead, it 
decouples the link between social capital and the institutional management of rights.  His 
novel’s depictions of outsiders’ attempts to claim the right to the life depicted within 
American Dream narratives reveal the degree to which America is not America, that the 
projected coherence of any national identity is primarily a means to protect the market 
value of its cultural exports and to validate international policy.  In place of an 
Americanized America, Kunzru’s America becomes the nexus of global feelings 
associated with the consumption of U.S. dominated popular culture. 
Transmission’s rhetorical structure is fairly straightforward and can be 
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summarized according to three related claims.  First, Kunzru insists on the proposition 
that all acts of communication are subject to distorting noise.  No form of attention 
results in the perfect maintenance of intergenerational structures of care.  The answer his 
narrator supplies to the question, “How many people must be involved for certainty to 
dissipate?” is “two” (146).  His position challenges Stiegler’s claim that media, or any 
institution for that matter, can seize control of the process of individuation through the 
management of tertiary retentions alone.  The problem this position addresses does not 
concern the expansion of societies of control but rather the way individuals respond to 
texts within any society, either flexibly or plastically.  When individuals perceive their 
global position as precarious, they subsequently feel obliged to internalize those 
affective and attentive structures accompanying media associated with powerful or 
dominant cultural narratives.  To manage what Judith Butler refers to as their 
“precarity,” consumers with low self-esteem or from impoverished and oppressed parts 
of the world imagine themselves participating in exceptionalist narratives originating 
from dominant locations, like America.  If they resist flexibility’s reduction of humanity 
to economic value, they appropriate such narratives as their own, and in fact, only this 
latter, plastic act of consumption ever occurs.  The idea of flexibility is a rhetorical 
strategy for managing the dominant culture’s interaction, on an affective level, with 
those it has marginalized.   
In more mundane terms, the signals we emit – our words, gestures, stories – 
cease to be our own in public space and take on surprising new forms by merit of their 
very circulation.  This is true of individuals speaking face-to-face and of aggressively 
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marketed commercial texts exported across national boundaries.  Even if we imagine 
ourselves within some stable community, the people we identify as our fellows probably 
imagine what we share in different ways.  There is always, Kunzru’s narrator claims, “a 
chance for noise to corrupt the signal.”  The children’s game of telephone is a good 
example of the ubiquity of noise: the message whispered into the first player’s ear bears 
no resemblance to what is finally spoken aloud at the end of the circle, whether because 
of misunderstood words, inattention, or deliberate invention.  The production of identity 
is the same.  We may believe a set of texts produces a shared affect, but even with a 
consistent label, the experience of affect is individual and transforms the nature of a 
received text.22  Nonetheless, each participant has heard a message and furthered its 
circulation.  This is Kunzru’s second big claim.  In the aftermath of Arjun’s virus, the 
narrator reflects, “Do you know anyone who Leela did not touch in some way?” (254).  
Despite the distorted form in which we receive all communication, messages do circulate 
globally in ways that affect, or touch, all of us.  While a particular text may be associated 
with a national tradition or culture, it does not circulate within a limited body and is not 
received within a controlled environment.  Everyone everywhere may feel for it and the 
feelings they may have can take on any form.   
We “have drenched the world in information” the narrator continues, but we 
pursue the cosmopolitan expansion of information’s affective range out of a primordial 
“hope that the unknown will finally and definitively go away” (253).  Wallace’s own 
desire to communicate feelingly is a case in point.  The impulse to communicate is not 
innocent.  This is Kunzru’s third proposition.  As his description indicates, 
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communication is always about exerting power over a representational field.  Successful 
communication defines the narratives by which communities take shape and does so by 
identifying a portion of a cultural milieu as signal and another as noise.  It suggests ways 
in which an individual can claim, exploit, or make use of social capital by becoming a 
particular kind of someone.  By internalizing and re-transmitting a specific message, an 
individual attempts to root him- or herself in a stable, institutional site of abstract value 
production, whether the nation or something more prosaic like a brand name.  One signal 
becomes information and another noise out of a relation of imbalanced power.  What 
Kunzru entertains, and what makes his work interesting and complex, is the idea that, 
contrasted with a writer like Wallace, it is in the abandonment of the subject to the play 
of transmission that individual life becomes possible.  Only by giving up the attempt to 
justify one’s dominance over cultural space does cultural space become democratic.  
Although communication is about overcoming noise with some form of clarity, in a 
cosmopolitan context, a great deal of noise escapes regulation and continues to circulate 
beneath disciplinary observation.  Cut loose from the constraints of identity rubrics, 
narratives that define what it means to be a successful Englishman or what America 
offers the world, Kunzru’s individuals circulate wildly within imaginary cosmopolitan 
spaces that never take hold, that cannot be flexible because they do not accede to the 
static demands of any institution, but which continually gesture toward human plasticity. 
The plot of Kunzru’s novel is set into motion in the fateful moment when Arjun 
watches Naughty Naughty, Lovely Lovely, the latest Bollywood romance sensation 
starring Leela Zahir, already the object of his fantasies.  A very emotionally confused 
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and idealistic young man, Arjun gazes raptly at the screen and concludes that the film 
was a prophetic message meant specifically for him, “nothing less than a call to change 
his life” according to its narrative (33).  It depicts another young man, Dilip, who, very 
much like Arjun, is well educated, but discontented with his life in India.  The 
predictable introduction of a charming and wealthy but indifferent Indian-American girl 
home for a visit suggests to Arjun a template for worldly success: “the key to his 
beloved’s heart lies in acquiring NRI status” (34).  The film is so seductive to Arjun, 
because, whereas real-live people “were a chasm, an abyss” spilling forth inexplicable 
“violence,” “vagueness,” and “unknowable motivations” that weave together “into a 
nightmarish social world,” narrative fantasy offers him a structured alternative.  (101).   
Even though he realizes one should not “make a major life decision on the basis of a 
movie,” and that the plan he concocts from it is no more than a daydream, for Arjun, a 
rigidly controlled daydream is nonetheless an obviously “preferable choice,” because it 
responds to his “commands, reconfiguring itself according to well-understood 
operations” (33, 14).  A film or dream, Arjun here suggests, holds its appeal by making 
the promise that identity remains stable across time and space, that people can be known 
and predicted.  Arjun’s conscious decision to transform himself according to the 
narrative constraints and values the film endorses exemplifies the effects of 
cosmopolitan flexibility.  Since the success of the film’s hero depends on his 
assimilation to American society, although it is a product of the Indian film industry and 
Bollywood conventions, it extends American exceptionalism to global terrain.  Only by 
rewriting India as American from an Indian perspective can an individual like Arjun 
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fulfill his desires.  To be employable to an American software company, Arjun must first 
appear marginally American and understand himself as pursuing American desires.  This 
is the tyranny of flexibility.  It ties success to a particular identity rather than to kinds of 
actions or behaviors, or even suspect narratives like “hard work leads to wealth,” toward 
which an individual could actually work.   
Arjun’s total seduction to the American values on display in commercial cinema 
echoes Stiegler’s and Wallace’s paranoid fears that commercial culture destroys more 
genuine and local structures of care.  Watching the film, Arjun identifies absolutely with 
its hero.  However, Kunzru repeatedly suggests he does so not because film has 
inherently seductive qualities, but because Arjun suffers from Asperger’s syndrome.  
One of the defining traits of Asperger’s is susceptibility to overwhelming fascination 
with minutia.  The problem Kunzru’s characterization of Arjun suggests is not of an 
insufficiently committed attention, one spread too thin across a plethora of sources, but 
rather of one over-zealously searching for patterns on which the consumer may define a 
stable sense of identity.  In other words, deep attention is more susceptible to cultural 
imperialism because it does not actively seek out outside stimuli that complicate 
communication’s signal to noise ratio.  Arjun’s deep attention toward cinema sustains 
the illusion that it expresses a direct communication of cultural values, free of noise.  
Kunzru’s pathologization of Arjun parallels Malabou’s own evaluation of neoliberal 
flexibility.  As a consequence of a cognitive disorder, Arjun’s efforts to find himself 
within Dilip echo the contemporary individual’s difficulty switching between deep and 
hyper attention.  Even though Arjun is a film consumer, which critics like Hayles and 
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Stiegler associate with hyper attention, he is operating according to the principles of 
deep attention.  He believes that pursuing inquiry into the structural features of the 
cinematic genre holds the key to his personal success, as if becoming an attentive 
consumer of its attentive forms can refashion his identity.  His consumption entails 
absolute flexibility.23  
We can see the negotiation between idem and ipse, and particularly the way it 
involves the effective deployment of attentive forms, at work in the way Arjun relates to 
the world through film.  The film he is obsessed with, like any other, deploys characters 
as models of ideal human possibilities and inserts them into a bland story about the 
inevitable successes that accompany hard work.  Although set in India, it tells the story 
of the American Dream.  What is appealing about the film is its promise that life 
generally does work out for the best.  It finds a way to comfort uncertain viewers.  Arjun 
translates the film’s narration of character into a formula for his own desire for self-
actualization, in which he feels frustrated in part because he comes from a lower-middle 
class family.  He makes the faulty assumption that orchestrating the same set of general 
events as those depicted on-screen will render himself identical to the character and 
produce similar results.  Notice here, the shift from same to self.  Faithfulness to oneself, 
in the sense of the self as an unfolding event, evokes plasticity’s capacity to refuse 
narrative as a form of automatic definition.  To remain faithful to the abstract self 
requires the ready ability to detach one’s attention from acculturated objects of attention.  
To make Dilip his model for reality, Arjun must reduce all of subjectivity to the sort of 
identity inhering in stable categories and give up the ability to adapt or deviate from 
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these templates.  He must sustain deep attention at all costs.  In this case, his deep 
attentiveness to film distracts Arjun from the material realities evident in his everyday 
life.  For example, when in a job interview for what is clearly a slimy transnational 
temping agency, Arjun notices his interviewer’s glamorous appearance, especially his 
cool sunglasses, but not his instant readiness to offer Arjun a position without examining 
his credentials or providing any specifics on the job itself.     
The narrative Arjun creates about his relation to his fictional hero makes his own 
sense of self about rigid consistency with the generic structure of romantic heroism – he 
needs to be the same across time and space.  While the subjectivities we produce through 
narrative are not inherently destructive, Kunzru’s novel suggests that the disjunction 
opened up through fidelity to actions, or the choices immanently available within 
provisional contexts, where narrative continuity is hegemonic, is what generates 
cosmopolitan solidarity.  For example, after witnessing his American friend and crush 
Chris Schnorr kiss another woman, Arjun feels deeply confused and disappointed 
because he cannot incorporate her actions into his adopted narrative framework.  He has 
feelings for her; as the hero of his story, he is supposed to be the exclusive object of her 
desire and she is supposed to be unspoiled, pure, and heterosexual.  His is not a moral 
outrage, nor is his confusion the result of a limited understanding of sexuality.  He was 
“familiar with lesbianism,” a “favorite theme of the CD-ROMs Aamir sold at Gabbar 
Singh’s Internet Shack” (76).   Instead, Christine’s interest in another woman disturbs 
Arjun because it does not fit within the romantic narrative he has adopted as his basis for 
reading life, and his exclusive attention to such narratives has him at a loss.  He is 
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equally upset to learn that Chris “lived and slept with” her boyfriend Nicolai when “they 
were not married” (75).   Arjun can only respond to this new information within the 
confines of a rigid deep attentiveness by reducing her identity to his schematic 
understanding of human character.  Since he is a student of romance, he must fit Chris 
into a romantic narrative to make her meaningful.  He demands her flexibility to his 
Indian reading of American conventions.  First, he thinks “her limit-definition” for 
relationality “was unsound” and proposes “a less vague system” using “measurable 
criteria” structured around the “performance of particular sex acts” (75).  Next, he 
attempts to categorize Chris’s non-normative behavior with the direct question, “Is there 
a word for someone like you?” (76).  He is interested in her, but her sexual activity does 
not lead to the fairy-tale ending he has in mind.  The whole encounter leaves Arjun 
feeling violated, as if Chris had “flayed away a skin of romantic possibility” (78).  From 
it, he realizes he cannot have the love he imagined with her.  Chris’s plasticity, her 
refusal to adopt the form of his vision of the world, starts in motion a comprehensive 
explosion of Arjun’s own sense of self. 
The simplicity of Arjun’s conclusion that a responsive dream can serve as a 
model for reality corresponds to Guy Swift’s interpretation of product branding.  He 
practices what he refers to as “Total Brand Mutability,” a marketing technique that 
reduces a brand’s identity to whatever images bear cultural capital at the moment.  For 
Guy, the embodiment of hyper attention, life’s meaning does not come from any one 
source.  Instead, life takes shape in a cosmopolitan and provisional matrix of 
consumption options.  His cosmopolitan consumer exists as the center of gravity for a 
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series of “intersecting value circles that he visualized as defining his life” (67).  The 
range and weight of these circles, like Guy’s mutable brand image, may at any time 
shift, but together, whatever their substance, define the conglomerate expression of need 
that is Guy.  An effective brand is so because it acknowledges something common to a 
wide audience base and positions itself as central to that feeling or desire.  Total Brand 
Mutability finds the human in something strange or incidental and renders a consumer 
object, the marketed good, legible to the community to which it is exported.  It draws the 
world inward to the marketer’s vision of value by making its products central points of 
identification for diverse peoples.  As it does so, it creates powerful narratives, like the 
one that consumes Arjun, about what it means to be happy and successful in today’s 
busy, unpredictable world. 
Total Brand Mutability, despite the chaotic and flexible appearance Guy would 
like to associate with it, is, rather, a process of establishing narrative continuity.  It 
asserts the stability of affect across shifting product appeals.  By drawing the strange and 
unfamiliar into a personalized inner circle of stable affective signs, a successful brand 
creates a narrative of individual emotional stability.  By investing one’s identity in it, a 
consumer transforms the product into an imaginary point of refuge from change.  As 
Guy explains, it is “Human input,” or adaptation, that “creates awareness and mines the 
brand for emotion” (20).  Brands exert power over consumers, he suggests, only to the 
extent that they attract investments of deep attention into their images.  If a brand’s 
identity is the function of a public’s free investment of attention, then its materialization 
as the site of what Guy describes as “the perfect way to come together” offers a different 
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range of possibilities for community than do identity categories like race, gender, or 
nationality.  By framing his activity in this way, as a brand advocate, Guy is ineligible 
for accusations of exploitation, because his brand can only exert power through an 
individual’s active investment of power into it.  Any effect it has upon a person is the 
product of that person’s prior action upon it.  In this sense, a brand narrative is not a 
public object, but the private consequence of focusing attention on public feelings.  If a 
public, as Michael Warner has suggested, requires only attention for inclusion within its 
identity, then Guy’s marketing perspective reminds us that it also depends on the 
attention of its audience to supply the identity that attracts them to it in the first place.24  
All a brand does is bind an associative link between a feeling and a product through 
archetypal imagery.  If that is the case, then Arjun is seduced by his desire for a 
girlfriend and not by the romanticized narrative about American opportunity.  Such 
distinctions cannot be made.  It’s a little of both.   
Although his branding methodology claims to revolutionize marketing, Guy 
“didn’t want to change the world, just to be in the lead as it moved forward on its 
preordained path” (124).  The pose of flexibility Guy embodies, while exuding 
confidence within mobility, or mutability, is no more than a tenuous covering over deep-
seated anxieties about his value as a human being and the certainty of his place in the 
world.  A brand may be entirely subject to instantaneous change, but Guy’s idea is that 
these changes do not alter the common feeling they inspire.  Instead, constant change 
produces a static affective atmosphere of security and placement out of which insecure 
individuals may narrate some sort of life.  Tellingly, Guy shifts from his description of 
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branding strategies to the reassuring thought that the brands he creates insulate him from 
common folk going about their lives in a cocoon of “the even light and neutral colors of 
a present that seemed to be declaring its own provisionality,” and his home, in the In 
Vitro housing complex, whose name suggests an artificial womb-like cloistering, 
produces an effect “of absolute calm, a heavenly sense of floating free from the cares of 
the world” (20, 110).  Guy needs the privacy of his luxury apartment and the power to 
regulate the images that define public space because he wants to prove that he is his 
father’s son and that he is different from his father.  For example, when Guy feels 
flustered, he thinks back to how his father taught him to believe that “People like us 
don’t lose” while also reminding himself that his own “‘we’ was different from his 
father’s,” better for his ability to distance himself from middle-class “self-denying 
rubbish” (206).  His is a putative cosmopolitanism defined in terms of people who 
consciously craft an identity costume out of mundane consumer decisions.  They are 
detached from local limitations because their felt loyalties are to the feelings underlying 
branded images,25 which ultimately are their own desires, rather than lengthy narratives 
about past or purpose that ground the imagined nation with its inter-generational 
structures of care.26   
Total Brand Mutability is for people trying to evade the pain or risk of fixity.  As 
such, even though the idea of mutability evokes mobility amongst objects and modes of 
attention, it is a model of flexibility rather than plasticity because it requires its 
consumers to adapt to the flavor of the moment in order to stay cool.  Playing off the 
mobility of capital, Guy’s company equates identity with assets and concludes that 
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personal stability means existing in harmony with the market’s “constant cycle of fall 
and recovery” (21).  What an individual or organization wants, according to his theory of 
branding, is not to be some thing, but rather, to command attention, to exert influence in 
a way that attracts social and economic capital.  All anyone wants, it seems, is the 
feeling of value that comes with recognition.  A brand offers only the hollow promise of 
stability to those who cannot really afford to stay put.  It promises stability in mobility, 
certainty in provisionality, or the benefits of a combination of deep and hyper attention 
without the work of switching between them.  As Guy explains, “humans are social,” 
and “need relationships,” but those relationships may exist on any basis (20).  What 
brand identity is concerned with are not the narratives people imagine out of interaction 
with a particular product, that is, the way individual moments of decision accrete over 
the course of sustained deep attention to retroactively define a narrative of becoming, but 
the formation of objects saturated with particular affects that can assert the political force 
of identity without the limitations or risks of plastic consumption of narrative.  A brand 
makes a product the signifier of a feeling like happiness rather than of a value or event.  
In becoming effective, a brand serves a good or entity by making that good or entity felt 
as occupying a site of empathetic potential.  It consolidates power within a single site 
that becomes the nexus of plural feelings of identification, or, makes the world recognize 
itself as contracting toward the innermost concentric circle of the advertised thing. 
The nod to provisionality at the center of Guy’s consumerist vision of reality 
feels like a compelling and cosmopolitan alternative to norming pressures of fixed 
identities only so long as it is held entirely apart from any economic context, or as 
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Kunzu’s narrator observes, until we consider that “it would be hard to specify who other 
than himself was included” in the world Guy imagines (206).  His brands, and even ideas 
about branding, change according to his shifting desires in order to ensure that he always 
occupies an influential, lucrative place within society.  By exploiting the brand’s 
capacity for change rather than developing a thick narrative atop a product, Guy forces 
consumers to internalize the risks of the instability he feels as an entrepreneur who must 
earn his keep by attracting business and as a man who fears he can never live up to his 
parents’ expectations.  Guy’s character is problematic not because he lives in a world 
filled with branded products, or because he draws meaning from his consumption of 
them.  Instead, what makes Guy intolerable is his belief that he can master the world 
through his regulation of how branded products make people feel.  He thinks he shapes 
others through objects; they do not shape him.  Kunzru illustrates the absurdity of Guy’s 
beliefs in two disastrous episodes.  In the first finds Guy making a sales pitch to a 
fantastically wealthy oil emirate who owns a golf resort in Dubai, and the second finds 
him refashioning xenophobic EU immigration policy.   
Where he meant for his company, Tomorrow*, to rebrand “British youth sector 
business,” Guy finds in Dubai “the future, arriving at mouse-click velocity” without his 
help (168, 166).  When he finally meets Al-Rahman, Guy is surprised to learn his client 
has a passion for golf (168).  To compensate for his own complete lack of understanding 
Guy decides he wants to find out “What does Al-Rahman actually stand for?,” assuming 
the family name is, like any other good or service, an image in need of a positive 
emotion (171).  Guy proceeds to explain to his client, the Arab golf expert, that while 
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“Golf is great,” he is concerned whether it is “really something your people can get 
behind” (171).  His understanding of the narrative underlying golf’s consistent identity is 
one of “freedom” and “style.”  His confusion is the product of his Arjun-like inability to 
reconcile his need for consistency with the fact that Al-Rahman is Arab and his resort is 
located in the Middle East.  Guy only understands freedom and style as elements of 
stories about the West, whereas Arab people are oppressive Islamic fundamentalists or 
terrorists who cannot credibly project an interest in a genteel pursuit like golf.  His 
rebranding of the resort centers on the racist slogan “‘There is no game but golf and Al-
Rahman is its prophet,” unfolding elegantly in “your traditional Arabic calligraphy 
style” (171).27  The stylistic change is an obvious attempt to stabilize Guy’s momentary 
disorientation at the sight of Dubai’s conspicuous wealth through an Orientalist appeal.  
Not surprisingly, Al-Rahman rejects Guy, explaining that he likes “to do business with 
people who respect the things I do” (172). 
Determined to cast his client in the role of a backward and confused foreigner in 
need of help, Guy describes a brand image, in language eerily evocative of Wallace’s 
pleas for redemptive fiction to provide Americans with a guide for how to feel, as a 
device that “help[s] you to make your choice” when shopping and “nurtures and protects 
you like a caring parent” by reassuring that the choice you have made feels good (170).  
A brand filters out the uncertainty of life for insecure consumers.  Like Guy’s apartment, 
a brand promises consumers an artificial private shelter from the instability of the public 
world.  His reading of the brand is highly revealing.  First, it shows how Guy modulates 
his presentation of who he is and what he does in response to a preconceived 
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understanding of geopolitical power relations.  As an Englishman, Guy suspects his 
Middle Eastern client must be anxious about participating in the world of modern 
consumerism.  Since Al-Rahman is a foreigner, but one with money, Guy presents his 
form of branding as a means of entering into a desired community.  He assumes a 
paternal role toward his customer despite the awe-inspiring display of wealth and power 
that makes even him uncomfortable.  His pitch targets a person stuck with but not 
actually comfortable within the fluidity of life, someone who feels his place in life 
threatened and who must flexibly conform to the demands of capital.  This person is 
certainly not a man like Al-Rahman, but it does describe Guy, who, after his failure, 
fears his life is a “structure wrapped around a vast emptiness” (173).  Al-Rahman does 
not need to cater to British Orientalist fantasies about the Middle East.  Guy’s branding 
only works because it speaks to the aspirational desires of people forced into movement 
against their will, and his failure to realize this is a product of his own need to maintain 
the image of himself as a savvy insider who is not so constrained.   
Guy’s second pitch goes better, but exposes him to the very precarity he attempts 
to cover over because it is such a success.  In anticipation of a massive tightening of 
immigration policy and deportations, Europe’s border police headquarters in Belgium 
plans to rebrand its agents’ uniforms.  Where Guy presents branding as a gentle guide 
for helpless consumers in search of a nurturing community in his presentation to Al-
Rahman, what he describes for EU bureaucrats overtly facilitates violence and exclusion.  
“The border,” he points out to his enthusiastic audience, “is not just a line on the earth 
anymore,” but a negotiation of personal “status … opportunity” (235).  Using a brand as 
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a way to express the desire to be “one of the gang” is perfectly fine when it relates to 
leisure activities and hobbies.  Advertising a golf resort as the most exclusive in the 
world is elitist, but not entirely objectionable.  In the context of the border police, 
however, the status and opportunity to which Guy euphemistically refers through a 
glamorous “metaphorics of leisure” and “club culture” stand for racial and national 
identity and economic class (239).  The border agent he describes as the continent’s 
bouncer effectively sends the message that “you should only try to get past … if you’re 
wearing the right kind of clothes,” or class and nationality (239-40).  Unlike a clubbers, 
though, the people being bounced from Europe are asylum seekers, displaced persons, 
and the destitute.  Despite his general buffoonery, in the middle of his pitch, Guy makes 
the profoundly incorrect observation that citizenship is just “a question of attitude” 
(235).  His confidence that through effective branding, a person “can be on the inside” 
and still be made to feel “on the outside,” reveals the extent to which the rights and 
privileges associated with legal citizenship are, in practice, only the effect of a 
community’s willingness to acknowledge an individual’s performance of its brand 
identity.28  At the same time, he fails to note that this willingness is largely a matter of 
capital.  So, despite a mutable appearance, branding is a form of maintaining the 
narrative continuity of the community or product it defines.  People who fail to conform 
to mutable ideals or standards lose the protections accorded to those who keep up with 
the tone set by the state.  By reconfiguring the border police in a very visible way as an 
agency unified against outsiders, Guy’s project re-territorializes those lines abstracted 
away from the map to a degree the state could never legitimately approach through overt 
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political actions.  His mediation of border patrol agents’ contact with unwanted refugees 
and asylum seekers through the image of clubbing de-politicizes Europe’s assertion of 
power over the mobility of its citizens that allows a return to the degree of regulation 
remembered within its past of “fascist grandiosity,” to achieve an inadmissible “sinister 
aim of final consensus,” without the taint of overt violence (232). 
Guy’s border is only “in your mind” but the power it authorizes is not (235).  As 
his venture capitalist Yves claims, “people don’t give a shit about power, not really, not 
if it looks cool” (243).  The attitude the two express corresponds to what Sloterdijk calls 
the paradox of modern conservatism, that the more repressive a regime is, “the more 
violently must the rhetoric of freedom be hammered into the people’s heads” (185).  His 
own example follows a different history of xenophobic violence across Dostoevsky’s 
Grand Inquisitor.  The Inquisitor, he says, does operate out of utopian principles.  He is 
perverting religion in a way that exploits his followers, but does so in order that 
eventually people will, through greater oppression, begin to feel more free.  Since the 
Inquisitor’s force defines public reality, only he knows the pain of inauthenticity.   
Likewise, Guy and the EU bureaucrats feel the violence underlying the pleasurable 
surface of public life they rebrand as European clubland.  Sloterdijk describes this 
posture as exemplary of modern cynicism, that is an attitude cynical about one’s means 
but religiously inflexible about the ends (192).29  Guy’s rebranded Europe is an 
exclusive place that not just anyone can inhabit.  Its horrific new deportation policy 
guarantees stability and opportunity for the lucky few permitted to remain.  According to 
cynical logic, mass violence is just as good a means to reach this point as any other.  
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Although Guy cynically believes belonging is all about attitude and that attitude can 
modulate to signal belonging in any community, his critical intersection with 
disciplinary power reverses his formula: belonging, the possession of power, allows one 
the privilege to play with signs of identity, like attitude. 
The power Guy has failed to give a shit about is based on an assumption about 
information equally naïve as Arjun’s reading of cinema: that the border can be rendered 
solid through “common information collection and retrieval” (234).    In a novel 
obsessed with noise and miscommunication, this reliance is an obvious weakness.  When 
Arjun realizes that love in America does not correspond to what he saw in Bollywood, 
he reacts violently on a local scale to restore the viability of his vision of reality.  When 
Chris, who pities his virginity, sleeps with Arjun in moment of drunkenness, he takes her 
attention as confirmation that she finally sees him as the hero of their shared story.   His 
reaction temporarily allows him to go on living comfortably.  Although naïve, Arjun is 
also highly cynical.  He will deploy any means to attain the end of narrative continuity, 
to preserve the world contained within his obsessive devotion to cinema.  Retreat into 
fantasy stabilizes Arjun’s grasp of reality momentarily.  However, shortly after having 
sex, Arjun falls victim to a cycle of massive layoffs.  Distracted by romantic narrative 
making, he fails to notice the severity of his situation until his supervisor calls him in for 
an “employee encounter” (90).  As he listens to the grim news that he will lose his job 
and be forced to return to India penniless and in shame, Arjun “realizes” that the events 
he is swept up in are not “his story because this was not how his story went,” someone 
“had made a mistake” (90).  The pain he feels in his moment of panic is, once again, that 
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of exposure to discontinuity in his process of narrative subjectivity.  The distractions of 
material reality force him to depart from the exclusivity of deep attention.  
Unemployment threatens the endpoint of the romance narrative, and without a clear 
destination, Arjun fears the validity or solidity of his self in both past and future 
becomes invalid.  Given his assessment of the situation, all Arjun needs to do is follow 
the contours of the narrative that is his, or learn to better tune out hyper attentiveness to 
the world developing around him.  When heroes face troubles, they use their 
inventiveness to save the day.  Arjun acts as if he was in the midst of “any other 
technical problem” (92).  To save his job at the struggling anti-virus company, he needs 
to create demand, to prove himself his company’s hero.  He does this by programming 
and then releasing an incredibly adaptable virus spread through an email attachment 
bearing the image of Leela Zahir, the star of Naughty Naughty, Lovely Lovely.   
When Arjun’s computer virus scrambles an EU census database, Guy finds 
himself the victim of the action his work glamorizes.  Mistaken for an Albanian gangster 
seeking asylum in Germany, Guy is forced half-naked into a holding cell and eventually 
winds up entirely nude on a beach outside Naples after smugglers toss him overboard 
(259).  Guy’s slippage through the cracks of the information system in which the EU is 
so confident reveals the fallacy of his assumption that the line between insider and 
outsider can be marked by branded images.  Despite his passport, Queen’s English, and 
concerned friends, Guy himself becomes subject to total brand mutability.  His attention 
to the appearances of insiderness and outsiderness do not ensure recognition by the 
powers enforcing identity.  The information system’s failure exposes the threat of 
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violence against individuals endorsing the Total Brand Mutability lifestyle of flexible 
capital.  Guy cannot control his image or its reception.  It is totally mutable, and as such, 
can, without warning, become detached from the security and comfort he associates with 
branding itself.  Following the realization of the inevitability of radical insecurity in the 
modern world, Guy retreats from public life entirely.  As his narrative closes, we find 
him living in a remote village, unlisted in public registries.  To cope with his experience 
of contingent violence, Guy develops an arcane system of reading geomagnetism as a 
source of psychic “distortion in the earth’s natural energy field” and gives solid form to 
wet clay as a potter (258).  For Guy, the solution to the risk of public life is surrender, 
irrelevance.  He no longer engages with the outside world but he does remain in it, a 
person commanding some dignity and the right to exist.  What he doesn’t admit, but 
seems to have learned from his experience, is that he can be what he wants to be only by 
ensuring that he is not publically visible.  So long as he does not interact, is no one to the 
market, the world of targeted marketing and surveillance will leave him to his “sincere 
pots” (259).   
The devastation the Leela virus unleashes is the fault of his flawed understanding 
of reality, but, unlike Guy, the reality Arjun fails to understand in his overvaluation of 
his centrality to the world places justice on his side.  Arjun lives in a fantasy world of 
Romance because the reality of his life is brutal and impossible.  When, inevitably, the 
FBI identifies Arjun as the source of the virus, which by then is causing financial chaos 
globally, Arjun goes on the lamb, attempting first to reach the nearby Canadian border.  
When he takes the wrong bus and ends up in Oregon instead, he abandons his plan and 
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heads for Mexico because flexibility in crisis is “the kind of tactic that had worked for 
Rajiv Rana in Run from Injustice” (197).  His plan, despite its inanity, seems to work.  
With a new disguise consisting of dark sunglasses and a ball cap, Arjun realizes, nobody 
“was paying attention to him” (201).  Even when he appears on the news as a “Cyber-
terror suspect,” complete with a close-up photo, his companions on the bus are 
captivated with the spectacle itself or just bored by the monotonous landscape. By 
ceasing to be the hero to those around him, and instead occupying a peripheral position 
in his own life, Arjun gains a new degree of freedom of mobility.  What actually 
happens to Arjun is unclear, however.  He does manage to run to California, but his hotel 
is raided by the FBI, who find and kill an armed Korean American teenager who had 
recognized Arjun.  Kunzru leaves a gap in the narrative between when Arjun enters the 
hotel and when his pursuers close in, a gap in which he ceases to be a concrete person 
and becomes “legend” (249).  The intense focus of media attention upon Arjun’s life and 
his subsequent disappearance makes him an object of speculation for authorities and 
rebels alike.  The official stance is that he died en route to Mexico, another nameless 
body in the desert.  Others, however, narrate out of his disappearance a “hope” for 
revolutionary causes (267).   
When Guy ceases to be a promising and wealthy young marketer and becomes a 
forger of sincere pottery in an isolated country shack, he undergoes a transformation 
from what Sloterdijk describes as a being cynical of means to kynical of ends.  Whereas 
the cynic is always invested in institutional power, directed at grand aims, the kynic 
“culminates in the knowledge … that we must snub the grand goals” (194).  The kynic 
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affirms the “meaningless of life” implied in the radical instability of total brand 
mutability or cosmopolitan mobility, “about which” Sloterdijk writes, “so much stupid 
nihilistic prattle winds itself” (203).  Instead of finding despair in the meaningless, he 
suggests an affirmative kynicism founded upon the recognition of meaninglessness 
“provides the foundation for [life’s] full preciousness.”  Devoid of the possibility of 
orchestrating the continuity between popular narrative conventions and the individual 
experience of life, or a plastic subject deploying a nuanced and supple repertoire of deep 
and hyper attentive strategies, the kynic revels in a life that may go nowhere.  This free 
play “endows meaning, energetic consciousness in the here and now” where otherwise 
only noise might be visible.  In ceasing to be the hero of his own story, Arjun becomes a 
potential hero for all sorts of heroic causes.  He may lose all tangible substance and the 
freedom to exist openly, but, in disappearing into noise, Arjun finally does become a 
romantic hero.  In the end, Guy becomes just a guy, a person.  In doing so, he absents 
himself from narrative projects.  He is a self with no continuity, no trajectory.  Arjun, 
however, becomes a purely narrative being, losing his embodied self completely.  
Despite this division, both Guy and Arjun become exactly what they desire – Guy is 
finally stable and Arjun can be the hero of anyone’s story.  Narratives about ourselves 
only work to a limited extent.  In a noisy cosmopolitan world, the risk of instability is 
unavoidable.  However, as the redemption of both characters shows, living within the 
risk of noise provides surprising opportunities.  After all, Arjun’s death is only 
speculative.  As his many admirers noted, when he fell off the face of the earth, so did 
the film star whose image he used for the virus.  As their theories suggest, the best 
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explanation for the continued absence of both is in a mutual escape from unwanted 
attention.  By losing control of his own direction, Arjun became subject to the possibility 
that he could become what he could only dream on his own. 
Notes 
1  In The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de Certeau argues that simply watching the 
media does not transform viewers into reflections of its contents.  Instead, he suggests 
that viewers perform a sort of production of a second order on media products – this is 
his consumption.  The viewer actively transforms what is sent or imposed by the media, 
not becoming like the media, but reading the media so that it is made like the viewer – 
finding something within it with which he or she may identify (30-33). 
2  Wallace’s argument recapitulates Horkheimer and Adorno’s assessment of the culture 
industry, although his concern is for American TV exclusively.  In statements Wallace 
echoes nearly verbatim, they claim that film in particular  
trains those exposed to it to identify film directly with reality.  The withering of 
imagination and spontaneity in the consumer of culture today need not be traced 
back to psychological mechanisms.  The products themselves, especially the 
most characteristic, the sound film, cripple those faculties through their objective 
makeup.  They are so constructed that their adequate comprehension requires a 
quick, observant, knowledgeable cast of mind but positively debars the spectator 
from thinking, if he is not to miss the fleeting facts (100) 
Film destroys human creativity by demanding the entirety of the spectator’s attention, 
leaving no room for imagination.  Entertainment becomes a form of labor for the 
entertainment industry.  Further, they conclude, “the original affinity between business 
and entertainment reveals itself in the meaning of entertainment itself: as society’s 
apologia.  To be entertained means to be in agreement.  Entertainment makes itself 
possible only by insulating itself from the totality of the social process, making itself 
stupid and perversely renouncing from the first the inescapable claim of any work, even 
the most trivial” (115-6).  In short, new media, because they occupy the attention of 
contemporary consumers, causing them to fail to appreciate older works and older 
values, are destroying human civilization. 
3  We see this assumption as well in discussions of cosmopolitanism, and globalization 
more broadly, which take up the matter of the fate of the nation in the current 
atmosphere of circulation.  A notable, and notorious, example is Martha Nussbaum’s 
essay “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism.”  In it, she expresses her concern that cultural 
particularity leads to a bad form of divisive patriotism that frustrates the expansion of 
humanizing cosmopolitan projects, both of which are the outcome of regimes of 
education.  While the impulse of her project, which is to envision a cosmopolitan subject 
whose “allegiances are to the worldwide community of human beings” first, is 
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admirable, what many critics have noted is that Nussbaum imagines the production of 
this community emanating from a colonizing American center.  It also moves through a 
process of normalizing global practices of defining and recognizing the human through 
textual consumption within the national classroom.  Nussbaum gives the image of 
ripples moving placidly across the surface of a body of water as a metaphor for the 
expansion of cosmopolitan consciousness.  Education, by exposing American youngsters 
to foreign cultures, she argues, allows them to perceive that what they see as human in 
themselves, or American culture, is also at the heart of what other cultures value, 
provided they approach such encounters “undeterred by traits that are strange to them, 
and eager to understand humanity in all its strange guises” (9).   
As a pedagogical device, difference in Nussbaum’s system of cosmopolitan education 
serves as an inoculation against cosmopolitan change.  By treating the other, with its 
difference, as a consumable good from which we can produce universal humanity, 
Nussbaum’s cosmopolitan students construct an homogenous global space.  The goal of 
her program, after all, is to produce subjects capable of “draw[ing] the circles” of her 
metaphor “somehow toward the center” and eventually to make “all human beings more 
like our fellow city-dwellers.”  When we do so completely, there is no longer a 
distinction between patriotism and cosmopolitanism and we no longer need to give any 
other “circle” our “special attention” (9).  As we pay attention to the “strange” 
differences of others, that which obscures the recognition of humanity evident in 
America, we do so in order to reduce it to sets of “morally irrelevant characteristic[s]” 
and practices from which we can extract practical value.  The example Nussbaum 
supplies is of attending to the “child-rearing” practices of non-Western cultures (11).  
Doing so can help Americans to understand “in what configurations families exist, and 
through what strategies children are in fact being cared for” (11).  This sensitive 
awareness presumably allows us to assert that the local differences that give rise to such 
unique practices are strange and irrelevant.  (It also makes, given the center-periphery 
imagery and language invested in West-rest power dynamics, the unintended suggestion 
that the value of such attention might lie in learning how foreigners working as childcare 
providers might have an undesired effect on their American charges).  What Nussbaum’s 
cosmopolitan education seeks to manage, then, is the way in which a national body pays 
attention to its boundaries through the act of learning, which is comparable to 
cosmopolitan consumerism.  The act of reaching outward in textual selection, which is 
comparable to hyper attentive stimulation, is grounded in a system of deep attentive 
interpretive structures that draw reading practices back inward to the production of a 
globalized national imaginary, one immunized against global influences that might 
otherwise compromise a strong sense of patriotic loyalty. 
Paying attention to human difference is not itself negative, imperialistic, or elitist.  It is 
how a particular community attempts to manage the value of particular forms of 
attending to the world that determines its relative openness or oppressiveness.  As 
Walter Mignolo argues, cosmopolitanisms, which are always plural, can be either good 
or bad, globalizing or subversive.  Every way of representing or interpreting history is 
locally bound but some, he argues, have global designs.  Nussbaum’s cosmopolitanism 
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is globalizing because it positions itself as the unquestionable center of human value.  
The difference between local histories or cultures, cosmopolitanisms with colonial 
global designs, and critical cosmopolitanisms that do not lies in the scope each assumes 
as an explanatory model for humanity.   The former possess the trappings of justice, 
equality, and a vision of a better world for all, but through these images, work to impose 
ideologically localized ways of understanding and valuating life upon the world at large, 
hence their global designs for local texts.  Cosmopolitanisms with global designs are 
resisted by the latter critical variety, whose insistence on irreducible particularity, the 
provisionality of identity, and the colonial history of others’ efforts to manage their ways 
of life, disrupts globalizing cosmopolitanisms’ utopian surfaces.  Within Mignolo’s 
plural cosmopolitanisms, all cultures potentially circulate in global space.  Local 
histories do not exist in isolation but they also do not claim to be an interpretive key for 
other local histories they contact.  There are very real differences between global 
capitalism from above and the local sites of resistance Mignolo calls critical 
cosmopolitanisms.  However, common to both is the assumption that what they struggle 
over is not to control physical territory or material resources directly.  Instead, at stake in 
such conflicts are networks of cultural distribution and the attendant power to make 
visible particular narratives about the human.  In each case, what is objectionable is the 
actual or potential development of linear and vertically structured communication 
hierarchies.  Such systems not only assume culture as a source of economic and political 
power, but move to regulate its expression.  Globalizing cosmopolitanisms offer the 
potential for us to become a harmonious community but only through conceding an 
absolute and central authority of cultural value.  At its heart, then, the debate over 
cosmopolitanism is one concerning how media are distributed and the effects our 
attentiveness to its various forms have on how communities take shape. 
4  Although Hayles understands deep and hyper attention as necessarily complementary, 
which suggests a need to develop a capacity for both, she presents her case for a 
differently balanced attention in terms of a correlation between media’s evolution and 
the pathologization of attentive forms under the rubric of ADD/ADHD, which 
consequently devalues the independent merits of emergent forms of community. 
5  In How do We Think?, Hayles responds to Stiegler’s commentary on deep and hyper 
attention, noting that while she disagrees with his tendency to villainize digital media, 
she finds his system of retentions useful nonetheless.  As my reading above suggests, 
while Hayles may be more open to the idea of new media and their value, she is still 
highly invested in the idea of the nation as the site within and for which any new mixture 
of media produces social value. 
6  The system of retentions is the subject of Stiegler’s Technics and Time volumes 2 and 
3.  For a more concise overview, see his “Relational Ecology and the Digital 
Pharmakon.” 
7  The ability of television to define how people feel for community and understand 
themselves is so devastating to Wallace because, as Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Kelly 
argue, the “sole possibility for meaning, according to Wallace, is found in the struggle of 
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the individual’s will” (45).  TV neutralizes this willfulness by supplying a steady stream 
of pleasures and consequently prevents the actualization of full human potential. 
8  Wallace’s critique of the pleasures of consumption are cynical and indicate a degree of 
cosmopolitan concern for humanity’s well-being.  Diogenes once remarked that “people 
eat for the sake of pleasure, but for that same reason are unwilling to desist from eating” 
(14).  Unlike others, who “lived to eat,” he claimed to eat “to live.”  This comment 
epitomizes Wallace’s attitude.  One must eat, but eating should not be a source of 
pleasure.  We must communicate with others to have a meaningful life, but we should 
not communicate because we find it pleasing.  Diogenes, unlike Wallace, follows up his 
moralizing with an ironic jab at himself, undoing the distinction between himself and 
others.  As Diogenes Laertius relates, when asked “whether the wise eat cakes, 
[Diogenes of Sinope] said, ‘Cakes of every kind, just like everyone else’” (15).  The 
cosmopolitan cynic takes pleasure in the world of consumption but does not feel entitled 
to its constant presence. 
9  And yet, he is aware.  Immediately before introducing his letter to black students, 
Wallace comments that the “real truth, of course, is that SWE is the dialect of the 
American elite. That it was invented, codified, and promulgated by Privileged WASP 
Males and is perpetuated as “Standard” by same. That it is the shibboleth of the 
Establishment and an instrument of political power and class division and racial 
discrimination and all manner of social inequity (107).  So, he is aware of what he is 
doing but finds it easier or more beneficial to contribute to the inequality he observes. 
10  Wallace scholars tend to defend his work according to the same gendered terms, as 
well.  For example, Paul Giles suggests that Wallace’s racial condescension is equally 
significant as the “confusion that a ‘misplaced modifier’ can create within a social 
group,” ignoring his active intent (“Sentimental Posthumanism” 336).  In a more recent 
article, he laments critics’ dismissal of Wallace as insensitive toward women with the 
complaint that for “some women readers” –  referring explicitly to Catherine Toal, 
whose article on Wallace gives an insightful analysis of his representation of depression 
–  it is “difficult to empathize in particular with some of the more schematic and 
apparently dehumanizing aspects of Wallace’s earlier style” (All Swallowed Up” 9-10).  
However, as Adam Kelly argues, the schematic in Wallace is exactly what makes his 
work significant because it marks his fiction as about “ideas” rather than trivial feelings 
(“Development through Dialogue” 268).  For Kelly, those ideas women just cannot quite 
get a hold of are those that “transcend” individual experiences and make Wallace’s 
world broadly inclusive of humanity. 
11  Wallace makes this case overtly when he complains “the very language in which 
today's socialist, feminist, minority, gay, and environmentalist movements frame their 
sides of political debates is informed by the Descriptivist belief that traditional English is 
conceived and perpetuated by Privileged WASP Males and is thus inherently capitalist, 
sexist, racist, xenophobic, homophobic, elitist: unfair” and invites us to ponder that 
injustice by considering “the tense deliberate way white males now adjust their 
vocabularies around non-w.m.'s” (Consider the Lobster 81). 
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12  And in making this distinction, Wallace relies on a moral devaluation of 
consumption.  Things people purchase or which are complicit with commercial 
enterprise involve acts of consumerism, consumers are motivated to purchase by 
pleasure, and for Wallace, basing decisions off of pleasure destabilizes political 
community.  How fiction, which is also distributed in the form of consumer goods, could 
escape this context, is not detailed in Wallace’s argument.  Instead, he supplies the 
proposition that fiction writers do not depend on the reader’s good opinion for their 
livelihood as do TV producers.  This is another obviously problematic claim.  What 
makes his attempt to support his reasoning on this distinction interesting, though, is that 
historically, defenders of nationalism have consistently attacked cosmopolitanism on the 
grounds that cosmopolitan subjectivities are just too consumeristic (see Walkowitz). 
13  It is significant that as Wallace defines the subject of fiction, he conflates the writer’s 
desire to be a witness with the ordinary individual’s voyeurism.  To be a witness to a 
scene is to determine its structuring principles, to give meaning to its appearance.  
Witnessing implies an active agent who defines the meaning of an absent scene for 
others in order to communicate its meaning publicly.  A voyeur, by contrast, is one 
whose desire is fulfilled through the act of observing another.  The very secrecy of the 
act suggests that what the voyeur gains is for personal use rather than public knowledge.  
By juxtaposing the two, Wallace’s formulation of the writer-viewer relationship suggests 
a writer who takes pleasure in structuring another’s experience of subject formation and 
a reader who is pleased by the structures fiction puts on display. 
14  At this point, it is useful to think of the performance occurring in the internalization 
of social values common to both viewing and reading in Judith Butler’s terms rather than 
Wallace’s.  Butler defines the “social agent” as the product of the circulation of social 
signs.  Her agent contrasts with the phenomenological Cartesian subject who exists prior 
to language, who chooses which signs are pertinent to who it is and subsequently comes 
to think itself into certain being (270).  As Butler explains, “the appearance of 
substance” that legitimizes normative identities and hegemonic values “is precisely that, 
a constructed identity, a performative accomplishment which the mundane social 
audience, including the actors themselves, come to believe and to perform in the mode 
of belief” (271).  This belief is what underlies the defense of nationalism, as in the case 
of Wallace’s hurt and outrage.  But, the reason we perform in a particular way is that we 
feel their elements to be of value.  For instance, Sara Ahmed argues the family is happy 
“not because it causes happiness and not even because it affects us in a good way, but 
because we share an orientation toward the family as being good, as being what 
promises happiness in return for loyalty” (“Happy Objects” 37). 
15  Wallace’s subject is an individual product obscured by the intrusion of the social 
upon its thought.  It is Cartesian and ontological and this causes problems when he wants 
it to also have a primarily ethical orientation defined in terms of its ability to freely “care 
about other people and to sacrifice for them, over and over, in myriad petty little unsexy 
ways, every day” (Water 120).  As Lacan suggests, the cogito posits a subject committed 
to itself, to exploring the conditions of its own being.  Ethics, by contrast, requires a 
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subject of relationships (Four 34).  The cogito, for Lacan, offers an inadequate 
explanation of subjectivity because its understanding of thinking is autonomous and 
conscious.  As he argues, “this I think … cannot be detached from the fact that he can 
formulate it only by saying it to us” (36).  The movement of thought into being relies 
upon some real principle grounding its own reading.  This real remains outside the 
subject, in the social, and forces the subject “to reassure himself … of an Other that is 
not deceptive,” one which is not what Wallace would call ironic, “which will … 
guarantee by its very existence the bases of truth, guarantee him that there are in his own 
objective reason the necessary foundations for the very real, about whose existence he 
has just reassured himself” (36).  The truth that Wallace implicitly uses to ground his 
distinction between behavior and acting or performance -- that private individuals 
observed in voyeurism behave without motive whereas actors’ performance is 
exclusively motivated -- is one that only exists for the private, thinking individual in the 
movement of that individual into a social symbolic.  For the individual to be him or 
herself, the Other of people-watching has to simply be what it is, as it seems on the 
surface.  The consequence of this is that the Other has to be, in full, the individual’s 
desire. 
16  Lacan says something similar in “The Signification of the Phallus:” “What I seek in 
speech is a response from the other.  What constitutes me as a subject is my question.  In 
order to be recognized by the other, I proffer what was only in view of what will be.  In 
order to find him, I call him by a name that he must assume or refuse in order to answer 
me” (Ecrits 247). 
17  Foucault proposes a shift from thinking of texts as the product of an individual genius 
who owns the content therein, an Author, to moments in which new discursive 
possibilities are founded.  For Foucault, an author is “the ideological figure which one 
marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning” (Reader 119).  
Wallace’s attempt to limit the movement of national identity to serious fiction 
exemplifies this fear: the biggest threat to individuals is information coming from 
sources he does not know intimately.  By making the author our object of concern in 
interpretation, we produce questions like “Who really spoke?  Is it really he and not 
someone else?  With what authenticity or originality? And what part of his deepest self 
did he express in his discourse?” (119).  This last seems particularly relevant to 
Wallace’s concern for fiction research.  Following Foucault, I read Wallace’s work 
according to the questions “What difference does it make who is speaking?” and “Where 
has [this discourse] been used, how can it circulate, and who can appropriate it for 
himself?” (120). 
18  The circular and debilitating structure I’ve identified within Wallace’s description of 
reading is what Lauren Berlant would call “cruel optimism.”  As she explains, 
“optimism [is] the force that moves you out of yourself and into the world in order to 
bring closer the satisfying something that you cannot generate on your own” (1-2).  
Optimism is the feeling enabling empathy.  All attachments are optimistic in that they 
encourage the repetition of affective investments in expectation “ that this time, nearness 
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to this thing will help you or a world to become different in just the right way” (2).  An 
optimistic attachment becomes cruel when “the object that draws your attachment 
actively impedes the aim that brought you to it initially” (1).  Regardless of its object, 
“the content of the attachment is, the continuity of the form of it provides something of 
the continuity of the subject’s sense of what it means to keep on living on and to look 
forward to being in the world” (24).  The dynamic between cruel and ordinary optimisms 
is one Wallace is aware of as well.  He makes the distinction between addiction and 
malignant addiction, noting in terms similar to Berlant’s, that one’s “activity is addictive 
if one’s relationship to it lies on that downward-sloping continuum between liking it a 
little too much and really needing it…. But something is malignantly addictive if (1) it 
causes real problems for the addict, and (2) it offers itself as a relief from the very 
problems it causes (EUP 38).  What differentiates Wallace’s work from Berlant’s is that 
unlike Wallace, Berlant considers the possibility that people who feel attachments to 
objects of cruel optimism are still in the process of making meaningful lives.  For 
Wallace, “Television is the way it is because people tend to be extremely similar in their 
vulgar and prurient and dumb interests and wildly different in their refined and aesthetic 
and noble interests” (37).  TV might indeed appeal, as Wallace suggests, to society’s 
lowest common denominator and may even do so out of dubious economic motives, but 
people identify with its images, nonetheless and the identifications they form generate 
new possibilities for remaining optimistic in a world filled with painful uncertainty and 
instability. 
19  The individual feels lonely because his culture is predominantly ironic.  Essentially, 
this is so because TV allows viewers to sustain a fantasy that their personality is 
coincident with the world.  TV pleases the viewer by promising the fulfillment of a 
desire for a return to an undifferentiated ego, or a return to the presymbolic moment of 
the mirror stage.  Wallace scholars, Marshall Boswell in particular, have noted the 
similarity between Wallace’s critique of TV and Lacan’s mirror stage, but have 
consistently misinterpreted Lacan’s point.  Boswell, summarizing Lacan’s argument, 
suggests that the subject’s acquisition of the symbolic during the mirror stage produces a 
subject split between itself and an other who “then spends the rest of her life desiring a 
return to that lost wholeness, that lost one-to-one connection with the (m)other, and this 
desire takes the form of a series of endless substitutions – material goods, other people, 
drugs, you name it” (130).  He does not, however, connect this moment with the 
individual’s development of the ability to identify with others or to use symbolic 
language.  For Boswell, the subject’s split formation and its acquisition of language “is a 
seductive but ultimately alienating idea that can and should be overcome” by an 
alternative found in Wallace’s turn to sincerity and democracy (128).  This analysis 
rather misses the point of what Lacan has to say about the centrality of language and 
mediation to subject formation in the mirror stage, namely that the passage from the 
mirror stage into the symbolic is what allows people to empathize with others, if only 
partially and out of self-serving interests.  Boswell’s characterization of what Wallace 
wants to do with Lacan sets up his work as advocating what Lacan describes as “an 
existential psychoanalysis” (Écrits 80).  In their attempt to find a selfless good deed, an 
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act not motivated by personal desire, this sort of existential thinking leaves the subject 
trapped in a series of “impasses” or as Wallace frequently puts it, “double-binds”: “a 
freedom that is never so authentically affirmed as when it is within the walls of a prison; 
a demand for commitment that expresses the inability of pure consciousness to 
overcome any situation; a voyeuristic-sadistic idealization of sexual relationships; a 
personality that achieves self-realization only in suicide; and a consciousness of the 
other that can only be satisfied by Hegelian murder” (80).  Boswell’s misreading of 
Lacan may or may not be Wallace’s own, but his description has been taken as fact 
within Wallace studies and serves as a key foundation to many readings (for example, 
David Herring describes his reading as “the clearest delineation of Wallace’s agenda and 
canon” (10)).  The problem, as I see it, that Wallace’s work addresses is not that the 
subject is alienated in language and needs to be returned to a pre-symbolic state in which 
sincerity is possible and in which self-gratification would hold no addictive appeal.  
Instead, TV disingenuously promises viewers that to be other than alienated is possible.  
Fiction, for Wallace, differs from TV because it confronts readers with the inescapable 
pain of feeling alienated. 
20  In a similar way, Lee Konstantinou proposes that Wallace moves beyond irony to a 
post-ironic discourse characterized by people who cannot but believe in personal 
“ontological convictions” (87).  Irony, he suggests, eliminates entirely “the possibility of 
belief as such,” and Wallace’s mode of addressing readers restores balance and order to 
people’s ability to make sense of the world.  One wonders what people managed to find 
meaningful in the years leading up to Wallace’s amazing intervention if belief itself was 
entirely impossible during the era of metafiction, which ironically enough coincides with 
the years of Vietnam War protest and civil rights agitation.  If Konstantinou’s claim that 
the self-referential irony characteristic of metafiction has anything at all sustainable 
about it, then it represents a pretty once-and-for-all and damning case against the genre.  
To strip people of the possibility of feeling belief is almost unthinkably monstrous.  To 
believe is to imagine that power extends beyond oneself, that one can be a self in a 
meaningful way, that existence can happen, that there is worth to living.  What a life 
devoid of the sensation of belief might look like is difficult to imagine because belief, 
treated as a general affect and not as pertaining to a particular value-system, is 
fundamental to human experience.  It is not possible to be conscious of existence without 
assuming belief in some sort of order or value.  To say that metafiction has the power to 
deprive even its most devoted readership, let alone a larger public, of such ability is 
absurd.  Take Barth, for example.  Although the short stories of his most meta-fictional 
work, Lost in the Funhouse, may be tedious and boring as hell, and even if the thought 
of re-reading them fills me with a profound feeling of despair, they do not undermine my 
ability to imagine myself as part of a larger world or to believe that there is something 
underlying the rules of social order.  In fact, despite Barth’s ironic textual gestures, his 
work, in the end, is about the playful spaces for communication and the surprising kinds 
of personhood enabled by the art of storytelling.  That is, his self-referentiallity is all 
about the ways telling a story like his enables one to go on believing in the face of 
despair and doubt.  A much better target for a critique of his work is of the type of 
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pleasure, or lack thereof, that can be taken easily from reading his work, but this is one 
that is much less dramatic, as well as less worthwhile.  If you don’t like heavy-handed 
and baroque metafiction, don’t read it. But don’t blame all of society’s ongoing 
problems on artists’ adoption of its communicative tropes.  It seems much more 
advantageous to let people communicate in whatever means feel effective or possible 
than to disallow them because they make us as individual readers feel displeased with 
our reading selection.  If metafiction does not inspire Konstantinou to want to make the 
world a better place or fails to grasp the heart of what he believes is holding his world 
back, there are plenty of other genres out there to engage with.  I think this 
dissatisfaction lies at the heart of his complaint and in his turn to “post-ironic” fiction, 
but his critique lacks the honesty to present its grounding on taste overtly.  Whatever its 
effect upon belief, for Konstantinou, post-ironic fiction also serves an important political 
function.  Freed from the shackles of irony, post-ironists, he says, become “more 
concerned with overthrowing the rule of a particular type of person, the ironist, and have 
far less to say about changing the institutional relations that give rise to this type” (106).  
Incredibly, Konstantinou presents this putative development as if it were a positive and 
inspiring one.  The post-ironic turn from addressing systemic injustices and oppressive 
power structures to petty attacks on individuals who symbolically occupy sites 
representing them along with those individuals who have made a meaningful life out of a 
relationship to public figures, in addition to its superficiality and cruelty, guarantees a 
continuation of violence against difference.  If true critique involves turning a blind eye 
to structures of inequality, it is unlikely that such structures will ever change on their 
own. 
21  Richard Brock argues that, because of the novel’s focus on computer viruses and the 
coincidence of sex with prostitutes, Transmission can be read as an AIDS allegory.  The 
parallel between transmission of computer viruses and information and biological 
pathogens can certainly be made, but to say that this is the primary point of the novel 
overstates the case (380). 
22  Incidently, this is also the point of Borges’s story, “Pierre Menard, Author of the 
Quixote,” in which a modern day writer types up Don Quixote word for word and claims 
to be the author of a new text.  Jonathan Safran Foer also relies on the individuality of 
affective experience when he claims to be the author of his Tree of Codes, a story he 
created by physically cutting most of the words out of Bruno Schulz’s short story 
collection, Street of Crocodiles. 
23  Where Kunzru identifies Arjun’s problem with his simplistic tendency to assume that 
the chain of events unfolding on screen represent a path to success, a plausible way to 
structure his own life, Paul Ricoeur argues that the problem of self-identity is a complex 
of both fidelity to one’s word, something like Foucault’s care of self, and consistency 
across time.  Narrative mediates between the description of a subject and prescriptive 
conclusions that make of the description a model for being and identification (114).  
Narrative fuses the distinction between idem, sameness or the consistency across time 
associated more exclusively with deep attention, and ipse, self or awareness of the 
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ongoing process of embodiment, a sensation that is plastic according to shifting stimuli 
and which deploys both deep and hyper attention in concert. 
24  See Warner, “Publics and Counterpublics.” 
25  Guy’s drive for constant mutability and futurity evokes what sociologist Aihwa Ong 
calls “flexible citizenship.”  The flexible citizen is an “effect of novel articulations 
between the regimes of the family, the state, and capital,” informed by an all-
encompassing immersion in “the cultural logics of capitalistic accumulation, travel, and 
displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing 
political-economic conditions” (4, 6).  Ong finds that “in their quest to accumulate 
capital and social prestige in the global arena,” flexible citizens “empathize, and are 
regulated by, practices favoring flexibility, mobility, and repositioning in relation to 
markets, governments, and cultural regimes” to the extent that “flexibility, migration, 
and relocations, instead of being coerced or resisted, have become practices to strive for 
rather than stability” (6, 19).  The flexible citizen, while concerned with toppling 
hegemonic knowledge regimes positing Western cultural and economic superiority, are 
ultimately driven by this logic of individual accumulation and opportunism, whether in 
the form of consuming the latest fashion goods or in holding passports to politically and 
economically favorable nations. 
26  The shift from the novel to the advertisement image, though, does not suggest that 
people have shifted from affective communities founded on elaborate narrative projects 
to depthless schizophrenia.  Instead, consumers engage with smaller narrative units.  As 
Guy points out at another point in the novel, branding works well because it demands 
little attention at any single point in time.  He calls this property “extreme concision” 
(207). 
27  If what’s wrong with Guy’s pitch doesn’t speak for itself, see Said, Orientalism. 
28  Or, that is, that people can be made to feel cosmopolitan.  Diogenes, the originator of 
the term, as Andreas Huyssen points out, was “the plebian outsider inside the walls of 
the city” (xvii).  Guy’s assertion is a good reminder that the feeling of detachment 
associated with cosmopolitanism is not exclusively the privilege of the wealthy, but also 
the pain and discomfort that must be borne by those with least recourse to the securities 
afforded by citizenship. 
29  This is how Kunzru differs.  Wallace, despite his forceful calls for compassion, 
remains cynical in Sloterdijk’s terms.  He is always violently committed to the moral 
idea that Americans need a kind of freedom from pleasure that he can supply by 
exposing them to the reality of pain.  The imposition of freedom through attentiveness to 
pain is his cynical means to the greater freedom of civic freedom underwriting his 
critique. 
  
 113 
 
CHAPTER III 
HUMANITARIAN INTEREST AND INTERESTING HUMANS 
In Transmission, Arjun’s and Guy’s unswerving commitments to the idea that the 
media defines clear personal, social, and political boundaries result in moments of 
violence against the self.  But unlike Wallace, who blames the proliferation of media 
networks for social degeneration, Kunzru suggests it is the attempt to live as if media in 
any form could transmit identity uncorrupted that is the source of frustration, emotional 
pain, and his novel’s dramatic portrayal of economic upheaval.  Where both Guy and 
Arjun are consumed with the belief that paying attention to the media will make a home 
for themselves in the world, Kunzru’s Leela virus offers a vision of a different 
possibility through its chaotic introduction of noise into the attempts of both to master 
communication.  Its own transmission across global networks scrambles all ordered 
concepts of identity and boundedness as it swaps, reorders, erases, and creates personal 
data.  The fluidity the virus unleashes is threatening in its unpredictability but also 
profoundly liberating in its capacity to undermine any claims to the ownership of 
representation.   The emergent cosmopolitan sociality of Kunzru’s novel is deeply 
unstable and cannot be pinned down, owned or contained, but it does not result in the 
fragmentation or negation of meaningful senses of self for his characters.  Meaning still 
occurs within Kunzru’s noisy cosmopolitanism, but it does not converge upon a single 
narrative arc or branded image.  The conspiracy theory Arjun’s life becomes is not so 
much a turn from a corrupt, because commercialized, cosmopolitanism, but rather a 
critique of the monopolization of attention’s value that occurs when sociality is limited 
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to static narratives and set channels of distribution.  His disappearance from the visual 
poses him as an ethical, cosmopolitan alternative for the production of affect-based 
solidarities in a world increasingly dominated by American cultural imperialism. 
The ethical dilemma for Kunzru’s characters results from their shared inability to 
see other people as endowed with the same degree of complexity and depth of feeling 
they value in themselves.  Instead, each treats the difference of others as a commodity 
within heavily mediated commercial discourse.  The other, for Guy and Arjun, offers 
insight into the subject, but has no chance to speak for itself.  As an ethical text, 
Transmission suggests that the image of the human face cannot be produced as an end in 
itself.  To do so reduces the other to a resource exploited on behalf of the subject’s 
production of affective and social value.  Instead, subjectivity must be the byproduct of 
an already ethical representation or encounter.  In this chapter, I look more closely at the 
question of ethics as it relates to the possibility and necessity of representing foreign 
encounters.  In particular, I am interested in how authors depict scenes of injustice and 
violence abroad to appeal to humanitarian intervention from within the nation, as a 
matter of cosmopolitan curiosity, or interest in human difference.  To do so, I consider 
works by Joe Sacco and Aleksander Hemon, both European immigrants to the U.S. 
concerned with America’s knowledge of and intervention in suffering abroad.  Although 
they write in different genres, both are fundamentally invested in the problem of 
American representations of suffering others as the object of national concern.  For both, 
Americans or people living in America enjoy responsibility for the well being of global 
humanity that is satisfied through their fascination with the lives of others.  My reading 
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of both authors begins with two interdependent claims.  First, ethics necessarily appeals 
to the cosmopolitan because it attempts to systematize action across time and space; 
ethics relies upon the universal, the common.  Second, cosmopolitan politics involves a 
constant pursuit of ethicality that continually undermines all systematic articulations of 
the ethical.  My purpose in this chapter is not to declare one author more or less ethical 
than the other.  Instead, by examining liberal ethical systems that base the demand to act 
on behalf of another in the Levinasian Face, I address the ways the models for 
representation and engagement within literature about Americans involving themselves 
in humanitarian interventions abroad complicate America’s claim to ethical interest in 
global others.  
Encountering the Other: Levinas and Humanitarian Intervention 
As is well known, Immanuel Levinas founds his ethics upon a moment of 
encounter with difference.  When I look upon it, the other’s face “gives itself, all its 
weakness comes through and at the same time its mortality emerges,” he says (Alterity 
and Transcendence 104).  The very sight of the face, “without recourse, without 
security, exposed to my look and in its weakness and its mortality,” Levinas explains, is 
the “possibility of murder, that powerlessness of being and that authority that commands 
me: ‘thou shalt not kill’” (104).  The ethical response to the sight of the face of the other 
is a refusal to kill, to spare the other, in its weakness, out of “the fear of all violence and 
usurpation that my existing, despite the innocence of its intentions, risks committing” 
(Entre Nous 169).  Levinas explains that this responsibility is generated by the difference 
of a transcendent Other that is nakedly visible on any human body prior to the 
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production of cultural or political identities that give an individual its specificity.  The 
ethical encounter is one of humanitarian compassion in which I am moved by the other’s 
humanity to address its suffering, one commanding an intervention blind to the particular 
differences of the other.  The ethical I, by merit of seeing the other’s weakness, assumes 
responsibility for its well-being equal to that of its own care-of-self.  The face of any 
individual produces the same recognition of the infinite and the same burden that 
remains in force despite local conditions.  Ethical responsibility is a static cosmopolitan 
ground within Levinas’s thought because it is prior to identity.   
Levinas suggests that identity is always a reaction to difference.  The subject 
cannot “be” without recourse to some other.  However, he bases the ethical upon an 
imbalanced encounter with a difference that cannot be localized within an entirely 
powerless other.  In this sense, his ethics are always complicit with exclusionary 
violence toward difference.  As he explains, “the relation to the Face is both the relation 
to the absolutely weak – to what is absolutely exposed, what is bare and destitute” – and 
to the decision to not kill, “the fact that I cannot let the other die alone” (Entre Nous 
104).  Levinas describes this commitment as an absolutely selfless orientation toward the 
other and his or her needs.  To be ethical, he explains, is “[w]ithout knowing how to 
swim, to jump into the water to save someone […] to go toward the other totally, 
without holding back anything of one’s self” (Alterity and Transcendence 164).  On a 
purely theoretical level, this burden is heroic.  The one who views the spectacle of the 
other’s helplessness in the world maintains a relationship of absolute imbalance in order 
to quiet murderous urges with a feeling of pity.  This pity, although resulting in empathy 
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and compassion, emerges from the perception of the infinite superiority of one’s own 
self.  The “thou shalt not kill” only emerges within the face at the moment when the 
individual chooses to not abandon the other to a situation of helplessness manufactured 
within the perception of the subject for the sake of self-making.   
Ethics depends on the individual’s capacity to exercise power over the being of 
the other.  I cannot be ethical unless I imagine the other as in need of my sacrifice.  
Levinas attempts to account for the power transaction in the ethical moment by 
suggesting that the ability to look in this way is always mutually shared.  One of the 
things I recognize as I gaze upon the face of the other is that whatever is within the other 
is also gazing back.  “At the outset,” Levinas writes, “I hardly care what the other is with 
respect to me, that is his own business” (EN 105).  I ought to be willing to risk my 
comfort to prevent the certain demise of someone else.  To jump into the stream, as 
Levinas would have us, is to assume that one is the only agent capable of addressing the 
other’s needs without first assessing the context.  The irreplaceable human value for 
which I sacrifice my well-being is balanced by the insubstitutability of my own efforts.  
It may be a selfless act, but drowning myself on my way to rescue the other is not 
expedient.  I am only ethical when an other affects me but I have not yet translated my 
affection into feeling or language.1  When two people meet in the way he describes, they 
have no personal history or basis for grounding their relationship to one another.  In this 
moment, responsibility makes its demand.  In the absence of politics, there is no reason 
not to commit oneself to the good of the other.  What the other is, in the moment of pre-
political contact, “is above all the one I am responsible for” (105).  Levinas’s ethics are 
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cosmopolitan precisely in the way Nussbaum’s patriotic reading is as well.  Both depend 
upon the idea that recognition of the human, in Nussbaum’s case, or the divine in the 
human in Levinas’s, produces a responsibility to make the conditions by which life 
becomes possible, and both presume that those differences creating tension between the 
self and other exist not as productive aspects of human difference, but as irrelevant or 
suspect noise.  The culture and politics that disrupt ethics are treated as dematerialized 
sources of historical identities.  To the contrary, it is necessary to think of our relation to 
others precisely in material terms.  As Cheah points out, material inequalities prevent 
many of the world’s inhabitants from the luxury of looking at America in particular in 
the way Levinas requires.  An other is only other in the sense Levinas describes at the 
moment of initial encounter, before the establishment of any identity.  As Rancière has 
argued, humanitarian intervention relies upon a deployment of the ethical concept of 
human rights to justify its political management of global populations.  Where 
democracy requires dissensus, the logic of intervention commands consensus, which he 
defines as “the attempt to get rid of politics” by transforming “conflicts into problems 
that have to be sorted out by learned expertise and a negotiated adjustment of interests” 
(“Who is the Subject” 304, 306).  Consensus, Rancière argues, reduces democracy to the 
production of a particular lifestyle’s ongoing visibility. 
Within the context of the nation, consensus defends the idea that all members of 
a particular population equally enjoy the protection of certain rights on the basis of their 
shared physical and cultural space.  The effect that consensus has upon the felt 
experience of holding rights is to nullify their value.  If citizenship guarantees rights and 
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everyone is a member of some nation, then human rights become the rights of those who 
have rights, by merit of universal citizenship, or they become the rights of those who 
have no rights.  Human rights, as Rancière points out, are either a tautology or nothing 
(302).  Refusing the logic of consensus, he argues rights ought to be reformulated 
accordingly: human rights “are the rights of those who have not the rights that they have 
and have the rights that they have not” (302).  The Rights of Man, he argues, only 
belong to an individual when that individual is capable of enacting them in order to 
produce dissensus within socio-political space.  This is not possible within ethics, he 
claims, because encounter represents others as always in need of management and 
protection from misfortune and stupidity.  If they have rights it is because the I sacrifices 
its comfort to guarantee them.  Within a consensual space of nationalism, humanitarian 
intervention operates discursively to lodge rights within the humanitarian, generating a 
primary set of citizen’s rights and ancillary “victim’s rights.”  The citizen, who already 
has rights protected by the nation, has no use for human rights.  Human rights pertain 
only to those who do not have rights.  They are the rights of those without rights.  But, 
rights, as Rancière suggests, require the capacity to deploy power in order to exert them.  
Lacking rights, the subject of human rights has no capacity to claim their right to have 
rights.  From this point, the humanitarian can return the meaningless right to human 
rights to the victim and feel good about making the world a better place.  In order to 
realize human rights within the logic of intervention, or responsibility, “somebody else 
has to inherit” them in order to bring about the moment of their enactment (308).  This 
shuttling of rights is what Rancière calls the “right to humanitarian interference.”  
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Humanitarianism’s appropriation of rights through the differentiation between citizen’s 
and human rights opens up a political space through the discourse of ethics, “the infinite 
conflict of Good and Evil” that closes “all political intervals of dissensus” and holds the 
other hostage to the lifestyle of the humanitarian (309).   
Although Rancière characterizes ethics as a discourse of false dilemma, I believe 
this claim needs a finer point put upon it.  It is not ethics per se that is at issue.  Rather, it 
is a particular usage of the ethical as a justification of power and the application of 
power in the production of what he would call distributions of the sensible.  To associate 
an individual with an identity, or to claim to know the person, by contrast, reduces his or 
her infinite potential, guaranteed by the infinite alterity, to a limited totalization 
emerging from the exercise of power.  Despite its contradictions, the ethical system 
Levinas describes has a great deal of potential for rethinking political solidarity within 
cosmopolitan spaces exactly because it does not result in a tenable means to claim one’s 
own ethicality.  What I find useful about his thought is its performance of how 
subjectivity comes about and is justified through the economic management of the 
affects generated through the interdependent acts of paying attention to others, in pursuit 
of interest, and performing on their behalf to make ourselves interesting to them.  By 
staging the emergence of ethics as a pre-political, pre-subjective, continually repeating 
moment, Levinas implies that the location of responsibility is not within a particular 
community defined in terms of power relations as Rancière describes, but rather in our 
capacity to form and economize on affective bonds between them.  We spare the other 
because its face inspires a particular kind of feeling within us, prior to our commitments 
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to particular identities or values.  Ethics, more so than a propensity for good or evil 
action, is a sensitivity to others’ capacity to affect, or change, oneself and, consequently, 
to redefine solidarities.  It is the cosmopolitan impulse underlying democracy’s push 
toward the demos that continually refutes power in Rancière’s descriptions (“Ten Theses 
on Politics” 32-33).  The other is what enables affect to stick to an object and circulate as 
representation, and our desire to see others as worth caring for extends humanity to them 
in ways that command restructurings of the sensible.  It is this affect, and not the face we 
associate with the other, that is for Levinas the site of ethical infinity.  Or, as Judith 
Butler notes, “affect is never merely our own, … [it] is, from the start, communicated 
from elsewhere” (Frames of War 50).   
As Levinas himself confessed, his ethics becomes immensely complex with the 
real-life introduction of the problem of the third person.  The third person, someone who 
is not present at an encounter but who has affected the self or other, disrupts ethics 
because between three parties, politics has always already intervened.  With the third 
party, I arrive upon a scene with a history.2  Ethics demands an absolute commitment to 
all others, but when one intervenes between two others who have a history of interaction, 
comparisons must be made and comparison economizes our interest in them.  As 
Levinas explains, “it is important to me to know which of the two takes precedence” in 
the bid for commitment, that is, who is of greater value to my subjective production of 
my self as the agent of the good (EN 104).  The comparison this requires demands the 
formation of totalizing representations of others through which I may know and judge 
them.  It is not quite so simple as declaring allegiance to universal humanity at the 
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expense of local identity, although the local enters into the ethical formula as the source 
of all conflict and can be understood as producing useful dissensus.  In practice, though, 
ethics always operates under the assumption of a favorable imbalance of power in which 
the self occupies a privileged site of discretion and action to produce the interest, with its 
promise of returns, that motivates responsibility.  While it encourages feeling for the 
suffering of others, it does so in order to consolidate the self’s right to manage the rights 
of others.  Whichever other most effectively and positively moves the self becomes the 
object of ethical care and the recipient of the various sorts of economic capital and 
political legitimization that accompany it.  As a consequence, others in need of care must 
perform on behalf of their humanitarian benefactors in ways that confirm the legitimacy 
of the imbalanced relation of power between them.   
To be ethical is at the same time to be capable of representing or imagining the 
other as utterly dependent upon oneself and to never entertain the possibility that one 
appears as this evil already present in the eyes of the other.  The ethical self cannot see 
that seeing the other as abject and dependent deprives that other of the capacity to 
produce social capital of any value to itself.  The other for whom I am responsible 
cannot be my equal.  Although the I of the encounter has the power to represent the other 
as utterly dependent upon its agency and mercy, this I also depends entirely on the 
other’s persistence to supply it with ethical value, without which it would cease to exist.  
Levinas writes, “[t]he I as hostage to the other human being is precisely called to answer 
for this death” prefigured in the “thou shalt not kill” (EN 167).  When framed as the 
source of absolute responsibility, the face-to-face encounter becomes a risk that one 
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must manage through the assumption of responsibility for global effects, or, in Levinas’s 
own terminology, systematization within some totality.  This distribution of risk differs 
from Ulrich Beck’s observation that we live in a world of globally shared risk, which 
simply recognizes the arbitrariness of boundaries divvying up its ownership and the 
reality of environmental events that span them, or Butler’s similar suggestion that we 
recognize the differential exposure to precariousness that global politics institutes.3  
Although for Levinas, risk moves beyond any boundaries, and we are all subject to its 
effects, his ethical responsibility charges  us with the task of claiming the total right to its 
management.  Furthermore, it does so in order to produce a beneficial affective state in 
the self – the satisfaction of mastering evil with personal benevolence and sacrifice 
through the production of interest at the site of the other’s abject embodiment.  By 
continually distancing itself from the political and cultural, Levinasian ethics obscures 
the labor involved in making the other into a decontextualized individual.  To perceive 
oneself as ethical is to be unethical, as to do so assumes absolute control over the 
attention economy encounter creates between self and other.   
If Levinas’s ethics does not offer a way to behave ethically, it is less 
objectionable as an account of how power functions in the production of hegemony.4  I 
approach Levinas’s system of totality and infinity in secular and materialist terms rather 
than the more traditional theological reading ascribed to it.  The infinite is not some 
thing that actually is, or it at least is not accessible in any way that could be claimed to 
justify an order of power.  Infinity is the untroubled state for which hegemony, a 
totalization, strives.  As Levinas explains, totality is   “the integration of aspects [of 
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humanity] that confirm one another” (AT 44).  Totality naturalizes a particular reading of 
the human as a justification for a form of power.  As it naturalizes power, it also effaces 
the transfer of value from other to self to maintain the dependence of the other upon the 
self.  In fact, the reverse is the case: the self can only allow itself to exist if the other 
recognizes its own need to be taken responsibility for, by reducing itself to the object of 
the self’s interest.  Confronted with its own exercise of power, a totality “does not 
explode,” or cease to exert influence over the social, Levinas claims.  Instead, each 
“moment of breaking open” that occurs as totality encounters human excess or 
supplementarity “immediately reconstitutes the totality in another direction” (44).  
Power always reconsolidates, or as Deleuze and Guattari argue, every deterritorialization 
ends in some other reterritorialization.  Totality is always provisional, never total.  The 
infinite is no more than the desire for a natural state of being that effaces the exertion of 
power enabling a particular discursive system to regulate social space.  As a 
consequence, the infinite should not be the aim of Levinasian ethics because the infinite 
is a denial of the appropriation of abstract value from the other’s body on which ethics 
depends.   
Edward Said’s discussion of Palestinian-Israeli relations provides a good 
illustration of the breakdown of Levinas’s drive to infinity.  Orientalism is discourse 
structured around the idea that any Westerner can become an expert on Asian cultures 
while Asians themselves are incapable of knowing or representing themselves to the 
world.  In the context of Orientalism, Westerners have a responsibility to preserve, learn 
about, and communicate Arab culture on behalf of Arabs who cannot do these things for 
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themselves.  As is the case of Orientalist discourse generally, in twentieth century British 
descriptions of Palestine, which set the stage for its representation in global discourse, 
“‘Arabs’ were always being represented, never able to speak for themselves,” Said 
writes (The Question of Palestine 25).  A big part of the problem for him is that the 
British represented Palestinians as savage and uncivilized, and thus, as both interesting 
to British individuals looking for no more than the thrill of adventure and in need of 
British management.  Since they cannot reliably speak for themselves, Arabs cannot 
object to British characterizations. The British claimed responsibility for the Palestinian 
condition and managed Palestinians as if they had no investment of their own in the 
community, even as if they were not really there, Said claims (85).  The conjunction of 
British imperialism and its commitment to Zionism further complicated the issue.  Said 
describes Zionism as mediating between the British and Arabs by positioning itself as a 
liberalized or Westernized East, claiming the right to produce Orientalist commentary on 
its own environment.  This enabled an alignment between Israeli and British 
imperialism.  If Israelis are really “like” Westerners, then an encounter in the Middle 
East becomes one simply between Westerners and Arabs rather than Israelis and Arabs 
in which the West intervenes.  The effect of this system of identification, Said points out, 
was that it became impossible to distinguish between a critique of Israeli violence and 
anti-Semitism.  The force of the positive association between Israelis and liberal values 
emerging from the history of Orientalist discourse about Palestinians and the feeling of 
responsibility toward Jews grounded in the negative association with Holocaust atrocity 
creates a political context in which America is vested with authority over the region but 
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in which it can make no distinction between Nazi violence against Jews and Palestinian 
defense of homeland.  In this light, any violence toward Jews is inexcusable because of 
the visibility of their traumatic history.   
The critic’s duty, Said writes, is to “make distinctions, to produce differences 
where at present there are none,” or to insist on the significance of the identity of the 
person being faced as responsibility is claimed (59).  The critic refuses responsibility at 
the level of encounter with the face because to claim responsibility is to deny the other 
the potential to produce value apart from human interest.  Even between two individuals, 
history and politics have already intervened.  His critique of the U.S.’s unconditional 
support for Israel over Palestine suggests an ethics of political difference.  Butler’s 
discussion of America’s Iraq and Afghan wars further clarifies this position.  She 
explains that the function of criticism, when it addresses political conflict, is to reveal 
the ways in which political discourse frames what is representable within public space.  
Politics conditions a public’s capacity to recognize a spectrum of humanity as living and 
another as not.  What she calls frames of “recognizability” are “the more general 
conditions that prepare or shape a subject for recognition” (FW 5)  Recognition of an 
actual person as endowed with human worth only follows conditioning according to 
normative schemes of  recognizability, that is, inculturation within history and politics.  
What we are able to recognize as a human face capable of inspiring the ethical moment 
is a political construction of humanity that may or may not be limited according to 
categories of race, gender, nationality, political orientation, religion, or other ideas. 
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Butler provides the illuminating example of American journalism’s depiction of 
Afghan women liberated from life beneath the burkha following U.S. military 
“intervention.”  On the cover of the New York Times, she recalls, the faces of these 
young women declared their exposure “an act of liberation, an act of gratitude to the 
U.S. military, and an expression of a pleasure that had become suddenly and ecstatically 
permissible” (Precarious Life 142).  As the images are framed within a narrative of 
Levinasian ethical responsibility driven by the face, the Times story reassures American 
readers that their violence is justified by the very increase in visibility it accords these 
women.  We can see them, and thus feel for their suffering, and at the same time, feel 
good about our military presence in Afghanistan because of their smiling, unveiled 
faces.  However, the story was, precisely as a story, staged to produce an effect.  It was 
“to the camera” and an American viewer, “made ready to see the face,” that the faces of 
these women, made to be the Levinasian face of the Other, were “finally bared.”  As an 
element of political narrative, the face becomes “a symbol of successfully exported 
American cultural progress,” and, Butler concludes, effectively conceals the suffering at 
the heart of the Levinasian face because “we saw and heard through that face no 
vocalization of grief or agony, no sense of the precariousness of life” (142).  It suggests 
only that American intervention into conflict abroad has resulted in the successful 
management of precarity, that the war is an act of responsibility toward Arab women 
that enables them to claim the economic and political value of the human interest their 
faces exude. 
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The logical conclusion of Levinas’s formulation of justice is that to intervene in 
conditions of suffering or inequality is ethical.  We jump into the lake even if we cannot 
swim.  If I perceive injustice abroad and determine to take action, I behave ethically 
towards the Other on whose behalf I act.  As the history of British and American 
Orientalism show, however, the act of managing others’ precarity is often no more than 
a convenient political excuse to justify the pursuit of self-interest.  The idea of universal 
and unconditional responsibility in Levinasian ethics is a rhetorical means to excuse 
oneself from injustices of global significance.  By remaining in the position of the ethical 
observer, the I of ethics claims the infinite status of humanitarian good.  The ethical 
humanitarian acts selflessly and self-sacrifically.  Its figure cannot be the center of 
humanitarianism’s production of human value, but to become humanitarian, the self 
must monopolize the abstract value produced in the encounter.  Humanitarianism’s 
disavowed economic structure allows clearly unethical acts and oversimplified 
interventions to claim the appearance of ethical grounding.  It is necessary to consider 
the additional possibility that the viewing subject, observing struggles beyond his or her 
home, is implicated and that responsibility involves a reassessment of domestic practices 
or political abstinence.  The ethical I needs to scrutinize its own desire to intervene and 
the consequences of assuming a totalizing responsibility for the well-being and, 
ultimately, the sovereignty of others.   
I want to consider one final comment from Levinas that complicates the use of 
his ethics of the face within neoliberal humanitarian discourse.  In “The I and the 
Totality,” he makes a distinction between being that simply lives and one that thinks and 
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consequently between feeling and thinking, empathy and representation. (EN 13-14).  
Being that simply lives is “ignorant of the exterior world,” its “senses bring it nothing, or 
only sensations,” or affects (14).  The living being has a self, finds its existence 
profoundly meaningful and important, but within the field of ethics, is problematic 
because the living being is “a consciousness not concerned with situating itself in 
relation to an exteriority, which does not comprehend itself as part of a whole.”  The 
living being, Levinas suggests, sees the world as an extension or representation of itself, 
as if there were no boundary delimiting the ability to unproblematically act within space 
on the one hand, and to claim responsibility for actions that affect others’ well-being on  
the other.  He remarks that for this living being, its “Same” determines “every other, 
without the Other ever determining the Same” (14).  The thinking being is one who 
reacts to the affects that inspire murderous rage and, through a process of affective labor, 
transmutes feeling to a recognition of difference that paves the way for sociality in any 
form.5  In this way, his ethics comes upon the political management of human rights. 
I see Levinas posing a challenge to the logic of consensus in his discussion of 
living being.  The living as that which reduces experience to fact forecloses dissensus 
through its denial of the value of affect.  Levinas returns the idea of living to nationalism 
with global aims, noting ironically that the paradigmatic expression of simply living is 
American patriotism transcribed upon global politics.  “The living being,” he writes, 
“lives beneath the sign of liberty or death” (EN 14).  The humanitarian collects factual 
data about global suffering and assumes the responsibility to dole out either possibility.  
Turning to Sacco, we see the production of a ground of factual data through which the 
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right to intervention can be claimed through journalism’s reduction of both Palestinian 
and Israeli experience to sound bites and visual imagery traded on a market based upon 
human interest. 
Human Interest and the Image in Sacco’s Palestine 
It may be easy to assume that graphic narrative, because its raison d’etre is the 
incorporation of visual representation within storytelling, intervenes in the field of 
ethics.   It is also tempting to conclude that because comics journalism, a genre single-
handedly pioneered by Joe Sacco, shows the faces of suffering individuals in the midst 
of conflict areas it is implicitly ethical.  In Understanding Comics, which has become the 
foundation for comics studies, Scott McCloud makes the impassioned case that comics, 
because of their tendency to represent humanity in iconic form, are also an inherently 
cosmopolitan medium (29-36).  He draws a parallel between the automatic facility with 
which readers identify human characteristics in simple drawings and everyday objects, 
for example the slots in an electric outlet, which resemble eyes and a mouth, to the 
political project of empathizing with people different from oneself.  Further, he suggests 
comics are necessarily engaged in ethical work because they require active imaginative 
labor from their readers to fill in action between the cuts from one frame to another (65-
8).6  As he understands them, comics make readers figuratively complicit with the 
actions they depict.  When a murder occurs between frames the reader must imagine 
how it unfolds, and this requires serious ethical thinking on the part of writers as well.7  
Building on McCloud’s work, Adam Rosenblatt and Andrea Lunsford argue that comics 
present a unique way to destabilize the myth that journalism and journalists are objective 
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and distanced observers by forcing its readers to visually identify with foreign people 
and places (69).  For them, “comics journalism is a hybrid form that uses images and 
words in sequenced panels to take readers directly into the situations” it depicts (70).  
Likewise, Hillary Chute and Marianne DeKoven argue that “graphic narratives usefully 
challenge the transparency of realism,” because, “the reader of graphic narratives is not 
trapped in the dark space of the cinema” unlike the frequently discussed “passive female 
spectator following and merging helplessly with the objectifying gaze of the camera” 
(770).  Elsewhere, Chute argues that graphic narratives are inherently suited to ethical 
interventions because they can “map a life, not only figuratively but literally” (109).   
While comics may be more immediate than a text-only report, the push to 
unmediated empathy Rosenblatt and Lunsford and Chute find suggests they view the 
medium as a means of converting the difference between experiencing suffering and 
witnessing it through representation into universally affecting moments, or 
cosmopolitanizing them, even if this is done with good intentions.  While it may be true 
that comics do speak powerfully to people on the level of generalization, I wonder 
whether the form of identification, and the sympathetic knowledge readers produce as a 
result, that come from their looking at the wholly abstracted cartoonish image of a circle 
with two dots and a line translates to a more effective politics of representation across 
difference.  Its tendency toward generalization does, as McCLoud suggests, allow 
readers to fill in a character’s features with their own, but the assumption of identity 
reduces difference to the visual.  As a genre addressing non-fiction and serious matters, 
comics journalism presents readers with visualizations of conflict and suffering in 
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addition to the interviews and commentary found in ordinary print journalism.  
However, it is important to bear in mind that a physical face itself is not the ethical Face, 
but an image subject to politicized representational schemas.  The represented face 
always directs attention to the production of value and value always accrues to power 
situated within some totality.  Instead, the genre walks a fine and often destabilized line 
between ethical concern for its subject matter and spectacle, sensation, and propaganda.  
This tension is especially evident in Sacco’s first major work, Palestine, which 
deconstructs his journalistic and egotistical urge to represent a conflict and a more 
altruistic and humanistic one to know the people involved.  In this section, I argue that 
Palestine critiques the desire to render the suffering of others a spectacle from which 
American consumers can develop a feeling of ethical responsibility and in that way also 
critiques the economization of humanitarian interest by situating comics journalism in an 
uncomfortable space between McCloud’s exuberant utopianism and Beller’s pessimistic 
Marxism.  Sacco’s graphic depictions of his own process of researching his book calls 
into question our ability to situate ourselves in the position of the ethical mediator 
between others or as capable of assuming responsibility for someone else.  Instead, I 
read Sacco’s meta-journalistic commentary as a destabilization of the visual logic behind 
Levinasian ethics as the site for national political identity formation. 
The visual, which is the defining feature of the graphic narrative, as it is situated 
within the discourse of humanitarian intervention, short-circuits the production of the 
Levinasian ethical or thinking being back into what he calls merely living being.  The 
discourse of humanitarian intervention does so by saturating the sensory field with an 
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overwhelming drive to know the other within a regulated representation from which one 
can thereby confirm oneself as the possessor of extra-human rights.  The sight of the 
Other, and intervention’s discursive framing of the other as a victim pleading for rights, 
constructs the consumer or viewer of its discourse as not pitiable, not abject, and not 
similarly devoid of both actual rights or the capacity to possess them.  From the 
perspective of intervention, such knowing produced through activist viewing constitutes 
cosmopolitan patriotism.  Its outlook upon the other held at a remove is requisite for the 
assumption of complete management of the well-being of the global other, even if only 
within the discourse of national fantasy that justifies the practice of intervention itself.  
Palestine, Sacco’s first work of comics journalism, documents his visit to the 
disputed area over a period of two months during 1991 and 1992.  It chronicles the end 
of the first Intifada with the hope, Sacco explains in the book’s foreword, of raising 
awareness of the ongoing conflict between Palestine and Israel as “an issue of 
international law and basic human rights” (vi).  Sacco approaches the political problem 
his work addresses as one of a lack of cosmopolitan knowledge on the part of his 
American readership.  If he can make his subjects interesting, he can inspire learning 
that can then sustain political and economic investments in international reform.  While 
the book does effectively raise awareness of Palestinian humanity and the justice of their 
cause, it is not simply a matter of witnessing atrocity or of making a case for 
international intervention.  Instead, as I have already suggested, Sacco develops a subtle 
critique of the impulse to claim the right to do both on the part of Western journalists, 
politicians, and ordinary citizens even as he continues to make such a claim for himself.  
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Sacco’s engagement with journalism and humanitarianism is complex, but I think of it in 
terms of two major thematic elements running across his more specific topical 
encounters.  First, Sacco consistently depicts himself as a figure for journalistic practice 
and, second, as dependent on foreigners as a fish out of water guest.   
As a journalist, Sacco is in pursuit of renown and comments on his intent to 
transform the objects of his investigation into economically productive spectacular 
imagery with which his audience may feel sympathy.  In effect, when he identifies his 
capacity to make Palestine into an arresting object of interest it becomes a valuable 
source of cultural prestige.  This prestige is Sacco’s source of the material well being 
and makes the boundary between himself and Palestinians meaningful throughout his 
humanitarian appeal – he is an authority on the human condition and on Palestine.  
Sacco’s representation of himself is one of the most immediately recognizable aspects of 
his work.  In a ubiquitously cited comment explaining his aesthetic, Sacco explains that 
when he began work on Palestine, his style was “a bit rubbery and cartoony” because 
that was “the only way [he] knew how to draw” (Gibson).  “It became clear,” he goes on 
to explain, “that [he] had to push it toward a more representational way of drawing,” but 
as he did so, he also intentionally neglected to “update” himself.  He is almost always 
shorter than his companions, hidden behind thick, opaque glasses, and generally 
dripping profusely with nervous sweat.  All in all, he depicts himself in an unflattering 
way, as physically awkward and as narcissistic in his hasty judgments of the people he is 
on a mission to humanize.  The easiest way to interpret these gestures is as a form of 
self-deprecating irony, taking the American abroad as its critical target.  Indeed, the most 
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common reading of Sacco’s Joe character takes his grotesque cartoonishness as a device 
by which he critiques American practices that readers might otherwise reject.8  However, 
this is not the rhetorical limit of what the Joe character does for the author.  Sacco can 
maintain the requisite distance essential to his status as an observer precisely because he 
does so frequently depict himself as the inverse of the typical cosmopolitan tourist, 
discomforted, shocked, even reviled by the sight of his Palestinian other rather than 
reveling in his consumption of their image.  In these moments, his response performs the 
Levinasian encounter, moving from an initial desire to kill to the repression of selfish 
desires and the claiming of responsibility.  Critics are right to note that Sacco’s use of 
cartoonish anger does encourage identification, but that identification does more than 
advance the text’s political critique.   
Second, he represents himself as a guest within Palestinian space.  Sacco is 
continually undermined in his efforts to uncover Palestinian experience by his utter 
dependence on the hospitality of his hosts and interpreters.  At the same time, though, 
his journalistic self intervenes in representations of foreign hospitality to turn the tables 
and restore the balance of the distribution of rights back to his favor.  The social capital 
the text produces and that Sacco desires is only his so long as it is evident that it is his 
work, his unique presence and perspective, that makes Palestine comprehensible and, 
more importantly, interesting to readers. 
Sacco’s story opens with him chatting up hotel receptionists in Egypt while he 
impatiently awaits the arrival of his travel visa.  The conversation he has with Shreef and 
Taha, the two clerks, vacillates between forlorn stories of love and impassioned 
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outbursts of politics.  The individual attention Sacco gives to each exemplifies the 
representational strategy through which Sacco the journalist would create an appeal to 
intervention through metonymy and sympathy.  Both men want Sacco to perceive them 
as figures for a larger Muslim community.  Shreef, “a Muslim in love,” tells of his 
extravagant courtship of a married woman.  He loves her deeply, he explains, and the six 
months wages he spent on a lavish date are no object to him.  When Taha objects to the 
absurdity of the story, Shreef appeals to Sacco as “a Westerner,” because this sort of 
love is something all Westerners understand, and further defuses Taha’s anger by listing 
his favorite English rock bands (2).  This comment appeals to Sacco for understanding 
by evoking the idea of Romantic love.  It also conflates British culture with American 
into an aggregate Westernized cosmopolitanism.  Shreef’s suggestion that Sacco, as a 
Westerner, would understand his plight where Taha, a fellow Muslim and Egyptian, 
would not, implies a degree of coincidence between his values and Sacco’s.  Although 
different, Shreef makes himself feel not so alien for Westerners; they share the same 
non-threatening pursuits.  Shreef strategically accepts an Orientalist framing of Egypt 
and repositions himself within that frame as a Western-amenable access point that makes 
him of attentive value to Sacco and his Western readers.  He is interesting because 
readers can relate to his hopeless consumeristic infatuation.  His appeal is one of outright 
sympathy, which, as Foucault observes, “is an instance of the Same so strong and so 
insistent that it will not rest content to be merely one of the forms of likeness; it has the 
dangerous power of assimilating, of rendering things identical to one another” (The 
Order of Things 23).  Sympathy through cosmopolitan consumption in this instance is a 
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totalization effacing the difference of the Arabic third person.  Shreef’s claim to 
Westernization refuses the chaotic energy of Egypt as a foreign space, represented in the 
busy street scene filling the top half of the book’s opening page and in Taha’s more 
intimately violent face. By depicting Shreef in terms of easily identifiable Western 
attributes, Sacco opens the possibility that while “there are Muslims and there are 
Muslims,” in actuality, Muslims are not so different from his readers (1).  Not 
surprisingly, then, Shreef responds to Sacco’s mention of his Israeli visa calmly and 
rationally.  He evades the difficult politics of the topic, claiming “I have no problem with 
Israelis, they are like Europeans,” which of course also means like Sacco and his readers 
(2).  He is a Muslim Sacco’s readers can get on board with. 
Ultimately what Sacco suggests Shreef wants out of his performance is not for 
Sacco to understand his pining for the married woman, but instead to feel sympathetic 
for all Muslims, whose problems and interests are like those of Americans.  Although 
not overt, his performance is political.  Sacco calls attention to Shreef’s appeal to 
Western consumerism in order to generate interest and to clear the ground for his own 
depiction of Palestinians suffering atrocity at the hands of Israelis who do continually 
dwell on militant politics rather than consumable culture in Sacco’s text.  This strategy is 
more or less typical of humanitarian journalism.  It depicts the local subject in terms of 
some cosmopolitan common that forms the basis for appeals to political solidarity.  
Sacco, however, complicates this appeal structure with the interruption of Shreef’s 
companion, Taha.  Where Shreef works within the text as a means of smoothing over 
difference through cosmopolitan consumerism, Taha insists upon the particularity of 
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local identity through discourse on politics.  When Sacco mentions he is waiting for his 
visa, Taha explodes in a violent outburst, screaming, “I would smash Israel,” as he 
pounds the table with his enormous fist (2).  Where Shreef appears calm and pensive, 
Sacco renders Taha absurd and irrational.  His face is distended with rage and globs of 
saliva fly from his mouth.  By contrast, both Shreef and Sacco are united in their alarm 
at Taha’s anger.  Although Shreef makes his case using absurd clichés and outdated 
cultural references and Taha is an informed speaker, in this moment Sacco reduces the 
latter to a metonym for the Arab rage with which his readers are also familiar.  His 
cartoonish representation corresponds to a second element of humanitarian journalism.  
Where Sacco suggests we want to get to know Shreef and can include him within our 
idea of humanity, Taha is alienating.  His anger at a comment Shreef is willing to 
overlook positions him as that which justifies intervention.  The short exchange suggests 
that readers can support the cosmopolitan socialization of Muslims of Shreef’s variety 
by more actively paying attention to Palestine. 
As a composite interaction, one between Sacco, Shreef, and Taha 
simultaneously, Palestine’s opening scene illustrates how people are reduced to 
metonymic sites of sympathy and antagonism in order to sustain violent relationships, in 
this instance operating within discourses of tolerance and cosmopolitan interest in 
popular culture.  At the same time, it also suggests a refusal of the humanitarian 
journalistic paradigm through the unpredictable intrusion of a more violent form of 
violence.  While either moment, Shreef’s nod to cultural intimacy or Taha’s refusal to 
assimilate to a Western vision of the Middle East, on their own are reductive and 
 139 
 
exploitative, Sacco’s juxtaposition challenges journalistic generalizations about the 
Middle East.  The first instance is a performance of something visibly sympathetic, 
almost tailored to a Western audience.  However, Shreef’s appeal to common 
consumption habits fails to suture Egyptian and Western being seamlessly because of the 
intrusion of Taha’s particular politics.  Shreef’s performance requires no commitment on 
the part of potential readers.  They can identify with him on the basis of shared feelings 
for music or narrative conventions without thinking about where Shreef lives or what 
other sorts of values he might hold.  Shreef poses himself as an object for identification 
without history or politics.  Although represented as a unique person, Shreef is a figure 
for generic values.  His appeal attempts to merge Egypt and Islam with America and 
thus to eliminate the problem of the third person within the ethical decision.  By feeling 
sympathy for his humanity in contrast with Taha’s violence, Sacco justifies the desire to 
manage his right to be.  As a generic person, Shreef becomes a figure of the human in 
human rights.  But, to read him generously, he is also engaging in a more subtle and self-
conscious act of attentiveness to Western perceptions of Arab men, like Taha  in order to 
undercut the humanitarian justification for intervention against inflexible, violent 
fundamentalists.   
Taha, as the third voice of the passage, refuses the work of sympathy or 
consensus in which Sacco and Shreef are jointly engaged.   His violence does not allow 
the two subjects to merge into some indistinguishable whole and is not content with the 
reduction to a sort of bare humanity that is the subject of rights management.  On this 
point, Butler makes the interesting observation that nonviolence does not mean an 
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absolute abstention from violence, but rather a particular way of engaging the ineluctable 
possibility for violence in order to minimize its effects upon a loved object or context 
(FW 178).  As a challenge to Western representations of Islam and Arabic people, 
Taha’s outburst disrupts the sympathy Sacco elicits from Shreef.  We could assume 
responsibility for the latter because he invites us into a sympathetic relationship in which 
there is no third party.  We have the same deep values and commitments and our 
differences are superficial.  Taha, however, forces readers, along with Sacco, to consider 
our own politics by refusing to play along politely, or by persistently being the 
Levinasian third person.  For Butler, the ideal instance of nonviolence is not the peaceful 
compliance we see in Shreef, which ultimately allows for violent management of others, 
but what she describes as “a social and political struggle to make rage articulate and 
effective – the carefully crafted ‘fuck you’” (FW 182).  This is also the function of the 
third person in the Levinasian ethical encounter.  The presence of the third person 
continually explodes the ethical I’s production of totality.  Where Shreef would simply 
allow himself to become the object of Sacco’s journalistic fantasy in the hope of 
attracting a less oppressive intervention, Taha intervenes on his own behalf in order to 
frustrate the claiming of responsibility on Sacco’s part.  His “I would smash Israel,” 
while not quite the Butlerian well-crafted statement, nevertheless has the effect she 
describes of recirculating political specificity in a way that commands careful attention.  
Sacco follows up this initial vignette with a short section titled “Blind Dates,” 
building upon Shreef’s appeal to romance, in which he elaborates on the production of 
sympathy with a self-deprecating depiction of himself as a guest within Palestine.  
 141 
 
Ordinarily the relationship of hospitality places burdens of generosity and responsibility 
upon the host.  Sacco’s depiction of an ordinary encounter with a Palestinian man, 
however, shows him challenging this situation.  Given that Palestine does not have 
internationally recognized sovereignty, Sacco balks at the man’s desire to know what he 
thinks of “his country” (4).  While the scene depicts the anonymous man welcoming 
Sacco, making him comfortable, and serving him tea, Sacco’s response reorients it along 
humanitarian lines.  By refusing the other’s sovereignty from the outset, Sacco cancels 
the man’s capacity to extend hospitality.  Now Sacco can occupy the frame as an 
international, or cosmopolitan, operative lending credibility to the eventual production of 
what the man assumes the capacity to give.  The gift of hospitality he cannot give, if it 
were extendible, would be one of Sacco’s own making anyways – it would be a return, 
not a gift.  His gesture reduces Palestinians to exiles or refugees within contested areas, 
and as such, to precisely that sort of victim incapable of enacting the right to have rights 
autonomously.  Instead, Sacco, as the humanitarian journalist, is in a position to return 
such a right by humoring his Palestinian host’s repeated inquiry “what do you think of 
my country?” (5).  He thinks of himself as “gracious … a perfect guest of Palestine” (4).  
As it appears in this scene, such a guest is one willing to absorb the ingratiating, 
valueless attentions of his host of refugees. 
A perfect guest, Sacco, like Shreef, initially evades the political, commenting 
instead on the beauty of the land.  Finally, he agrees to humor the man and notes that 
“this occupation thing looks pretty harsh,” reflecting that this comment hits the man’s 
“nail on the head” (5).  Cosmopolitan subjectivity here can only be claimed by those 
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with rights guaranteed by national attachments.  Since Sacco alone possesses these, or 
recognizes only his right to them, he alone can engage in the cosmopolitan practice of 
hospitality.  His attention secures the position of the Palestinian man living within 
humanitarian liminal space.  As it unfolds, the interaction becomes one in which Sacco 
extends the generosity of his interest to his Palestinian victim, humoring him with his 
attention.  Sacco assumes that he can lead his hosts around through superficial comments 
in order to give them what they want, a political platform from which to alert others of 
their suffering.  He frames his presence as allowing Palestinians to feel as if they are 
welcoming him into their space, extending the right of hospitality to a guest.  In effect, 
he permits them to feel as if they enjoy his own State’s rights by directing his 
humanitarian attention toward them.  This sleight of hand reverses the claim to 
ownership of political space. Sacco understands himself, as journalist, as the true 
inhabitant and giver of hospitality by permitting his host to welcome him and by 
feigning interest in his host’s everyday business.  His initial investment of attention in 
the plight of the people pays off when Sacco’s growing audience performs for him 
exactly what he needs to sell his story.  His Palestinian acquaintances become “real-life 
adaptation of all those affidavits I’ve been reading,” “up close and almost personal!” 
(10). 
Sacco interrupts his account of interviewing Palestinians in Jerusalem with a 
comparison to the way American journalism creates sympathy for Israeli individuals 
through appeals to human interest, something human Palestinians apparently lack.  He 
presents the case of media coverage of Leon Klinghoffer’s murder in 1985.  Klinghoffer, 
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a disabled Jewish American retiree, was murdered and dumped into the Mediterranean 
by members of the Palestinian Liberation Front, who had hijacked the cruise ship Achille 
Lauro to demand the release of Palestinians held in Israeli prisons.  Sacco recalls the 
event as sparking a passionate conversation with Claudia, a half-Iraqi woman with 
whom he was infatuated at the time.  Although both share a passionate commitment to 
Palestinian sovereignty, Sacco explains to her that the visibility the international press 
creates around Klinghoffer constitutes something like an unethical intrusion of the third 
person that exists as a negative contrast to the interruption Taha makes upon the earlier 
hotel scene.  The American media, Sacco explains, wants “human interest” (6).  Unlike 
someone like Taha, or any other Palestinian victim, Klinghoffer is a sympathetic figure 
for the media.  “We get,” Sacco says “the full profile,” down to “what he put on his Corn 
Flakes,” until “he sounds like the guy next door who borrows your ladder.”  The point of 
the anecdote for the younger Sacco recalled in the scene is to justify to his love interest 
why America does not act, why Palestine is not visible within the national consciousness 
as an object of ethical concern.  He would like to appear compassionate, but remain 
uncommitted to the cause in any real way.  He can safely share a commitment to corn 
flakes without addressing touchy matters of sovereignty, torture, or ethnic violence.  No 
such common ground exists with Palestinians, who Americans must meet at the site of 
difficult topics.  Klinghoffer, although an American, was also Jewish, and as such 
became grounds for representations of Palestinians as universally against Jewish 
existence.  The conjunction of his Jewishness with his Americanness unified American 
sympathy with Israeli nationalism against the PLF and Palestinian resistance more 
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generally.  To attack a helpless man like Klinghoffer was to attack an ordinary 
American, possibly like the reader or watcher of media.  His murder, then, became a 
personal act that made the Palestinian conflict a threat to Americans rather than a 
political one against unjust international practice.   
Sacco’s comments are not simply limited to teasing out the way national media 
coverage of international events shapes sympathy.  He further undercuts journalistic 
motivations by depicting himself as speaking out of a self-interested desire to manipulate 
Claudia’s feelings.  As he explains international politics to her, his implication is that 
Israelis are more effective at attracting the attention of Americans because they are able 
to frame their suffering in a gentle, human way whereas Palestinians insist on voicing 
their right to exist violently.9  The problem is that Americans are able to know 
Klinghoffer as someone who exists within the boundaries of their own imagined 
community, defined in terms of safe consumer choices.  The ability to imaginatively 
place Klinghoffer within our own home, eating our breakfast, is the site of journalistic 
human interest.  Israelis buy and eat the same things as Americans and therefore need no 
special mediation in order to become approachable to American consumers.  Palestinians 
and the Egyptian Arabs Sacco depicts live in a wholly alien world that has to be 
conditioned for receptivity through this narrative about consumption in order to sustain 
later dialogue about politics.  This politics, however, is sustainable only in the absence of 
any call for solidarity.  As Sacco concludes, “Americans won’t care about the problems 
of Palestinians when Americans get killed in these terrorist attacks” (7).  The political 
action he initially recognizes returns to unjustifiable terrorism when it infringes upon his 
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sense of personal safety and distance.  Sympathy emerges not from the significant 
political appeals at the heart of Palestinian rhetoric, but rather, on the mundane consumer 
choices, the brand of corn flakes Klinghoffer ate, or again, the list of bands Shreef rattles 
off.  We do not know Palestinians as like us because they do not construct a visible 
image of familiar accessories to living.  The appeal to Israel confirms an American 
totalization of the scene of global politics, or its consensus, whereas Palestinians 
challenge this hegemony.   
When Claudia is not sympathetic to his explanation that Americans don’t care 
about Palestinians because Palestinians just don’t know how to frame their pleas in 
amenable terms, Sacco responds with peevish rage, decrying her privately as a “bitch” 
and a “terrorist groupie” (7).  His depiction of his own uncontrollable rage creeping into 
his representation of the scene reveals the essential narcissism of the journalistic circuit 
of production.  As an American, Sacco wants to enjoy the comfort of the assumption that 
violence is contained elsewhere, where he may or may not take it as the object of his 
fascination.  When commitment to a cause poses the threat of actual consequence or the 
fantasy of personal romance is disrupted by political difference, he claims, both interest 
and the public of ethical concern evaporate.  Sacco is only interested in appearing 
compassionate and committed so long as there is the possibility of romance with 
Claudia.  When the conversation ends without an invitation to her hotel room, Sacco 
reverts to feeling for the object of American media.  The capacity to selectively focus 
attention according to the potential for pleasurable return, or interest, is the basis for the 
international management of rights, and is conditioned by its object’s ability to appear 
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sympathetic in the face of suffering.  That this situation is “unfair” Sacco freely 
acknowledges (7).  Nonetheless, he confesses that he “couldn’t get the taste” of Middle 
Eastern terrorist spectacle out of his mouth.  “Terrorism,” he writes “is the bread 
Palestinians get buttered on,” a metaphor that again prepares them for the pleasure of 
foreign consumers.  As a matter limited to terrorism, the problem of pain within the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict is continually returned to its effects on those with legitimate 
sovereignty.  Klinghoffer is an American victim of indiscriminate violence and what 
Sacco remembers are only those events in which Westerners were involved: the airliners 
that “went sky high in the desert, … Munich and the blown up athletes, the bus and 
airport massacres” (7).  Sacco concludes, “sure I had sympathy for a homeland lost, but 
what were the problems of Palestinians to me next to Klinghoffer, who ate Brand X corn 
flakes and probably borrowed my ladder” (8).  When Palestinians even make the news, 
they are bodies or masked men, never faces, and certainly never consumers of corn 
flakes.  He returns from this excursus to the outcome of his enactment of inverted 
hospitality.  Shaking the grateful hand of his Palestinian host, Sacco thinks, “I will alert 
the world to your suffering!” and “Mission Accomplished! Told you I was good at this” 
(10).10  Ironically, the passage as a whole, because it so insistently undercuts Sacco’s 
expressed journalistic purposes and aspirations, does frame his interviewees 
compassionately, as victimized by his inquisitive presence and his desire to monetize 
their suffering into marketable objects of human interest.  
Sacco’s meta-journalistic practice reveals his failure to create the sympathetic, 
human interest content he is after and instead results in something that may actually be 
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more ethical that is capable of inspiring deeper empathy.  It also challenges his capacity 
to take responsibility for the text he ultimately creates and for the human rights of the 
people he depicts.  It is their generosity and patience with his shortcomings that allow 
Sacco to get a glimpse at something human and interesting going on in the refugee 
camps he visits.  Jabalia, the largest and poorest camp in Palestine, was also the site of 
some of the most intense political violence during the first Intifada and as such is an 
essential location for Sacco’s account.  In the chapters of the book that cover his 
investigation there, he sets up a complex tension between the good work of documenting 
conditions in order to accomplish the work of alerting the world, his own motives for 
doing so, and the effect the production of his humanitarian text has on the people with 
whom he comes into contact.  Throughout his time in Palestine, Sacco works closely 
with local contacts to arrange meetings, translate, and contextualize the finer points of 
the conflict’s history, but he is especially dependent upon them in the camp.  Sacco’s 
depiction of his reliance upon his sources, for both shelter and contact with the local 
people, calls into question his ability to “accomplish” good within the Palestinian 
community and the extent to which he is responsible for the representation of its people 
he produces in his comics. 
Although he describes his relationship with several sources over the course of the 
book, Sacco worked most extensively with a well-educated man, Sameh.  After teaching 
philosophy in Yemen, Sameh returned to Palestine to help his family and has been 
unable to find employment since.  Nonetheless, when Sacco meets him, he is busy 
working as a volunteer.  Although without income of his own, he helped set up a 
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rehabilitation and education center serving deaf and mentally disabled children within 
the camp.  The disabled are typically marginalized even in affluent societies, and as 
Sameh relates, the circumstances in the camp are even worse.  According to his count, 
“only five people in Gaza work in the field of special education, and none have 
specialized training” (206).  Sameh’s mission, like Sacco’s own, is to foster a “humane 
understanding of the handicapped” through a “professional program.”  Even though the 
United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) has nominated him for a training 
course in Israel, he cannot attend until he receives Israeli permission to leave the camp.  
In the meantime, Sameh continues to devote himself to the disabled children of the 
center, which “can’t even afford a wage for him or its six teachers” (207).  Despite the 
futility of the situation Sacco describes, it seems as though Sameh is doing something 
that makes a real difference in the lives of the refugee children Sacco draws happily 
learning to speak, read, and write.  Unlike other volunteer workers, Sameh has built up 
his program through professional commitment rather than political affiliation.  His 
education, altruism, and focus on pragmatism over ideology characterize Sameh as an 
appealing moderate to skeptical readers taking in an otherwise disorienting environment. 
In addition to his work at the facility, Sameh enthusiastically takes Sacco under 
his wing.  When he needs a place to stay, Sameh is the model of hospitality, making 
Sacco “feel comfortable in his place,” so much so that he notes, “initially I felt 
uncomfortable” (187).  Whereas in the earlier market scene, Sacco depicts himself as a 
savvy negotiator of public spaces, at home in Jerusalem’s busy streets, at the heart of the 
Palestinian conflict, his confidence is shaken.  The camps offer little from which Sacco 
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can form a cosmopolitan foothold.  Although politically oppressed, the people he 
encounters in Jerusalem live within a minimum standard that Sacco is able to recognize 
as human.  They have homes with electricity, jobs that pay living wages, access to 
education, and a degree of mobility within their community.  Sacco can claim to 
accomplish some work on their behalf because they already have the rights his text aims 
to produce.  By paying attention to their existence, Sacco can create a sense of empathy 
that allows readers to feel closer with their everyday struggles to have their voices heard 
without demanding a change in behavior or political values.  Although he is a guest 
within their community, he is also a tourist and pays his way.  The economic power he 
exerts as a tourist diminishes the effect their gestures of hospitality have upon his 
conscience.  Their attention to him is proportionate to the gifts his presence offers.  
There is no need for discomfort, because although he offers nothing of substantial value 
he takes nothing from the community either.  Life within the camp is entirely alien to 
Sacco’s economic cosmopolitanism.  There is no hotel and Sacco’s money is relatively 
useless.  Because life in the camp is not stratified according to consumer practices, but 
rather political affiliation, Sacco loses the capacity to differentiate himself from the 
locals in the way he could in Jerusalem and resorts instead to wearing one of Sameh’s 
keffiyehs.  In the camp, although the economic power differential between him and his 
hosts increases exponentially, Sacco becomes much more dependent upon Sameh’s 
hospitality.  
Whereas Sacco was able to keep the disparity of his own power and wealth out of 
focus in the city, the extent of Sameh’s sacrifice on behalf of his superficial comfort 
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shifts the balance of responsibility out of Sacco’s favor in the camp.  He is there to 
intervene on behalf of Palestinian suffering, after all, so Sameh should not suffer too 
much on his account.  When Sacco runs short on clean clothes, Sameh offers up his own 
clothes to keep Sacco in clean ones, and Sacco draws the line.  He could live in his 
house, take him from his job, but he would not be seen “wearing his underwear … you 
gotta keep some distance” (189).  What Sacco’s discomfort at Sameh’s hospitality 
reveals is the one-sided dynamic by which humanitarian intervention attempts to manage 
the distribution of rights.  Only by assuming the absence of the capacity to exert rights 
can Sacco enter the camp with the objective of relieving the suffering he encounters 
there by representing it abroad.  Sameh’s gift of his clean underwear places a burden of 
an entirely different magnitude upon Sacco.  The thought of such intimate contact 
threatens to dissolve the boundaries between journalistic observer, humanitarian 
intervener, and object of intervention.  If he were to wear them, Sacco would have to act 
in order to justify his act of taking.  This disturbing care Sameh extends to Sacco also 
destabilizes Sacco’s representation of himself as witness to suffering.  As if recognizing 
the futility of Sacco’s endeavor, Sameh approached him during his first UNRWA tour of 
the camp with the proposition that while Sacco may have produced results by showing 
sympathy with the people in the city, “You’re not going to see anything this way” in 
Jabalia (218).  Instead, Sacco explains, he needed someone who knows “why I’m here,” 
that he wanted “real stories” and not just the view from the UN tour bus (219).  This is 
ironic, however, given that “comics is a visual medium,” and what Sacco, the journalist 
on the ground, wants above all else are memorable images that will produce 
 151 
 
humanitarian value in the imagination of his readers (218).  It is doubly ironic that his 
project, to get to know Palestinians intimately, to make them interesting, depends upon 
their prior and superior knowledge of their American audience.  He can only succeed in 
enlightening his American audience of the plight of hapless Palestinians if they are 
already savvy members of a cosmopolitan society able to present themselves in ways 
Americans will find appealing and sympathetic.  Despite the clarity of his own purpose – 
to alert the world to Palestinian suffering – Sacco claims to not “quite know what Sameh 
got out of hosting me for four days, indulging my quest for unhappy stories,” apart from 
the pleasure of his personal company and the friendship they developed in the process 
(189).  It is as if he has forgotten that in addition to revealing suffering, his work is also 
to show Palestinians as human.  Sameh, as an equal of sorts, becomes too human to fit 
within the frame of refugee or object of humanitarian interest, and Sacco cannot quite 
place him without compromising the sense of distance he must maintain in order to 
preserve the credibility of his activity.  Sameh gives him food and shelter, political 
connections, and supplies him with the focused and visually compelling subject matter 
necessary to make Sacco’s book economically successful.  What Sameh seems to get out 
of the interaction is the chance to personify Rancière’s thesis that he has the rights he has 
not but does not have the rights he has.  Sacco the journalist assumes Sameh is the 
victim in need of his intervention, denying him of the ability to pursue his own rights; 
but, Sameh continually subverts this assumption by rescuing Sacco from his failures to 
understand the realities of camp life.  Sameh is human and cannot be reduced to the 
subject of human rights within Sacco’s journalistic representation.  But Sacco’s 
 152 
 
representation cannot avoid putting him to work for his production of humanitarian 
interest. 
  As promised, Sameh becomes a way for Sacco to obtain the “vivid descriptions, 
the details, man” that promise to make his book appealing (219).  For example, in one 
notable episode, Sacco recalls a dark and rainy night on which Sameh drove him across 
the camp, at great personal risk, to view a contraband video of Israeli atrocity.  As 
Sameh navigates the uneven, muddy road, compulsively telling himself “I don’t like 
this,” Sacco thinks to himself, “I’ve made it … I’ve come hundreds of miles via planes 
and buses and taxis to be precisely here: Jabalia, … a Disneyland of refuse and squalor” 
(208).  If the two are stopped by the authorities, Sameh will face imprisonment.  He 
doesn’t have a driver’s license, is out past curfew, and is in possession of an illegal 
video.  The thought of the danger, however, is a thrill for Sacco, who at most would be 
asked to leave the camp and return to comfort if they were stopped.  A scene of arrest, 
interrogation, and deportation  would give interesting action to Sacco’s narrative, adding 
further value to his book.  He describes his sensation of Sameh’s anxiety producing in 
him “my happiest moment” (208).  Whereas Sameh is trapped within the reality of the 
camp, “unaware of the moment’s magnificence,” Sacco perceives their danger 
aesthetically. “This’ll make a great couple of pages in the comic,” he thinks, as Sameh 
struggles to find his way through the impenetrable maze of washed-out streets.  In the 
moment, Sacco claims his success and ceases to be a humanitarian journalist.  Instead, 
he becomes an even sexier “goddamn adventure cartoonist.”  The scene offers the thrill 
of adventure for Sacco in which he can take pleasure in the risk of living in the 
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politically repressive squalor of the camp because for him, unlike for Sameh, it presents 
an exception to ordinary life.  He will ride to the home of Sameh’s friend, watch the 
video, and return to the safety of America.  While he indulges in delusions of grandeur, 
conjuring up images of himself as the seasoned veteran, talking comfortably with even 
the most hardened Palestinians, Sacco also returns his reader to the reality of his 
situation: “I’m pinching myself in a car in the dark in a flood, giddy from the ferocity 
outside, and thinking, ‘Throw it at me, baby, I can take it,’ but I’ve got the window 
rolled up tight…” (208).   
Just as the car insulates Sacco from any risk of exposure to the exciting weather, 
“the Palestinian experience” he feels himself brush up against exists only as the sense of 
worry he feels for Sameh, who cannot so easily divide himself from its reality.  Sacco 
remains on edge throughout the outing, relieved when the two finally leave.  On the walk 
home, he reflects, “this is all well and good for Sameh … he’s used to this sort of thing” 
(212).  He would like to document the plight of the camp’s refugees but will not subject 
himself to the experience of actually living like one.  Again, there is a certain distance he 
must enforce.  Sacco is the humanitarian journalist and does not want to “be mistaken 
for a Palestinian out here” (212).  The video is a way of preserving a record of Israeli 
violence for the refugees.   For Sacco, it’s an excuse for a thrilling exploit.  Although it 
does record compelling visual details, the very stuff of which graphic narratives are 
made, Sacco shows little interest in its content.  Instead, he notes that the very medium 
offers him a sense of security when they re-view it the next day from the safety of 
Sameh’s home.  The good thing about a video, he observes, is that “you can rewind it, 
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watch it over, eliminate all surprises … it’s easier on your nerves” than actual 
observation or facing the reality of life in the camp (213).  There is no risk in viewing a 
representation of violence, only in witnessing it directly.  And there is really no risk for 
Sacco as witness, only for those who must continue to live in the camp after his visit is 
over.  By showing himself subsumed within the joint problems of witnessing and 
viewing atrocity, however, Sacco opens an interesting aporia.  He can only attend to the 
feelings of living in the camp, of a life consumed with the risk of violence, by 
transforming his own contact into a source of adventure.  His witnessing must produce 
some sort of spectacular value.  He cannot justify participating in the scene of the camp 
unless it leads to some productive contribution to his book, splashy pages that will attract 
and hold readers’ attention.  At the same time, however, his interpretation of his act of 
viewing the atrocity video, the reason for his adventure, reflects critically on the 
relationship the text he produces has with American readers.  Like him, they may 
consume the representations of political oppression and violence at their leisure, 
insulated from any physical or emotional risk.  It is certain that Sacco will emerge from 
his descent into the camp untouched, and we may revisit his striking pages at will, 
lingering over his detailed illustrations or pondering his remarks without the worry that 
we too will be caught up in the consequences of what he represents. 
Sacco’s time in the camp jeopardizes Sameh’s position at the rehabilitation 
center.  On the last day of his visit, Sacco learns that the center has distributed a memo, 
“no more friends to hang out at the office; no more serving friends tea; no more leaving 
early to show friends around the camp” (220).  The note could have general 
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implications, but Sacco notes “my presence has been the catalyst.”  This turn of events 
leaves readers to consider the value of Sacco’s work.  He produces a text that challenges 
their attention with the humanity of Palestinian refugees, but it has disrupted the ability 
of a very talented Palestinian to make a material difference in the lives of some of the 
most underprivileged members of his community.  Throughout the text, Sacco 
consistently depicts Sameh as an archetypical good worker within the humanitarian 
paradigm in contrast with himself as ineffectual and selfish.  By depicting his own labor, 
implicated in the production of an image of the other, and subject to a capitalistic 
dynamic of intervention driving U.S. imperialism, not merely as ineffectual, though, but 
as actually damaging to the labor of Sameh, who remains less visible, Sacco actually 
devalorizes the graphic narrative as an implicitly ethical medium.  Rather than produce 
on behalf of humanitarian intervention, Sacco’s ironic labor subtracts value from his 
own intervention and diverts it back toward autonomous and unrepresented Palestinian 
agents.  Although his collaboration in the moment was detrimental to Sameh’s ongoing 
project, Sacco’s text ultimately attempts to recuperate Sameh’s humanity by refusing to 
manage his humanity. 
Although Sacco often calls into question his own motives and actions, he does, 
however, go to some lengths to make sure it is clear that he is not exactly like an 
ordinary journalist or Western tourist to the region.  He returns to Jerusalem for a few 
days of sightseeing and relaxation after his stay in Jabalia, and there, he makes this 
contrast clear during a brief encounter with a fellow tourist.  The young man, “an Oxford 
student with plans for going into the Anglican priesthood,” Sacco relates, was “a 
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connoisseur” of religious experiences and travelled to the Holy Land to take them all in.  
The young man’s interest in religion mirrors Sacco’s thirst for horrible stories of 
suffering.  Both want to witness first-hand the fullness of life’s variety.  Unlike Sacco, 
however, the young man attempts to live as if no distance existed between him and the 
people he had come to experience.  Sacco sees him doing the “Stations of the Cross with 
the Franciscans,” joining “the Armenian Orthodox for evening vespers,” and even lying 
about having a “Jewish mother in order to get invited to Shabbat supper by the Hasidim” 
(279).  Although both the man and Sacco are invested in witnessing a spectacle of sorts, 
the man’s performance strikes Sacco as false.  Both, he notes, find what they are looking 
for in the other they came to witness, but the young man has failed to recognize the 
significance of his own difference.  As the two share the experience of Christmas eve 
mass, Sacco reflects on the scene of the service projected across the street onto “the side 
of Israeli police headquarters” (280).  The young man, caught up in the ecstasy of 
Christmas in the Holy Land, thinks nothing of the oppressive statement this image 
makes. His inattention to the tensions between people, and his eagerness to win 
sympathy, flattens out the political into a superficially cosmopolitan space in which 
people can mingle without risk, in which we can choose to act for others without careful 
thought.  For him, the location is the site of religious interest, a set of consumable 
experiences devoid of politics that can enhance his sense of worldly subjectivity.  
Sacco’s disdain for the man calls readers to remain at a distance, to refuse the power to 
claim the right to represent others, but in so doing, finally succeeds. 
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The Performance of Interest in Alexsandar Hemon’s The Lazarus Project 
It is interesting that given the certainty of what the journalist gets out of 
representation and research trips, or the cosmopolitan tourist from his pilgrimage, Sacco 
claims to be mystified at his friend Sameh’s desire to help him.  The need to make a 
subject interesting traps Sacco the journalist in a cycle of complicity with oppressive 
institutions from which he would claim distance.  But, as his confusion over Sameh 
indicates, representations of crisis are not just a matter of journalists reducing people to 
slick human interest stories.  We report on something to raise awareness of it and to 
inspire transformative action.  To do this we have to make whatever it is we report on 
into something that first bears interest.  Terri Tomsky argues that because we only 
recognize certain kinds of trauma as worth our aid, humanitarians require victims to 
market their experiences according to our desire to aid specific forms of injury.  The 
result is the creation of what she calls a “trauma economy” in which the “movement of 
memories is enabled by infrastructures of power, and consequently mediated and 
consecrated through institutions” (50).  Within trauma economy, which is a form of 
attention economy, what matters, and what makes a representation marketable, is not 
factual accuracy, but, Tomsky notes, “getting it ‘right’ affectively” (54).  The purpose of 
humanitarian appeals is to evoke a strong emotional response from readers.  Sacco, she 
suggests, complicates this economy with his meta-journalistic representations of other 
journalists selectively constructing their stories out of human interactions.  Reading 
affect economically, something is interesting when it promises a good chance of 
stimulating a positive emotional state in exchange for an investment of attention.  And 
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attention defines the ways in which particular forms of community take shape.  To make 
some person, thing, or event interesting is to put it to work on behalf of its prospective 
audience’s sense of well-being and to reconsolidate the boundaries legitimizing the 
community of the audience as one oriented toward claiming responsibility for the state 
of others.  It does all this prior to addressing any of those conditions that attract concern 
and make the reported object one of interest in the first place, since it is in the interest of 
the humanitarian journalist to protect its source of value.  Further, the project of 
associating this mode of interest with a human being, as is the case of texts that frame 
ethics in terms of an encounter with singular humanity, makes an actual person and that 
person’s sense of self the site of the production of the economized interest that funds 
humanitarians.  Someone must become the Face behind the Levinasian encounter.  In the 
case of Palestine, Sameh occupies this position by becoming the perpetually self-
sacrificing guide.   
The way responsibility is taken in the encounter that drives the production of 
humanitarian interest, in which the other whom we find is helpless, exposed, and without 
the capacity to produce value on its own, is pure fantasy.  Interest requires someone to 
be the face, which means lending affective value to its ethical appeal.  This person, like 
Sameh, must labor to become the abject, powerless object of interest for a benefactor 
whose agency is legitimized through the structure of appeal humanitarianism requires.  
In this section, I look at Aleksandar Hemon’s The Lazarus Project to consider how 
people perceived as of interest to philanthropists and humanitarians, those in whose 
welfare we take a stake, must work to become interesting to their observers and what 
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effects this work has on their sense of placement in a cosmopolitan world.  The 
economic management of fascination with difference and its effects upon those taken as 
fascinating is the subject of Hemon’s novel.  Its narrative follows the efforts of a 
suggestively autobiographical character, Vladimir Brik, who like Hemon is a writer 
stranded in Chicago by the Bosnian conflict, as he sorts out his place in the world while 
also struggling to fit into the American family of his wife Mary, a successful 
neurosurgeon.  As he does so, Brik bears the pressure of constant demands to prove the 
social value of himself and his national identity and desires only to escape the constant 
attention to which he finds himself subject.  While he recognizes the inhumanity of 
interest, he feels he can only accomplish his escape from it by creating a narrative 
around himself so seductive that it will distract attention from his true, authentic self.  To 
escape life as the object of others’ interest, Brik distracts readers’ attention away from 
his body toward those of others for whom he can claim responsibility.   
The book’s chapters alternate between two texts Brik has written to this end.  
One set documents his travels across Eastern Europe with Rora, a childhood friend and 
photographer, to research the life of Lazarus Averbuch, a Ukrainian Jew who 
immigrated to Chicago to escape racist violence only to be murdered by the chief of 
police in 1908.  In it, Brik recounts his own conflicted feelings at the need to become 
appealing to wealthy philanthropists in order to fund his travels abroad, which he 
understands as a means to independence from America itself, and his growing 
disillusionment with his marriage, which is based on a similar reliance upon his wife’s 
name and explanations to secure his place in America.  The second set are a fictionalized 
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story of Lazarus’s sister and her grief following his murder and during attempts on the 
part of Chicago’s Jewish Americans and investigative reporters to ease her suffering in 
exchange for the right to make Lazarus a media sensation and a symbol for various 
political causes.  Brik’s personal interest in Lazarus stems from a strong sense of 
identification with the young man’s persecution as a misunderstood foreigner fleeing 
ethnic violence in the land of opportunity.  He fears that, like Lazarus, he too is not 
known for who he is but only as an embodiment of human interest.  This section of the 
novel makes a relatively straight-forward commentary on the callousness of journalists 
who see a chance to tell an exciting story but fail to appreciate that for their source, 
Olga, Lazarus is always first her brother, a person whose loss she can never recuperate.11  
The travel narrative, which documents Brik’s motives for producing the Lazarus story 
and explains the content he invents for it, is more complex in its negotiation of the 
feedback loop between human interest and ethical responsibility that determines Brik’s 
sense of self-worth. 
From the beginning of the novel, it is clear that although he makes a living off 
drawing attention to the uniqueness of his experience as a Bosnian exile living in 
America, Brik desires nothing so much as to escape notice.  When he writes columns 
describing the quirks of immigrant life, he complains that people continually take notice 
of the awkward ways he inevitably stands out.  When his unnamed narrator defines the 
meaning of home, he does so not in terms of a source of identity, the basis for what 
makes one comprehensible to others, or even as commitments to another, but as a place 
of indistinction “where somebody notices when you are no longer there” (3).  Home is 
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the site where one’s presence is simply given because it does not have to be justified 
through the sight of others.  Home, in other words, is where one’s body and basic 
mannerisms are legible as signs of social capital.  In the home Brik imagines he has the 
potential to regulate the effects of others’ attention upon his body.  As a Bosnian living 
in exile, the idea of effortless belonging haunts Brik’s thoughts.  If home is where 
someone misses you when you are gone, Brik thinks exile is like being forgotten during 
a game of hide and seek.  He recalls the multiple occasions in which he sat hidden, 
awaiting discovery while his friends “were being bathed by their caring mothers, having 
all left the game without telling me” (30).  His displacement hides or shelters him from 
the traumatic life of the nation, but its traumatization prevents his absence from 
becoming noteworthy.  Belonging to the nation is something like the inclusion the other 
children experience and that Brik has traumatically lost in the game of hide and seek.  
He is still a part of the game, since he remains hidden, but cannot take pleasure in the 
game’s unfolding.  The nation is central to his sense of self, but he feels cut off from the 
unfolding narrative of its collective identity and the institutionalized cultural capital that 
this narrative confers on those who have lived through the war. His abandonment by his 
companions simultaneously marks his value within the local attention economy as null.  
His attention is not sought and its loss is not noted.   
The years spent in Chicago, during which the war changed how the world at 
large understood what it means to be Bosnian, leave Brik feeling as if the nation has 
moved on without him, leaving him in the woods of the U.S. to fend for himself.  The 
overwhelming visibility of the war in media coverage of Bosnia during Brik’s exile 
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freezes his identity in America as the embodiment of its trauma and as a marker of the 
need for Americans to intervene on behalf of an imperiled Bosnian culture that otherwise 
might be lost to the world.  In America, everyone is a humanitarian who seems only to 
notice Brik as an object of concern or curiosity.  As a result, America demands a 
constant performance from Brik and can never be a home to him.  His sense of 
displacement orbits around the scene of the Association of Bosnian Americans’ annual 
charity dance that also sets in motion Brik’s scheme to use the Lazarus story as an 
excuse to return to Europe.  The dance stages a performance of Bosnian culture for the 
benefit of the community’s wealthy elite.  Each year, the city’s immigrants gather to put 
on a show with the understanding that their dance expresses something essential about 
their difference.  In it, Chicagoans can witness the Bosnian-Americans’ identity and 
subsequently feel as if, by observing culture in motion, they are preserving something 
that otherwise might be lost to humanity.  Although given in support of Bosnians, the 
charity ball is structured for the benefit of its American witnesses.  By investing 
charitably in the Association, their attention can, Brik thinks, ensure that Bosnia’s 
“untelligible customs” are “preserved forever, like a fly in resin” (13).  This image is 
paradigmatic of his understanding of his relationship to others throughout the novel.  
The event is one of humanitarian intervention through a superficially cosmopolitan 
encounter with pleasurable difference.  As he notes, Chicago’s wealthy philanthropists 
“are far more likely to fork out their charitable money … if convinced that our culture is 
nothing like theirs” (13).  The event sustains the Levinasian fantasy that the 
philanthropists’ gifts of attention, and as Brik hopes, occasionally financial support, 
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enables the irreplaceable human spectacle of Bosnia to continue to be.  The extent of his 
interest to them is limited to his capacity to stand out as an exemplar of their ideas of the 
war-torn refugee and of Eastern European society as entities in need of their charitable 
sacrifices.  Their attention to Bosnian difference crystallizes the culture within the 
American imaginary as an anthropological curiosity, as a distinct cultural artifact on 
display for their consumption.  The Bosnians’ value as a source of cosmopolitan 
pleasure for the interested philanthropist justifies the expansion of America’s political 
and economic influence as the philanthropist acts in order to preserve their existence.  As 
the extended metaphor suggests, however, neither philanthropists nor Brik see him as a 
hybrid subject transforming what it means to be American or Bosnian.  He is a relic, not 
a human being with a dynamic, living sense of self.  Once the face, he can be nothing 
else.  As the object of curiosity, he performs to the expectations of his benefactors in 
order to fulfill their desires.  They look upon his difference from a dispassionate, 
unaffected remove.  He makes himself a face that allows them to feel their wealth and 
power are ethical in the sight of its helplessness.  What Brik desires in America is to not 
be the object of human interest, but instead to be merely human.  But to be human 
requires a fund of social and economic capital he can only attain by capturing attention.  
When they give support for his life in America out of philanthropic or humanitarian 
concern, Brik’s American patrons force him to first give up the right to individual 
sovereignty and become instead whatever it is they are willing to validate in him.   
As an exile struggling to accumulate the cultural capital necessary to create an 
absence that would be missed and a presence that goes unnoticed, Brik feels he must 
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remain the object of foreign curiosity dependent for his preservation upon his hosts. For 
instance, Brik recognizes that to fit comfortably in Chicago society, he must perform the 
identity of the Bosnian refugee immigrant according to the expectations of its wealthy 
elite, as he understands them.  At the annual Association of Bosnian Americans ball, he 
spots the opportunity to secure a large grant to fund his research interests.  At the event, 
he chats up an elderly woman, Susie Schuettler, who confesses her thrill at its spectacle.  
It “was amazing,” she tells him, “how different the things you knew well looked through 
the eyes of a foreigner,” and she confides that “she liked reading” about foreigners 
“more than sex.”  Brik recalls how she makes this comment with a wink “demanding my 
complicity” (14).  In the moments that follow, he resolves to charm her but ends up 
stomping on her foot instead.  With him kneeling apologetically to massage her possibly 
broken toes, Brik and Susie become the subject of a photograph.  The image captures the 
conflicted dynamic – of a desire to belong where one is and the need to perform 
according to someone else’s expectations in order to do so – that makes up the heart of 
Hemon’s novel.  In it, he imagines she will see him as “a klutzy knight … touching her 
shriveled knee,” the perfect gesture to encapsulate her act of benevolent patronage (34).  
While both she and Brik know the photograph actually documents his clumsy dancing, 
he understands the act of offering that particular image, one both know to be something 
other than what he sells it as, as a sign of his willingness to play along with her fantasy.  
She will be his sponsor if he becomes her conquest, but he understands playing the part 
of enthralled dependent as his means to evade her interest. 
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As Brik continues to reflect on the power relations between himself and his place 
of refuge, he observes “belonging to one nation and not another” is an “unearned 
nobility” (13).  The right to belong unself-consciously cannot be earned but is a function 
of racial and ethnic markers.  Nonetheless, Brik feels as if he must contribute something 
of value to those observing him in order to justify even his agonized presence in the 
U.S..  What he has to offer is the idea of Bosnian difference, and to put this up for 
display, he must give up the capacity to determine what makes him both unique and 
Bosnian.  Unfortunately, he summarizes what he believes others see as interestingly 
Bosnian in the self-deprecating observations that his “country’s main exports are stolen 
cars and sadness” and that “In my country … candy is the chief currency” (73, 163).  
(And this second comment ironically relates back to Sacco’s depiction of himself as the 
humanitarian making inroads with Palestinian children by passing out sweets wherever 
he goes).  Brik’s complicity with this assessment perpetuates his sense of dislocation.  
He knows the sadness for which he is valued is one to which he has no claim since he 
spent the war years living in Chicago and visiting Europe only on luxury tours financed 
by his wealthy spouse.  Further, by making visible the stereotypical image of Bosnian 
traumatization and political corruption, Brik obscures any personal sadnesses that might 
otherwise define his own experience.  Everyone interested in him can see only the victim 
of war or ethnic violence.  No one sees a man simply longing for home.   
The effort to become interestingly different for American attentions, like a bug 
trapped in amber, leaves Brik feeling nostalgic for Sarajevo, where he knew “a kind of 
unspoken belief that everyone could be whatever they claimed they were – each life, 
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however imaginary, could be validated by its rightful, sovereign owner, from the inside” 
(20).  What he describes here is a desire to attain a cosmopolitan belonging to Bosnia on 
the basis of his being affected by its war despite not having physically experienced its 
events. In Bosnia, he suggests, the conviction that something effects one on an emotional 
or psychological level is equivalent to an American conflation of reality and proximity 
epitomized in reality television and the effect the unreality of reality news TV has on 
Americans’ sense of having experienced the movement of global history.  In America, 
he says, “people crave the truth” more than anything and “reality is the fastest … 
commodity” (103).  By this he does not mean new game show contests, but our 
perception of the war on terror and America’s own traumatic wound, the 9/11 attacks, 
both of which he continually indexes as a parallel to his own experiences.  For him, 
missing the event of the war leads to a traumatic inability to live within the truth he can 
sense emerging from it.  Its effects condition the nature of what it means to be Bosnian, 
at least from the perspective of media viewers, in such a way that he no longer fits in 
seamlessly with his fellow citizens who weathered its trials in Sarajevo.   
Brik only feels Bosnian when American philanthropists take interest in his nation 
by paying attention to him.  But Americans are no different.  They make an unexamined 
claim to national trauma without directly experienced violence or any other negative 
effect upon daily life.  What instead occurs is that the dramatic coverage of the events 
creates a compelling opportunity for its viewers to act as if they were affected directly, 
as Brik wishes he could do, as if by seeing or hearing of a violent event, one could 
incorporate its affects and chronology themselves, as one’s own – or, as if someone 
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else’s story could become one’s own by making it one that affects others.  What he is 
suggesting in these remarks is not that either the Bosnian or the American way of 
relating to history or reality is more or less real.  Both are fabulations spawned by our 
basic human capacity to feel for and identify with others.  Instead, it is a matter of 
regulating the effects of identification upon interest and the ways in which becoming 
interesting affects one’s capacity to produce cultural, political, and economic value.  In 
the Bosnian case, sadness, or being interesting, is the only legitimate value Brik and the 
world note.  Given this, he can only be the object of a humanitarian interest, which, as I 
argued at the beginning of the chapter, produces value at its object’s expense on behalf 
of the affective and political well-being of the intervener.  America, by contrast, is the 
land of opportunity, democracy, and freedom.  Its victimization allows its citizens to 
wield interest alongside other already materially valuable modes of production.  They do 
not have to rely on the witness of others to translate their abstract, affective labor into 
economically useful resources.  With its own trauma, America has no need to turn 
abroad to people like Brik for humanitarian good feeling.  They can just take care of 
themselves, following Bush’s advice to invest in the American economy.  Realizing this, 
Brik longs to return home where he can put his hurt feelings to work on his own and his 
own community’s behalf.  His feeling is echoed in Lazarus’s and Olga’s desire to return 
to Ukraine where, although they may face pogroms, they may live with dignity alongside 
family. 
The sense of national competition over the production of humanitarian interest 
also pervades Brik’s recollections of his crumbling marriage.  Money, he thinks, “has a 
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man’s face,” and as a sporadically employed writer, he worries his merely “symbolic” 
contributions to the “Field-Brik marital budget” reduce him to the unmanly state of 
being “kept by his wife” (16).  Susie’s grant offers him the hope that he can “show Mary 
that I was not a wastrel or a slacker or a lazy eastern-European, but a person of talent and 
potential” (17).  Or, that he is both productive and not identifiably foreign, someone 
worthy of the citizenship her association grants him.  But, Brik fears he can never 
compete with his wife, a successful neurosurgeon.  Her daily confrontation with death 
and her remuneration for it are a constant reminder of the equal extent to which his own 
labor seems trivial and goes unrewarded.  When she opens up a patient’s skull, she has 
the direct physical contact with life that Brik must appropriate in his own performance of 
sadness.  The reality of her job upsets the economic relationship of the marriage by 
displacing Brik’s capacity to monopolize the supply end of its affective production.  Her 
sadness is more immediate, as it affects her directly and bears upon American lives.  
However, she does not value her connection to trauma that Brik cannot access in his own 
life.  Brik thinks he must embody suffering to sustain his social value but Mary does not 
want to relive the consequences of her day as the two talk in bed.  She refuses to convert 
her experiences to stories which can become the materials for Brik’s performances of 
interest and can afford to because the medical field already pays so well.  Her silence on 
her own pain reinforces the humanitarian circuit of witnessing.  While his own pain is 
subject to public circulation and produces humanitarian value, as an American, Mary can 
keep her own pain private. 
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Brik objectifies Mary’s pain by imagining it as a simple can “whose red label 
read SADNESS,” tucked away in a discreet corner of their pantry (73).  When he feels 
dependent upon their relationship, Brik imagines Mary’s private feelings as something 
he could open up and discover.  His desire to open the can reveals his desire to be the 
humanitarian taking interest in, coming to know, or resolving the hurt of an objectified 
other.  His reification of her pain also imposes stasis upon it.  Later, however, he 
reimagines their circumstances using the controlled but dynamic atmosphere of her 
office.  Within its walls are “whole worlds of her” that he “had no access to” (278-9).  
His sense of her discomfort at his presence in the proximity of her private sanctum 
forces him to realize that “she would never allow me to imagine them,” let alone invite 
him in (279).  Unlike his own, Brik believes Mary’s feelings exist as an unwanted excess 
to her job’s economic productivity.  She leaves their capacity to affect untapped, hence 
his sublimation of them in a discretely sealed can.  He does not want to believe they are 
an intimate part of her identity because to see her as traumatized by violence strips him 
of his claim to humanitarian interest, the only valuable good he recognizes as at his 
disposal.  The metaphor of the can is an apt one precisely because it shows Brik 
trivializing Mary’s feelings as an object of no significance that she may absolve herself 
of, containing them where they attract no notice or interest whatsoever but absolutely 
compelling to his outsider’s interest in comforting and knowing her.  By reducing 
Mary’s feelings to such a banal object, Brik makes his own stand out as more 
worthwhile of our attentions, replicating both the appeal to humanitarian intervention he 
wants to break free from and the humanitarian taking of interest in the other.  Brik’s own 
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uninvited presence in her office, where Mary proves her affective and material value, he 
realizes, “violated the cleanliness of her sovereignty” by putting her experience on 
equally fragile ground as his own war-traumatized past and by insisting on its centrality 
to her sense of self.  By taking notice of her pain, her tension, Brik threatens to reverse 
the power dynamic of the marriage by occupying a position from which he could 
legitimize her worth by feeling sorry for her pain rather than indebted to its returns.  
Mary, he concludes, was unwilling to accept this possibility.  Reflecting upon her closed 
heart, Brik decides to leave his marriage. 
In order to defend his position within the attention economy of intervention, Brik 
frames the story about the end of his marriage as one of poor communication and lack of 
intimacy rather than the cultural power struggle it is.  It is attachment to physical and 
cultural space that affords Brik, as an individual, the luxury of deciding his identity.  His 
marriage to Mary opens the door for him in America, but leaves him indebted to and 
with the feeling that he is morally obligated to be something particular for her.  As Brik 
understands it, to be American is to be free, meaning “I could stop caring what I 
promised, what I committed myself to, because I would just not care who I was and 
become someone else on a whim” (132).  To be American means “I could be the sole 
meaning of my life.”  The act of determining the meaning of one’s life, apart from given 
culture, or to choose life, identity, is close to Rebecca Walkowitz’s definition of 
cosmopolitanism as one’s style of choosing identity.  However, As Brik perceives the 
issue, the felt need to be the sole meaning of his life is the result of the economic aspect 
of humanitarian attention.  He can never simply be himself because he is always the 
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object of an attention that commands he perform something that produces value for 
someone else.  Mary wants a certain kind of loving, but understanding, husband, and 
Susie can fulfill his wildest economic dreams, but also wants him to play along with her 
sexual fantasy.  To be able to choose life, in the sense Brik desires, is to possess the 
economic or social capital necessary to escape the scrutiny of attention, as Mary does 
within the marriage.  He sees two ways to achieve this aim; he could “earn the right to 
orgasmic selfishness (and the money required for it)” by producing a work of economic 
or cultural significance, or “purchase [his] moral insurance by going through the 
righteous process of self-doubt and self-realization” within the humanitarian discourse of 
traumatized victim of foreign violence (133).  Since he is not the latter and does not 
possess the personal fortitude to claim the former, Brik is trapped within an 
uncomfortable lie.  He can con others into making a real investment in him but cannot 
attain the security of a genuine, faithful tie to the events that define his sense of a 
national identity he can no longer fully claim. 
Where Brik suffers the constant feeling that he is exploited by the interest of 
Mary and Susie, his travelling companion Rora exemplifies his desire for Bosnian 
manliness through his seemingly endless supply of outrageous tales of close calls with 
violent deaths, of rubbing elbows with American journalists and Saravejan gangsters, 
and of always outwitting the tourists he continually seduces with his easy confidence.  
Much like Brik’s plan to dupe Susie into giving him the grant, Rora’s stories find him 
conning American tourists and journalists, usually to comic results.  But Rora, despite 
showing his hand as a liar and fraud, is seductively appealing to Brik as the model of 
 172 
 
Bosnian authenticity because his stories set his deceptions against the backdrop of 
Sarajevo’s wartime underworld and dodging bullets on the streets.  They are exactly 
what Brik lacks in his own biography.  Between stories of smuggling crime lords 
through underground tunnels, Rora tells Brik about how he once made a living selling 
American tourists chunks of painted concrete.  Passed off as fragments of the Berlin 
Wall, he sold the rubble not by its appearance, but rather through the appeal of a 
“certificate of authenticity, signed by himself” (22).  Even when the police force Rora to 
confess to his marks the fraudulence of his wares, the tourists, “chasing the shadows of 
true experience,” were still all too happy to pay up.  Back home, the anonymous 
certificate speaks for itself and allows the tourists to claim the reality of their brush with 
history.  Like Brik’s use of the photograph to manipulate Susie’s feelings, Rora’s con 
depends upon the contract the parties form around the certificate.  Without the testimony 
the certificate provides to the supposed origin of the object, the cement block is 
worthless.  What matters in the economic transaction is not the concrete itself, but rather 
the act of witnessing Rora documents through his signature on the paper even though the 
American tourists know perfectly well that Rora and the document are fake.  What Rora 
sells is not history or the Wall itself.  No one wants his worthless blocks.  The concrete 
solidifies a contract between them, on the basis of its mutually understood 
worthlessness.  In doing so, it becomes a vessel for cultural capital by embodying a site 
of geopolitical interest that is entirely subject to its purchasers’ desires.  The fall, which 
marked the end of totalitarian Communism in Europe, becomes instead a marker of the 
perpetuation of uneven power relations that inspired the destruction of the wall itself.    
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With his story of the sale of a worthless object, Rora sells Brik the idea of his capacity to 
invert the humanitarian relationship.  Likewise, what Brik sells throughout the novel is 
himself, a fake Brik. 
It is interesting, however, that as Brik makes a distinction between the reality-
oriented American story market and the more playful Bosnian one, he insists upon 
characterizing Rora as trafficking in the American mode of storytelling.  His account of 
Rora negotiating with the tourists forms the basis for his authentication of his novel’s 
testimony to Rora’s wartime experience as Bosnian, which is similarly suspect.  At the 
same time, Brik presents himself as a more Bosnian storyteller, adopting the experiences 
of others to remake his own place in the world while claiming the American styled 
reality of his narrative.  A story only holds value to the extent that it coincides with the 
identity of the teller.  Since the war passed him by, he lacks the credibility to project 
himself as a sympathetic object of attention.  Were he a more appealing victim of its 
violence, he could simply ask Susie for money directly, since no further conditioning 
would be necessary to condition his appearance.  Instead, he must orchestrate an 
elaborate scene to position himself as her dependent just as Rora must certify his fake 
bricks.  Hemon’s novel suggests cosmopolitan acts of storytelling involves an elaborate 
contract of deception between teller and hearer in order to manufacture a mutually 
beneficial economic relationship mediated by the expression of sympathy.  The aim of 
the story transaction is the production of a highly exploitative social belief.  Neither the 
teller nor the hearer can admit to the fabrication going on in the interaction.  Instead, 
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although both parties know what they are doing, both must pretend as if the story 
produces the genuine article.   
Just as the truly free subject can reinvent itself on a whim, Brik idealizes 
storytelling and witnessing as a politically subversive exercise.  In Sarajevo, Brik 
idealistically believes, deception proceeds more openly.  All stories had some value 
because “nobody expected the truth or information, just the pleasure of being in the story 
and maybe, passing it off as their own” (103).  Their recognition that reality is composed 
of fictions places witness and witnessed on equal footing.  The philanthropist can only 
hold the other like a bug in amber with the knowledge that they too will become 
similarly objectified by the storyteller and that whatever image they capture amounts to 
no more than a complex conglomeration of past appropriations and self-stylizations.  
Where Brik could not acknowledge that Susie was also playing him for her sexual thrills 
without cheapening the purity of his moral imperative or sacrificing his sense of 
masculinity, in Bosnia, he can feel as though his observers are being imaginative with 
him.  It does not have to take on the appearance of reality or authenticity in order to have 
value.  This is an appealing change because it means that a story does not have to claim 
to capture the essence of an event in order to lend appeal to the teller.  For Brik, who 
missed the war, it means he can retain a sense of Bosnianness vicariously by retelling the 
wartime experiences of his friend Rora without needing to make them his own.  He can 
merely witness the event rather than embodying it.   
The reason Brik cannot escape the deceptive mode of producing interest is that 
he is constantly concerned with the reception of his text and the image of himself that is 
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recalled from within it. Elaborating upon his earlier thoughts on his childhood memories 
of storytelling, Brik recalls reading to his blind Uncle Mikhal.  When he became bored 
with the text at hand, he “would occasionally simply add things,” a “new ship sinks in 
the Battle of Guadacanal” or “newly discovered subatomic particles that changed our 
thinking about the universe” (206).  His innocent deceptions gave the young Brik “a 
beautiful high” because he “was constructing a particular, custom-made world” for his 
uncle (206-7).  Blind to all else, the uncle depends on Brik to verify the content of the 
text and the text to supply the identity of its subject matter.  The imaginary world they 
flesh out through the act of storytelling both is and is not like the Bosnia Brik and Rora 
put on exhibit in their various deceptions.  It is false but it does not require an exchange 
of power.  Instead, storytelling, in this case, lets Uncle Mikhal and Brik escape together 
into a more fantastic world in which they retain their sense of belonging.  It offers them 
mobility and plasticity.  What Brik remembers, though, is the pleasure of holding his 
relative “in my power for as long as he listened” (207).  So, the attention gained through 
testifying to a particular state of reality allows Brik to feel justified when he claims the 
power over the world his uncle inhabits.  It is not the end result of any commitment to 
the event he is describing or the impact it might have upon its hearer.  He reassures 
himself that if ever confronted he could claim “misunderstanding” to protect his 
credibility and never considered the possibility that “my uncle might have been aware of 
my deception.”  Had he taken note of the mutual fantasy production the two were 
engaged in, had he imagined “Uncle Mikhal as complicit,” they could have together 
“arranged more gigantic battles, explored more nonexistent continents, and built stranger 
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universes from stranger particles” (207).  What Brik seems to recognize in this moment, 
inspired by Rora’s own con games, is that storytelling is always false, that what one 
expresses as witness is never the thing itself, but always something driven out of self-
interested desire.  The difference between the storytelling he despises in America and 
that for which he is nostalgic is not a greater or more innocent suspension of disbelief, 
but a disjunction of power and storytelling.  Brik desires his stories to no longer carry the 
weight of bearing witness to his people.  He wants to just be the meaning of himself, for 
himself, which, incidentally, is his definition of Americanness. 
To have the confidence to be himself, Brik must first reconnect with his national 
identity, since he believes only physical intimacy with his ethnic community can supply 
him with the reserve of social capital necessary to cease his performance as witness.  As 
he moves from America to Ukraine and Ukraine to Bulgaria and then Moldova, Brik 
represents himself regaining confidence in his ability to belong. Where he continually 
reminds readers of his pained sense of Bosnianness in America, in Ukraine, Brik 
effortlessly assumes his superiority, but as an American.  Drawing upon the global 
prestige his travel documents imply, he thinks, “Everyone imagines that they have a 
center, the seat of their soul” (176).  The soul, he explains, is “fixed,” it “does not move 
around” within a person, but remains constant, the product of whatever is essential to 
their identity (177).  At the same time, it does move “with you” from place to place, 
giving a person a comforting sense of personal validity.  When he was in America, Brik 
felt his soul in the memories of his lost Bosnia.  In Ukraine his soul shifts from his 
longing for homeliness to his “breast pocket,” and more specifically, to the “American 
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passport and a wad of cash” sitting in it.  This concept of belonging is a striking reversal 
of his earlier thought that home is where one is missed or appreciated apart from any 
potential economic value.  The contrast between the two suggests that, like the dilemma 
Brik experiences in his marriage, cosmopolitanism is a function of regulating the 
attention paid to oneself.  To be able to claim a center unified in the capacity to 
command attention through his presence, Brik must efface his status as an exile, and in 
so doing, insist upon the difference that makes him feel unhomed.  Whereas in America, 
Brik attracted attention because he had no other value than as a marker of contrast that 
enhanced local value, abroad Brik portrays himself as an agent recording first the 
presence and then the absence of his friend.  In these shifts, he renounces the spectacular 
attentive cosmopolitanism that has kept open his traumatic sense of displacement.  
Although he is the tourist, in Ukraine, he feels “wary of these people, these foreigners” 
he is forced to brush up against and describes his environment as a distressing 
“malodorous concoction of urine, vermin, and mental decomposition” (176, 124).  
Defined as an effect of power, the cosmopolitanism Hemon imagines is not the 
storytelling that occurs between Brik and his blind uncle, but that of Brik and Susie or 
Rora and Brik.  In it, all that matters is the facilitation of the production and 
accumulation of capital.  It is a thoroughly imperialistic cosmopolitanism opposed to all 
vital forms of national or local attachment.  The flies of its world must, for their own 
good, be preserved in humanitarian resin because on their own, alive, they are filth.   
Even as he begins to abandon his feelings for America, Brik has difficulty 
moving beyond the logic of humanitarian witnessing he has internalized there.  On their 
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travels, he hounds Rora constantly with questions about how it felt to undergo the 
shocking experiences of the war he describes in detail.  Brik’s relentless interest in 
Rora’s stories, which predictably end up being highly imaginative, seems to be driven by 
the idea that once animated with enough detail, they can take on a life of their own, apart 
from their source.  If Brik can know Rora’s past, he can use it to reconnect with his lost 
Sarajevo.  Rora becomes Brik’s fake brick.  Basking in the wealth of Rora’s memories, 
Brik is still distressed at the thought that although he has “X-rayed through the visible” 
to see “the original past version,” he “couldn’t see the now, only the before.”  Finally 
exasperated, Rora breaks form and tells Brik that “what you see is what you see, but that 
is never everything” (208).  As witness, Brik wants to embody Sarajevo’s past and its 
present.  He would like to become that object that guarantees interest in its existence, or 
that which renders its private truth communicable knowledge.  He wants to both own 
and save Bosnia.  While he can economize its stories in this way, Rora explains that 
doing so will never give Brik the feeling of belonging or legitimacy that he truly desires.  
The Real of the community, its “past and future,” he says, “exist without you ….Nothing 
at all depends on you seeing it” (209).  The only value of witnessing lies in its ability to 
become an economic resource.  It can address injustice or heal the self, Rora seems to 
say, but not both at the same time.  Directed toward humanitarian attention, Brik’s text is 
beyond worthless.  It marks him an outsider at home and gives him no means to belong 
in America. 
Rora’s outburst shatters the illusion of cosmopolitanism sustained under 
humanitarian attention. Freed from its allure, Brik takes action to reclaim his own, direct 
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ties to the present that exists beyond representation, or at least tells a story that may or 
may not be a lie.  He makes the transition by beating a seedy pimp into a pulp.  With this 
moment of explosive violence, Brik tries to definitively cast himself in the role of 
guarantor of rights and taker of interest.  Nothing could be further from the subservient, 
demasculinized figure kneeling before Susie at his story’s beginning.  The man, who had 
exploited Brik’s American papers in order to ease his sale of a young girl into the sex 
trade, impels Brik back into Bosnian space in order to seek medical attention for his 
fractured hand.  By taking action, Brik moves from witnessed to witness, from relying 
on the attention of others to giving attention, from begging for social security to freeing 
a powerless foreign woman from slavery.  Fittingly, after his transformation, which is 
also an endowment of capital, Hemon supplies Brik with the direct contact with Bosnian 
traumatic violence at the core of its national consciousness.  Living out Hemon’s desire 
for Bosnia, Brik becomes involved in the life of the nation once again when, days after 
their arrival, Rora is murdered in a mugging while drinking coffee at a street-side café.  
His needless, random death gives Brik the source to an identity he no longer needs.  The 
owner of real trauma, Brik can reconnect with his homeland and divert his attention from 
attracting the interest of others to being himself.  Thinking of his dead friend, and his 
sister, a Bosnian doctor who treats his wounds and replaces Mary, Brik thinks, “Rora 
had bonded us” (288).  Preserving the memory of his friend and his many dubious 
adventures allows Brik to feel at home at last.   
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Notes 
1  In this regard, Levinas’s ethics resemble Teresa Brennan’s redemptive theory of the 
transmission of affect.  Brennan argues that the affects, which roughly correspond to the 
Freudian death drive and Newtonian entropy, sap individuals of vital energy with their 
constant demands for interpretation and reaction.  Affects, she suggests, are physical 
particles our bodies unconsciously process through the sense of smell, often in the form 
of pheromones.  She compares their effect to the early Christian concepts of the deadly 
sins and demons.  The affects exert an invisible and seductive influence over rational 
being.  To counter their effects, Brennan posits attention, which she also suggests is a 
rough synonym for love, the only positive affect, or the life drive.  Brennan defines 
attention in terms of active thought upon affective stimuli.  To pay attention is to 
consciously think about the sources and motives for those affective states exerting a pull 
on the subject’s capacity to regulate action.  While I find Brennan’s idea that affect may 
be, at least in part, a biological response to physical contact with something entirely 
beyond our control, I’m not entirely comfortable with her evaluation of its role in 
subjectivity.  As I’ve already suggested in conjunction with Ahmed’s reading of affect 
and nationalism, the oppositions Brennan sets up between thinking and feeling, affected 
being and active being, and health and sickness is a defensive move against the openness 
and provisionality of cosmopolitan modes of sociality. 
2  Levinas’s insistence upon the pre-political nature of encounter absolves its individual 
actors of their positions relative to one another within networks of power.  This is 
Badiou’s well-known objection to Levinas.  As he argues, when politics is “subordinated 
to ethics,” what emerges in responsibility is not a redistribution of power along more just 
lines, but rather the reduction of humanity to a “single perspective that really matters in 
this conception of things: the sympathetic and indignant judgment of the spectator of the 
circumstances” (Ethics 9).  Or, as Badiou implies, a cosmopolitanism predicated on 
humanitarian intervention and rights management that depend upon the production of 
sensationalism and human interest.  Furthermore, as Badiou observes, Levinas’s ethics 
presumes evil precedes the good.  We naturally want to kill the other in order to assure 
the security of our personal space in the sun.  This desire is an economic one, to ensure 
we continue to enjoy the world’s best resources without feeling greedy. 
3  See Beck, Cosmopolitan Vision and Butler, Frames of War 
4  As Raymond Williams notes, individuals do not experience hegemony as a “system or 
a structure” but rather as a “complex of experiences, relationships, and activities, with 
specific and changing pressures and limits” (112).  Hegemony is never “singular,” or a 
passively extant “form of dominance” (112).  Instead, hegemonic articulations of power 
must constantly be “renewed, recreated, defended, and modified” in light of similarly 
continual encounters with alterity that defy the limits any hegemony imposes upon the 
social.  Or, in other terms again, people experience hegemony as a series of encounters 
with human beings, faces of others. 
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5  We might say that Wallace’s and Kunzru’s characters are living beings.  They feel but 
do not react appropriately to their feelings.  In Wallace’s case, appropriately means 
producing a totality independent of affective stimuli that can then be used to censor out 
affect’s unwanted effects upon the subject’s capacity for thought.  For Kunzru, it is more 
a matter of following up feeling with an examination of the merits of whatever meaning 
is produced through our socialization and those structures guiding socialization itself.  In 
other terms, for Wallace, the problem is that feelings have an effect on us that we cannot 
control, and for Kunzru it is that our response to feelings is conditioned by our 
positioning within political structures. 
6  The work of imagining a story in the white space between frames that McCloud 
describes as the ethical grounding of comics is also at the heart of film.  Jonathan Beller, 
however, suggests film’s appropriation of viewers’ attentions to produce the final 
product they consume, what he calls the “cinematic mode of production,” is exploitative 
(The Cinematic Mode of Production 1, 13-15).  For him, because cinema is tied to 
advertising, and often production decisions are made with an eye for marketing, the 
work of watching a film to produces its commercial meaning transforms leisure time into 
labor time that serves the interests of a film’s producers and sponsors.  There is certainly 
something to be said for the extent to which cinema is wedded to commercial interests 
but to think of it as an assembly line of sorts, especially because of the movement of 
frames, goes too far. 
7  Georgiana Banita takes this premise a step further.  In “Cosmopolitan Suspicion: 
Comics Journalism and Graphic Silence,” she argues that comics are defined by a “silent 
aesthetic” in which the white space between frames exposes the “failure of cosmopolitan 
convivial ethics” (51).  Rather than merely implicating readers in the production of 
violence, she takes white space as a universal representation of the subaltern’s inability 
to assert voice within public space.  There is certainly room to suggest that the way 
readers fill in the progression between frames mirrors the way colonists speak for 
subalterns, but Banita’s explanation does not account for how frames that overlay many 
images atop one another, with no white space, create a moving and powerful message at 
the same time that it devalues comics’s most valuable asset: the ability to render visible 
subjects otherwise overlooked. 
8  Aryn Bartley picks up McCloud’s suggestion that more cartoonish figures, because 
they are more generalized representations of humanity, encourage identification to argue 
that Sacco’s self-stylization facilitates his critique of humanitarian practices.  Were he 
more dashing, or at least less obviously grotesque, she suggests, readers would be more 
likely to resist identifying with his perspective (“Hateful Self” 65, 66).  While there is 
some truth in this, I do not quite agree that Sacco’s character exists at the level of 
generalization McCloud associates with the sort of identification Bartley implies.  His 
examples are a plain circle with dots and a line.  Sacco always remains a distinct 
individual.  Instead, I think of his representation as a self-deprecating way of addressing 
the power disparity between himself and his subjects.  If they are poor and 
disenfranchised, at least he is ugly.  What makes it so easy to identify with Sacco is the 
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way he presents his gracelessness with such good humor and constant grace.  This, along 
with his continual asides to the reader, create a sense of intimacy.  We don’t identify 
Sacco as a figure for all humanity, but do imagine him as someone we might have as a 
friend, or whose honesty we might respect. 
9  This is a common trope within a variety of discourses critical of speakers of oppressed 
identity categories appealing for rights.  Lauren Berlant, for example, unapologetically 
explains that she is tired of the expectation on the part of conservative straight 
Americans that she apologize for her queer agenda and cease to express her outrage over 
homophobic violence against non-straight individuals.  The rhetorical strategy of this 
appeal, as she suggests, is to efface the violence and injustice that demands paying 
attention to queer rights in the first place.  It is an appeal to the oppressed person to not 
make an individual feel aligned with violence, even while refusing to abandon sites of 
oppression.  In this case, her persistence is, again, the sort of “fuck you” Butler refers to.  
By remaining committed to violently exposing the greater violence of homophobia, 
Berlant’s discourse is non-violent. 
10  Palestine was published in 1991, long before George W. Bush’s similar infamous 
declaration, but I think both statements express similar logics and motivations. 
11  And in this sense, Hemon’s novel echoes Sophocles’s Antigone as well as Lacan’s 
ethics he derives from his reading of the play.  
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CHAPTER IV 
AMERICAN FICTION, TESTIMONY, AND COSMOPOLITAN TRAUMA* 
Brik’s story ends with his reintegration into Bosnia’s daily life.  In Hemon’s 
novel, the healing Brik feels as he rejoins his homeland is possible because he witnesses 
first hand the violence that saturates Bosnian life to this day as a result of the traumatic 
siege of Sarajevo and because he is able to shift from being the object of humanitarian 
fascination for a distanced benefactor to acting out an intervention of his own when he 
rescues the young Moldovan woman from a life of slavery in the Eastern European sex 
industry.  Although the novel closes on the optimistic note of Brik finding love and 
recognition, its optimism strikes a pessimistic note in that Brik’s self-actualization 
comes about through a shift in the triangulation of the humanitarian relationship without 
altering its structural imbalances.  Only by making his pain authentic to himself can Brik 
evade the need to be interesting, but this pain can only remain authentic so long as he 
does not need to express it to others.  Hemon’s conclusion is further pessimistic in that it 
suggests that humanitarian explorations of difference, along with projects more generally 
concerned with cosmopolitanism or transnationalism, are always constrained to the 
genre of the grift.  The authenticity of nonfictional trauma remains outside the frame of 
representation.  In this final chapter, I consider how the incorporation of trauma theory’s 
assumptions about the relationship between trauma’s victims, the representation of 
trauma, and the spectatorship of suffering inform the production of altruistic or  
*  Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “The Voices of Others: Dave Eggers and New  
Directions for Testimony Narrative and Cosmopolitan Literary Collaboration” by Brian Yost, 2011.  
Copyright © 2011 University of Calgary, Department of English. This article was first published in ariel: 
A Review of International English Literature 42.1 (2011), 152-153. Reprinted with permission by Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
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humanitarian fiction.  Trauma theory, which in its early stages consistently claimed the 
unrepresentability of traumatic events, necessitates humanitarian intervention to restore 
legitimacy to traumatized individuals’ subjectivities and to historical narratives that 
intersect with traumatic events and their ongoing consequences.  I argue that the 
assumption of trauma’s ceaseless rupture and evasion of representation contributes to the 
reconfiguration of humanitarian interest according to neoliberal values.   
While it is important to continue to remember atrocities of the past and to bear 
witness to the humanity of those who suffered because of them, trauma theory creates a 
space in which the text or voice of an outside observer can take on greater historical and 
affective value than the voices of those who experience violence directly.1  This in turn 
implies that the humanitarian drives the restoration and ongoing production of political 
and cultural identity in foreign spaces that become dependent upon the ongoing mining 
of interest from their cultural bodies following national or global traumas.  Lauren 
Berlant argues that trauma theory treats the present as “a symptom, the detritus of the 
significant relation between lived and remembered pasts and occluded futures” (848).  It 
does so because the spectacle of traumatic suffering makes such a productive resource 
within economies of attention that abandoning them makes little sense.  I argue that by 
incorporating the authority and appearance of nonfiction to fictionalized accounts of 
U.S. concern for international atrocity, post-Cold War American authors seek to assert a 
claim to the production and reception of global history in order to sustain America’s 
centrality to the cosmopolitan vision of trauma theory.  I do so through an examination 
of novels by Jonathan Safran Foer and Karen Tei Yamashita, both of which blend 
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autobiographical characters and events with fictional accounts of traumatic violence.  
When they characterize their texts as fictional, both authors lower the stakes of their 
interventions into the representation of the Holocaust and Japanese immigration policies, 
respectively.  Nonetheless, both texts make strong affective claims about their 
geopolitical and historical subjects and do so in order to elicit political reactions from 
American readers.  By making a fictional account something for which American 
readers can feel equally moved as direct encounters with foreignness, these texts 
circumvent Americans’ need to pay attention to the world in order to feel a part of a 
cosmopolitan society.  Despite advancing morally concerned visions of a world 
transformed in the name of love and justice, the optimism for cosmopolitanism within 
Foer’s and Yamashita’s testimonies to violence abroad is continually frustrated by an 
ongoing, but less triumphantly declared, commitment to the superiority of American 
liberal values, whether the autonomous self or multicultural tolerance for difference.  
The performance of cosmopolitan unity achieved through the global circulation and 
witnessing of American subjects, in the end, reproduces American liberal values in local 
dress, because it takes the absolution of historical guilt as its precondition.  The link 
between cosmopolitanism and America’s fictional production of the world’s true identity 
enables Americans to return to enthusiasm for the nation without addressing how the 
nation actually interacts with other forms of community on political, cultural, or 
economic levels.  
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Testimony and Trauma 
 The key generic feature of testimony is its insistent appeal for attention.  
Testimony’s aim is not to produce identification, a cosmopolitan vision in which readers 
recognize themselves to be in common with foreigners depicted in the text. 
Cosmopolitan identification would suggest that the pain, along with the conditions 
underlying it, are part of the reader’s sense of self and daily atmosphere.  Rather, 
testimony seeks to attract and hold affective resources which produce subsequent 
investments on material and political levels.  Luc Boltanski argues that the sight of 
distant suffering, as in the case of an American account, fictional or not, of the 
Holocaust, burdens its spectators with the responsibility to report on the content of what 
is seen and on how those sights produce affects within them.  By linking testimonial 
content to affect in communication, he suggests spectatorship is a legitimate basis for 
meaningful solidarity across difference (6).  The centrality of affect to his description of 
the process of collective individuation is persuasive, especially in its theorization of the 
spectator’s identity as the both provisional and active end of acts of consumption.  
Whether or not the mere act of talking about the spectacles of suffering that one finds 
moving necessarily translates to effective action is by no means certain.  What is clear, 
though, is that by putting suffering on display and by situating it beyond the limits of                                                                                                                                                                  
one’s given community, testimony produces affects that feel global or cosmopolitan,  
even if they do not result in political action that actually redefines geopolitical 
boundaries.  As an overtly transnational mode of attentiveness, testimonies to foreign 
abuse invite political intervention on the part of domestic readers.  These interventions, 
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even if they remain at the level of imagination, produce a domineering cosmopolitan 
impulse to reform foreign societies and cultures according to one’s own values.  In the 
case of Foer’s novel, this intervention supports the globalization of multicultural 
tolerance and liberal individualism; for Yamashita, it is a consumerist vision of 
cosmopolitanism mediated by globalized corporate experiences. 
Unlike legal testimony, which derives authority from an assumed correspondence 
with a single testifying individual’s experience, testimonial narratives gain meaning and 
authority to the extent that they create a flexible portrait of an entire community or 
culture.2  Despite the overt generic differences between legal discourse and narrative 
testimony, there is a broad tendency common to readers, writers, and theorists to 
conflate the expectations of the two when reading nonfictional and even fictional 
narratives.  The expectation that testimony speak to a broader human truth appeals to a 
superficial cosmopolitan ideal of homogeneity that then authorizes epistemological 
interventions – by reading about foreign nationals’ suffering within large-scale events, 
domestic readers come to know something about foreign nations as a whole.  The 
production of conclusive knowledge marks the shift from narrative to legal discourse.   
Robert Carr observes that testimonies “tak[e] on value as capital in the fund for 
agendas of national reconceptualization” not exclusively because narrated individuals 
claim representative status, although they often do, but because academics “assume an 
easy metonymic relationship between the subject of testimonial and the ethnic group 
from which she or he comes” (157). When texts constructed allegorically are published, 
Carr argues, they “celebrate the reader’s ignorance as the group is conversely constituted 
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as infinite duplicates of the ‘original’ subject presented in the pages of the testimonial” 
(157).3  Metonymic readings become a limitation to testimony narratives when the 
presence of the supposedly objective writer becomes too successfully effaced from the 
narrative text or conflated with the first-person voice of the narrator, an effect Kimberley 
Nance describes as fusion. If, as Kate Douglass suggests, testimony narratives rely upon 
a second-person reader to validate the experiences they record through the act of reading 
and subsequently, of empathizing, the merit of such experiences lies in their ability to 
provoke the proper reaction in a remote audience. While the production of empathy for 
suffering individuals is an admirable goal, such means of attaining this response are not 
entirely satisfactory for the purposes of testimonial narrative, which is concerned with 
action rather than validation or identification. Equating the perspectives of writer and 
narrator allows both reader and writer to fuse their own identities with that of the 
narrator, and to evade the need to intervene in a cause or alter personal beliefs (Nance, 
“Disarming Testimony” 573). The conventions of testimony narrative assume a narrator 
sacrifices the integrity of his or her personal experience in order to more fully relate 
communal concerns and to describe an exceptional situation, not an individual, worthy 
of the reader’s attention and action.  
Testimony narratives’ use of a metonymic representative of collective identity 
discourages voyeuristic readings and misplaced identification with their narrators, both 
effects that if left unaddressed would enable the reader to escape an ethical commitment 
to act (Braebeck 255).  Likewise, Boltanski argues that in moral spectatorship, the 
viewed individual is not the viewer’s unsuspecting object.  Instead, a reciprocal 
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anticipation between spectator and viewed and “the composition of these anticipations 
generates an equilibrium” between the two and prevents the relationship from becoming 
exploitative (39).  Testimony is not strictly sincere or authentic; it always involves 
calculation and strategic management of the affects it hopes to elicit.  Accordingly, 
simple factual description is never adequate to testimony, because its pretentions to 
realism only further exacerbate the imbalance of power implied in the victim/perpetrator 
opposition whose undoing is its aim (24).  However, as it refuses identification, 
testimony creates several attendant problems.  First, by making identification a moral 
issue, testimony foregrounds issues of identity and difference between subject and reader 
within its representation of political conflict, struggle, and trauma.  In this way, it 
becomes a condition of the fact that the person or people of the text are not metonymic, 
and cannot easily be assimilated to the readers’ own identity, that their pain remains 
irresolute.  Their persistent difference holds open the wounds of trauma that frustrate 
efforts to renew the production of sociability in traumatized foreign spaces.  This invites 
a second problematic response, a cosmopolitan and reformist impulse to address the 
issue of difference itself, in terms of cultural values and beliefs, as the whole or partial 
cause for traumatization and the failure or inability to address an event’s lingering 
effects.  The ethical imperative to act upon another’s world on the basis of humanitarian 
testimony leads to the imagination of those worlds reformed according to the safe and 
stable conventions of domesticity because it justifies intervention on the recognition of a 
generalized foundation of human identity.  The assumption of shared identity sustains 
the further assumption of a shared desire for the humanitarian’s form of intervention.  
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Domesticity, in turn, is intimately bound to institutionalized political narratives rooted in 
the reader’s geopolitical location, so the empathy testimony reading sparks becomes a 
desire to nationalize traumatized foreigners in order to restore their wounded 
subjectivity.  Reading about global atrocity incites a desire to make the world safe and 
ordinary, like home, and acting upon the impulse to intervene in this way overcomes the 
firm insistence upon difference, leading ultimately back to the undesirable state of fusion 
Nance identifies in which no one needs to act. 
Anne Frank’s diary provides a useful example of how a single text remembering 
a particular event serves different needs when used or witnessed from different locations.  
Its global reception also shows the necessity and impossibility of forgiveness to 
cosmopolitan projects.  In the U.S., the diary became popular following a stage 
adaptation.  The play, as Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider relate, de-emphasized Frank’s 
Jewishness in order to present her as a figure of universal suffering, the personification 
of Nazi violence against global humanity, and of a faith that humanity can withstand 
such suffering.  Avoiding her murder in the German camps entirely, the play concluded 
on Frank’s famous words, “In spite of everything, I still really believe that people are 
really good at heart” (qtd. in Levy and Sznaider, 61).  In the context of its post-war 
performance, those people really good at heart are American citizens who put an end to 
foreign genocide and were beginning to conceive of themselves as heroically responsible 
for determining the direction of global development.  The play’s reading of Frank’s 
words constructs the Holocaust in a way that serves specifically American purposes.  
Through the goodwill and hard work of Americans, Frank’s hope can be made reality as 
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life resumes after the horrors of a war America put an end to (61).  Under these terms her 
memory speaks to American munificence rather than Jewish hope or suffering and 
empowers American viewers to remake the world in their own image for Frank’s sake.  
Levy and Sznaider suggest that a Jewish use of the diary places the emphasis on the 
history of European anti-Semitism and sees American global leadership in a less 
optimistic light.   
The desire to interpret Anne Frank is a symptom of shifting global power 
structures.  The act of interpretation invests a priori the remembered object or event with 
a belief in its relevance to the interpreting subject.  Anne Frank says something about 
how America understands itself in the post-war world.  For representations of pain to 
circulate within cosmopolitan rather than individual or national registers, the recipients 
of their address must be able to imagine that anyone might feel included within them.  
Literary texts operate effectively as a means by which people anchor a sense of 
individual self within a larger, imagined community, because individuals are able to read 
into their perception of textual address a specific kind of public, in the sense that 
Michael Warner gives the term.4  As Warner argues, a public “might be real and 
efficacious, but its reality lies in just this reflexivity by which an addressable object is 
conjured into being in order to enable the very discourse that gives it existence” (67).  A 
public becomes real for those who feel included within its address by merit of their 
active investment in it of the agency to imbue their individual lives with a sense of 
purpose.  What we feel defines who we are, and how we fit into the world is real only to 
the extent that we believe it to define us. 
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The problem of speaking for others is compounded not only by the fact of vast 
differences in political, economic, and social power between witnesses and those whom 
they witness but also, in Foer’s and Yamashita’s novels, by the mediation of their stories 
in fiction that at times performs as non-fiction.  While, given trauma theory’s claim that 
trauma cannot be represented directly, it may not pose an immediate obstacle to affective 
truth, the shift in what the fictionalization of testimony offers up as a textual product is 
fundamentally different from that of more straightforward narratives.  With a victim or 
set of concrete historical circumstances no longer in view, the aim of such texts is no 
longer exactly to create empathy for either as specific or irreducible.  Instead, the good 
fictionalized testimonies offer up to readers is the experience of feeling pain by 
traumatizing them with the experience of feeling for characters in extreme 
circumstances.  This move, as Boltanski observes, reduces the common of 
cosmopolitanism to pain in general and treats the pain of readerly empathy as its central 
concern rather than the actual suffering of the people it professes to document (6-8). 
Further, the humanitarian novel’s foregrounding of a celebrity or Western presence 
within and influence upon sites of foreign suffering infuses its testimony with the aura of 
celebrity, and this is the basis of its value within an economy of attention.    
Cosmopolitanism as Affective Nationalism in Everything is Illuminated 
In the preceding chapters, I have theorized cosmopolitanism as means to 
organize affective stimuli into sociality rather than identity.  In this section, I consider 
the means by which humanitarian interest and generic conventions intersect in American 
literature in order to manage the boundaries of the nation within representations of 
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transnational encounters with events of global magnitude.  Where critical discussions of 
cosmopolitanism are continually mired in the false dichotomy between national and 
cosmopolitan solidarity, literature presents a more complex and seamlessly integrated 
vision of how Americans produce and are produced by their worlds.  Especially 
interesting is Jonathan Safran Foer’s novel, Everything is Illuminated (2002), which 
explores how solidarity comes into being as individuals from distant nations and 
conflicting cultures explore their feelings for global traumas and what consequences the 
movement of people and histories across global space might have for bounded 
communities.  Like Robbins, who I discussed in my “Introduction,” Foer envisions 
cosmopolitan sociability as a means to overcome America’s negative public image as a 
nation caught up with a belief in its inherent superiority without abandoning the 
assumption that America has valuable lessons to teach the world.  He does so by 
fictionalizing his travels to Ukraine to investigate his grandfather’s Holocaust 
experience.  The novel tells the story of Jonathan’s misinformed adventure through a 
correspondence between himself and Alex, his Ukrainian translator, following their 
discovery that Alex’s grandfather lived in a Jewish village and betrayed his friend 
Herschel to Nazi soldiers to secure the safety of his infant son.  In their letters, Alex also 
describes the way Jonathan taught him the liberal values that enable him to embrace a 
queer identity, one Jonathan seems ironically unwilling to accept.5  Foer undertakes a 
defense of the world from a culturally and economically imperialistic America by 
depicting Jonathan helping Alex to be true to his feelings.  Alex’s education proceeds 
according to an imperative Foer summarizes in the axiom “feel more,” the advice of his 
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editor that he acknowledges on the book’s copyright page as “always the best” and by 
presenting attentiveness to feeling as a particularly American value.  This process 
reaches its climax in Alex’s transformation of Jonathan’s own advice, “Just be yourself,” 
into sacrament (179).  His words are sacramental in a double sense, in that for Alex they 
are epiphanic, illuminating, but also a confession of his sin of preferring America to 
Ukraine, and his idealization of Jonathan to his true self.  The aim of Jonathan’s 
affective intervention into Ukrainian culture is to satisfy Foer’s own curiosity over the 
question, “can historical accuracy,” the documented events of the Holocaust, “be 
replaced with imaginative accuracy,” the story Foer desires (HarperCollins).  Yet Foer’s 
appreciation of affect also capitalizes on the production of identity within a world driven 
by what Hardt and Negri describe as an immaterial economy of affective labor.  In both, 
attention is the scarce resource for which information must compete.6  This reordering of 
the economy around attentiveness creates an awkward situation for Americans used to 
the idea of their exceptionalism since they cannot assume American culture holds a 
global premium.  To maintain this illusion, Jonathan, Foer’s representative of 
exceptionalist America, acts as if the world’s consumers are beholden to an 
imperializing American culture industry rather than allow their acts of feeling more, 
produced when they play the part of just being themselves, to solidify into narratives that 
legitimize independent local communities.  Instead of a heterogeneous but 
interconnected and dynamic cosmopolitanism, what results from his way of interacting 
with the world are global sites that feel autonomous but remain dependent upon 
American affective infrastructure to decode history.  I argue that Foer’s deliberate 
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blurring of the difference between fact and fiction, historical record and personal feeling 
allows him to manipulate the mechanisms through which affect adds value to specific 
forms of solidarity and aligns the feeling of cosmopolitan solidarity with a politics of 
American exceptionalism. 
Whereas typically Holocaust narratives and commentaries on them express 
universal warnings against human violence, as in Adorno’s phrase, “never again 
Auschwitz,” in Foer’s hands, the event’s horrific violence does not exhaust its meaning 
for those who experience its memory in the present (19).  Instead, Everything is 
Illuminated was born out of his preoccupation with the possibility that fictionalizing his 
relationship to Jewish history, along with that history itself, could help him overcome the 
shameful feeling that he was only “a closeted Jew” (HarperCollins).  In other words, 
Foer reimagines the Holocaust as an event upon which individuals may engage in 
affective labor on their own behalf, bringing to bear upon it their own local attentive 
forms and to form from it different ways of affiliating with the world.  Foer can feel 
authentically Jewish as a result of his interpretation, even though he acknowledges it is 
entirely the product of his imagination.  As the vehicle for attentive forms, his novel 
suggests one should construct history in a way that allows one to be true to immediate 
personal feelings in order to escape cultural imperialism.  By calling into question the 
solidity of “historical accuracy” and the validity of its effect upon individuation, Foer’s 
novel, a work of fiction, attempts to unmoor the individual from the biopolitical effects 
of identity.  Identity has what Michael Warner calls “manifest positive content” (75).  As 
such, its legibility relies upon its locus of production more than any attention paid to it 
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by those who claim it.  It is not a matter of circulation.  Whatever an identity’s content 
may be is determined and given fixed value through the power of some independent 
institution (75).  In this sense, identity is a means of regulating biopower.  One has 
identity regardless of individual attention or activity.  It is sent from an institution to an 
individual.  A person either is or is not a particular race and a nation “includes its 
members whether they are awake or asleep, sober or drunk, sane or deranged, alert or 
comatose” and, we might add, willing to belong or not (87).  One does not acquire 
identity through effort or devotion but the possession of an identity does provide an 
individual with a source of cultural capital.  Identity operates under the assumption of 
attentive forms that remain constant across communication.  In this sense, identity is a 
mode of imperialistic solidarity.  Foer’s understanding of the Holocaust as a source of 
individuation, however, depends entirely on how he does or does not choose to interact 
with its memory and representation.  By treating its effects upon him as the result of his 
own affective labor, he frees the event from institutional regulation and opens it to a 
form of individualistic cosmopolitan play in which imaginative accuracy is just as 
meaningful as objective facts. 
The potential equivalence of historical and imaginative accuracy he posits 
entertains the idea of individuation centered upon cosmopolitan networks of 
attentiveness rather than loyalty to the nation and the project of maintaining the 
consistency of its identity.  His act of feeling individual makes use of a cosmopolitan 
repertoire of historical narrative possibilities, but continually draws these narratives 
inward, into private sensation.  Here, a community and its claims are significant only to 
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the extent that an individual feels aligned with them.  Treating loyalty as a particular 
structure of care that informs engagement with textualized historical claims rather than a 
text’s objective affective content or the given starting point for individuation, liberates 
the individual from the confines of potentially oppressive given culture.  Since, as Sara 
Ahmed suggests, affect is what “sustains or preserves the connection between ideas, 
values, and objects,” thinking about loyalty as an individually constructed affective 
object opens up a space for cosmopolitan solidarity when narratives circulate globally 
(“Happy Objects” 29).  The destabilization of community through a shift toward affect 
justifies Foer’s desire to explore the potential of loyalty to individual feelings rather than 
to the narrative rigidity more commonly associated with faithful testimony.  His literary 
exercise becomes more significant and real to his experience of life and actually 
overcomes his need to pay attention to the Holocaust itself, along with other forms of 
documentary evidence.  So, by expressing a commitment to individualism in a novel, 
Foer overtly destabilizes loyalties to one type of bounded community that the novel 
represents as Alex’s Ukrainian nationalism while making a more subtle appeal to 
identify with another that is equally limited, a cosmopolitan rooted in the liberal values 
of American exceptionalism.    
Just as Anne Frank’s diary became a justification for American humanitarian 
intervention in Europe through its popularization in the U.S., so Foer uses a 
representation of Ukrainian collective memory of Jews and the Holocaust to authorize an 
American cultural intervention into the formation of democratic Ukraine in the present.  
In the novel, Jonathan’s relationship to Alex is metonymic for Foer’s construction of 
 198 
 
exactly this relationship between the U.S. and Ukraine.  In the fictional space of Alex’s 
letters to Jonathan, Ukraine exists as an infantile nation looking to America as a model 
for its new democratic existence and matures over the course of their pilgrimage to 
Trachimbrod.7  In fact, as Alex notes in the novel’s opening pages, the story of 
Jonathan’s trip happens to fall on “the first birthday of [Ukraine’s] ultramodern 
constitution,” modeled on America’s own (4).  Although the constitution was ratified on 
June 28th, Foer shifts the celebration to the first week of July to coincide with America’s 
celebration of its independence, suggesting that Ukraine itself, and not just its founding 
document, is merely imitative of all things American.  Alex’s lame attempts to perform 
American coolness on the basis of stale 80s pop cultural references like ALF bear this 
out.  Since Foer never presents Jonathan’s understanding of Ukraine or America directly, 
we are left to intuit them from Alex’s representations of Jonathan’s reactions.  Alex 
exemplifies the Ukrainian need for an American education in the value of diversity on 
behalf of Foer and American readers when he confesses that his idea of Jewishness is 
limited to anti-Semitic prejudices and textbook images which only portray Jews as 
emaciated concentration camp victims (32).  His loveable naiveté fuels a belief in the 
superiority of American social values based on liberal tolerance and consequently, 
justifies the affective intervention Jonathan makes over the course of the novel.  Alex’s 
thoughts on Jonathan as an American Jew perceiving Ukraine creates an ironic distance 
between Foer and Jonathan with its suggestion that Alex’s feeling of a lack of common 
ground with Americans and Jews is the result of false consciousness that more 
enlightened American readers can see beyond.  This suggestion allows Foer both to 
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critique American neo-imperialism and to act imperialistically by depicting the historical 
vision Alex develops as a result of his encounter with Jonathan as eclipsing Jonathan’s 
American perspective with a new cosmopolitan expansiveness. 
Foer’s efforts to distance himself from Jonathan are also ubiquitously implied in 
Alex’s very language and Jonathan’s (along with readers’) response to it.  Like 
reviewers, who nearly always praised Foer’s book first for its hilarious deformation of 
the English language, Jonathan apparently takes pleasure in Alex’s frequent 
malapropisms.8  In his letters, Alex reveals that while composing his chapters he 
“fatigued the thesaurus” as Jonathan “counseled” him to and later that he has “performed 
the corrections” as “demanded” (23, 24).  Among other things, Jonathan insists that Alex 
“not alter the mistakes, because they sound humorous, and humorous is the only truthful 
way to tell a sad story” (53).  His insistence that Alex write in absurd, broken English 
asserts his own mastery of the language and dominance over Alex’s poor performance of 
American expressive forms.  Jonathan’s demand that Alex perform foreign failure to 
adapt to English for the sake of laughter reincorporates Alex’s affective labor, his 
attempts to be himself in light of the history they are producing in the text, within an 
immaterial economy centered on America.  Whereas the exercise allows Foer to feel the 
benefit of inclusion in an authentic Jewish community, or, to come out as a Jew, Alex 
can only fail to attain the Americanness he seeks.  The value of his performance returns 
to American readers, who can take pride in their sympathy for Alex.   
Because Jonathan pays Alex to write, Alex feels he can only represent Jonathan 
in a flattering light.  Foer subverts Jonathan’s Americanizing influence over their text, 
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though, by showing readers Alex’s uncorrected draft and his response to Jonathan’s 
editorial impositions.  For example, Jonathan wants Alex to invent a violent demise for 
Grandfather’s dog Sammy Davis Junior Junior because Alex’s representation of 
Jonathan’s fear of dogs reveals his vulnerability (55).  The dog Alex sees as harmless 
inspires a less-than-manly fear in Jonathan.  Similarly, on the first night of their travels, 
Alex and Grandfather are stunned to learn that Jonathan will not eat any of the food their 
poor, rural hotel offers.  He is, as he impatiently explains to them, a vegetarian.  In 
Eating Animals, a book-length polemic against the U.S. factory farming system, Foer 
makes it clear that while he does not eat meat out of compassion for animals, his is not a 
lifestyle he expects everyone to follow.  Jonathan’s defense of the inherent value of his 
vegetarianism in foreign space differs from Foer’s by implying a sense of inferiority on 
the part of Ukrainians, who do not possess even the capacity to imagine such a choice as 
morally complicated.  All Alex and Grandfather can say in return is “I do not 
understand” and “what is wrong with him?” (65).  This logic in turn explains the novel’s 
Ukrainians’ inability to consider the humanity of Jews or homosexuals.  Jonathan’s 
defense of his lifestyle suggests that he understands his presence as broadening Alex’s 
horizons with better attentive forms that combat racism and homophobia.  However, his 
declaration of vegetarianism follows his demand that Alex figuratively murder his pet 
for the sake of his own reputation.  Grandfather and Alex do not eschew the vegetarian 
lifestyle because they are ignorant or cannot imagine animals as feeling.  They eat 
sausage because they are poor and it is the food that is available.   
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When Foer represents Alex’s hurt and confusion over Jonathan’s behavior, he 
creates empathy for his own political and moral values and distances them from 
stereotypical attitudes of the Ugly American.  Alex stands for Foer’s revitalized 
American patriotism taken to a global level while Jonathan is a straw man for blind 
insensitivity exemplified in his demand to be accommodated at the dinner table.  Foer 
subtly makes Jonathan a figure toward whom American readers may direct their feelings 
of outrage and associate with illiberal postures of cultural and economic imperialism.  
Alex’s sympathetic characterization authorizes Foer’s superficial critique of a certain 
kind of America from abroad – he is a vision of a more cosmopolitan humanity – while 
at the same time standing for the expansion of American attentive forms as the basis for 
a different sort of affective imperialism. This happens again when, while engaged in a 
typically patriotic conversation extolling the economic wonders of American life, Alex 
professes to “dig Negroes,” especially his hero, Michael Jackson (70).  For Jonathan, the 
word “negro” is burdened with America’s history of slavery, segregation, and racial 
violence.  Its value is always inseparable from its embeddedness in national history.  For 
Alex, it is most likely the term his thesaurus supplies for black.  Jonathan’s offense is the 
product of his feeling shame at having to face a national legacy of intolerance and 
violence in the presence of a citizen of a nation currently experiencing poverty as a result 
of American global economic dominance.  The recognition of his implication in a 
history of racist violence disrupts the power structure between the U.S. and Ukraine that 
Jonathan’s attitude attempts to maintain.  Jonathan acts upon his shame by attempting to 
include Alex within the historical address of the word – he defines “negro” as an 
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essentially offensive term within a globally American history that implicates all 
humanity in its violence.  He tells Alex that even in rural Ukraine, “You shouldn’t use 
that word,” even though it is not the even less admissible “n-word” (70).  Jonathan 
instead reinforces the use of the term “African-American,” which although not 
objectionable, nonetheless eliminates the possibility that Alex might admire Africans 
beyond American influence.  Alex rejects Jonathan’s cosmopolitanization of guilt and 
instead wonders “what’s wrong with Negroes? … they are premium people” (70).  Black 
people cannot be visible in Alex’s representation of American consciousness because 
they present American subjects with an uncomfortable realization that they are not so 
different from Ukrainian anti-Semites like the innkeeper who asks of Jonathan, “can I 
see his horns?” (107).  This shame destabilizes the American desire to read urban Jewish 
Americans who can only think of Ukrainians in the way Foer depicts them in the novel – 
as backward anti-Semites – as less prejudiced than rural Ukrainians.  But, while forcing 
Alex to revise his history, Jonathan also refuses the validity of Alex’s affective labor, of 
the value of his being true to his feelings and himself.  His insistence on the naturalness 
of the historical use of the word “negro,” rooted in his own American experience and the 
feelings it evokes, regulates the way Alex may imagine himself as within global 
community.  He should feel for the term, but only in a way that further normalizes a 
particular, American way of attending to history. 
When Jonathan and Alex finally find Augustine, the woman who saved his 
grandfather Safran, the two have a long conversation about the urban commercial sites 
that make America unique – Times Square, Las Vegas, Broadway – a list characterized 
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by ideas of greed, self-gratification, and an attempt to cover over deeper realities with a 
pleasing surface.  As Alex reflects on his interest in the U.S., he comes to the realization 
that he “was not proud of everything that I knew about America.  I was ashamed” (157).9  
The intimate knowledge he possesses is a source of shame for Alex because it indicates 
that he has failed to perceive who he is and where he lives as central to his imagination.  
He has attempted to remake Ukraine according to an Americanized façade rather than 
taking pride in what it actually is, as if he could value one or the other.  With a renewed 
sense of national pride, Alex vows never to leave Ukraine or his family.  His declaration 
of national loyalty shifts the locus of the American dream from a limited territorial place 
offering unlimited potential for self-transformation to a limitless deterritorialized global 
influence over how selves may be constructed, from imperialism to Empire.  Alex 
validates Foer’s American value for individual autonomy and self-definition when he 
chooses poor, humble Ukraine over the lure of American pop culture.  Being true to 
himself in this way, Alex Americanizes Ukrainian nationalism for Foer’s American 
readers who can then feel at home in Alex’s Ukraine.  If foreigners were transformed 
according to American examples in order to be true to their inner feelings, Foer’s 
representation of Alex suggests, cosmopolitan love could become possible.  Of course, 
the cosmopolitanism of this love depends on homogenization.  Nonetheless, Foer’s 
depiction of Alex’s earnestness suggests that the common ground for cosmopolitan 
solidarity, which is, in fact, no more than the Americanization of foreign spaces, or the 
desire for it, is already present; it is merely buried by repressive foreign political regimes 
and cultures.  Seen in this light, Jonathan’s presence enables moral and political 
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development within Ukraine in the name of a globally dominant form of American 
cultural capital.  In Alex, Foer produces the illumination of American individualism’s 
potential to remake himself within Ukraine.  The reader’s distancing from Jonathan 
marks a shift from one sort of imperialism and the emergence of cosmopolitan hope, but 
identification with Alex reinscribes that hope within a new imperialism still centered on 
America along less material dimensions. 
The aim of Foer’s collaborative testimony with an imaginary foreigner is to heal 
Americans from the traumatic feeling of an encounter with foreign claims to pain while 
simultaneously helping foreigners to come to terms with global atrocities.  In the place 
of a past conceptualized in terms of reified events, the sense of historical memory 
embedded in cosmopolitan American fiction, like Foer’s, translates into continual 
affective and inter-relational negotiations.  Foer’s negotiation between global and local 
modes of remembering makes the case that a provisional love premised on the painful 
feeling of forgiveness, what Jonathan calls love emerging from “useful sadness,” is 
possible between the descendants of victims and perpetrators of Holocaust violence 
(266).  Levy and Sznaider describe the global circulation of representations of local 
events as a cosmopolitanization of memory.  If, as Stiegler argues, external memory is a 
representation of attentive forms, then memories circulating cosmopolitically compete 
on behalf of nations or other political entities for the loyalty of consumers’ attentions to 
them.  Whereas in the past, sociology associated collective memory with the territorial 
boundaries of the nation, within the globalized present, structures of memory cannot be 
contained predictably within any territorial boundaries.  Globalization does not negate 
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the potency of collective memory or devalue its specificity.  Instead, as Levy and 
Sznaider argue, local and global memories are mutually constitutive.  The effect of a 
transition from rooted, national memory to a cosmopolitan one is to deterritorialize the 
sense by which ownership of or identification with an event occurs such that an event 
previously understood as exclusive to an individual population or identity category – the 
Jewishness of the Holocaust – becomes “everyone’s common property and allows 
people from different places to deal with it in the most diverse ways” (8).  The move 
from rooted to cosmopolitan memory mirrors the process by which attentive forms 
become externalized and produce sociality through acts of affective labor. 
In the case of the Holocaust, the circulation of attentive forms through its 
narrativization resists cultural stasis through the provisionality of the interrelationships it 
produces.  Trauma theorists frequently claim a traumatic event is unknowable because 
trauma is by definition that which breaks all frames of reference.  Considered from the 
perspective of an affective economy in which feeling generates solidarity, trauma 
represents a disruption in the production of social value.  For global capitalism, such a 
halt in productivity is unacceptable.  It leaves individuals with an event of immense 
psychological significance but unable to convert that event adequately into the object of 
collective attention, from which point it could circulate freely.  Being traumatized leaves 
a victim attentively impoverished, dependent upon the intervention of an untraumatized 
outsider to redefine a value-producing sociability.  Bearing in mind Terranova’s claim 
that affective labor produces sociability, trauma’s interruption to the production of 
attention also breaks the bonds of community through focusing attention doggedly upon 
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the wrong of the event.  Forgiveness is the means by which such disruptions in attention 
become sutured.  In the ordinary sense of the word, forgiveness implies a more or less 
straightforward set of social positions.  There is a victim and a perpetrator structured 
around a wrong.  The wrong between them is nullified through the victim’s 
abandonment of a claim against the perpetrator.  The act of abandonment restores the 
possibility of community.  This sort of forgiveness may be possible within extremely 
local contexts and in matters of trivial harm, but becomes impossible when directed 
toward whole societies and traumatic events.  Forgiveness structures the social around 
trauma such that relationships are permanently imbalanced.  It is an act of absolute 
generosity that leaves the wrongdoer eternally indebted to the victim while also defining 
the generosity of the victim as a condition of victimhood.  Forgiveness solidifies the 
wrong as the core of the identity of each party to its exchange even as the act of 
forgiveness renders guilt and wrongness null.  It is the core of the identity of each but 
cannot be addressed or modified.   
The problem of forgiveness is structured identically to the intervention into 
history that I find in Foer’s novel: in both cases, an individual’s understanding of self 
and other is the product of symbolic interaction with an imaginary universal object, be it 
collective history or trauma, in which both subject and object are mutually constitutive.  
By failing to make the Holocaust central to his sense of self, Foer, as he confesses, felt 
like “a closeted Jew.”  His reading of the event and his relationship to it is undertaken as 
an American but identifies him as a Jew with ties to the Ukrainian community and bound 
to the ongoing life of the geographic community from which his ancestors emigrated.  
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His sense of self, informed as it is by a global memory, is cosmopolitan in the sense that 
his narrative of the Holocaust is one circulating beyond borders, but is not in the sense 
that the movement of that narrative is continually interrupted by a return to national 
space demanded by trauma and guilt.10  The novel ends when Jonathan breaks off 
communication with Alex after learning that Grandfather betrayed his Jewish friend 
Herschel to the Nazis and Grandfather, unable to forgive himself, commits suicide.  
Foer’s insistence upon making forgiveness the affective focus of his encounter with 
Ukraine and between Alex and Jonathan, and more specifically the certain failure of 
forgiveness to repair trauma’s disruption of sociability, continually returns the 
cosmopolitan potential inherent in his notion of solidarity along the lines of felt 
experience to an unbalanced, exploitative economic relationship that runs parallel to 
existing modes of imperialism.11  In Foer’s case, American identification with Holocaust 
trauma demands that Alex and Ukraine concede power to Jonathan and the U.S..  Given 
the already imbalanced state of affairs between the two nations, such a claim is hardly 
justifiable.  A cosmopolitanism figured as globally inclusive depends upon a sense of 
forgiveness that treats all subject positions as flexible, that abandons the right to demand 
reformation on the part of offending others. 
Despite the extreme duress of the situation, Foer makes it clear that Grandfather 
understands himself as just as much a perpetrator of genocide as the men who shot 
Herschel.  By closing off his identity within a tragic narrative structure, Alex’s 
grandfather acts as if his failure to appreciate the extent of Nazi hatred implicates him in 
the violence they committed against all Jews.  His one moment of self-preservation 
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solidifies his place within rigid generic convention on the side of the villain rather than 
the hero.  Because he remains true to an idea of himself as a character within the 
narrative structure of the Holocaust as a historical tragedy rather than a being within 
some less meaningful provisional unfolding, Grandfather is unable to be true to himself.  
His reading of trauma as a wound without closure, following critics like Felman and 
Caruth, reinforces the pattern of cultural ownership of historical narratives that Foer’s 
critique of Jonathan subverts.  Similarly, when critics read the novel’s illumination as the 
restoration of Alex’s secret Jewishness and overlook Jonathan’s discomfort at his 
affection, they legitimize the superficial form of cosmopolitanism based in common 
identity that Foer’s transgressive reading of Holocaust history speaks against by 
neutralizing its more radical cosmopolitan attentiveness within the retroactive embrace 
of normative ethnicity.  Instead, illumination and a different, more cosmopolitan 
sociality, occur when Alex expresses a queer identity with the help of Jonathan’s 
example of American liberal tolerance and loyalty to self.  Alex’s gradual embrace of his 
queerness is evident in his belated confession that contrary to his initial self-portrait as 
the essence of heterosexual masculinity, he has “never been carnal with a girl” and that 
“If I were to inform Father … about how I comprehend love and who I desire to love, he 
would kill me” (144, 241).  Instead of womanizing, Alex spends his time alone on the 
beach, imagining “a line … painted on the sand and on the ocean” connecting his heart 
to Jonathan’s (214).  Jonathan’s vegetarianism becomes the model for Alex’s queerness 
– not something wrong, just the way he is.12  Unlike Jonathan, Alex demands honesty 
toward personal feelings.  He does not “command” Jonathan to “write a story that is as it 
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occurred in the actual,” but would “command” his story be “faithful” to love (240).13  If 
Jonathan is unwilling to allow Alex the freedom to make their story true to their feelings 
for one another, then no sort of relationship between them is possible.  Alex ends his 
final letter with an apology to Jonathan for finally revealing to him “for the first time 
exactly what I think,” and signing off with an intimate “Love” rather than his usual 
“Guilelessly” (242).       
Everything is Illuminated begins with Alex meditating on what it means to love 
another.  His mother has told him that to be part of a family means that “One day you 
will do things for me that you hate” (2).  He adds that one does things for another not 
only out of loyalty to blood but more importantly “because they are common decencies 
… because I am not a big fucking asshole” (2).14  When Jonathan and Alex write down 
their feelings about the memories they uncover, both already know that Grandfather 
betrayed Herschel.  When Alex describes family loyalty and common decency, he is not 
exactly describing his actions alone.  These words do describe the person he would like 
to be, but more significantly, they are his request to Jonathan for permission to use his 
feelings rather than historical documents as the basis for his portrait of his grandfather.  
He asks Jonathan to give up his Jewish claim to the authority to represent the Holocaust 
to the grandchild of a perpetrator of violence against Jews.  He wants to depict 
Grandfather as no less than “a good person, alive in a bad time” (145).  The purpose of 
Alex’s desire to misremember his grandfather’s role in history is not to gloss over its 
violence or even Grandfather’s moment of decision.  Alex knows he has to “point a 
finger at Grandfather pointing at Herschel” (178).  What he desires to revise is the 
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hegemony of Jewish and American usages of Holocaust narrative that enforce a reading 
of Grandfather as equally monstrous as those willingly carrying out the executions that 
justify the ongoing regulation of the production of Ukrainian cultural identity by self-
absorbed foreign tourists like Jonathan.  Taken as a description for the process of 
constructing history through affective memory, Alex’s words express a more complex 
demand to remain open to the possibility of finding oneself in surprising alignment with 
those solidified in opposition to oneself by merit of determinate historical memories of 
racial or national identity.15  Alex’s imperative translates directly to Jonathan’s effort to 
understand his relationship to Holocaust memory and the way his representation of his 
relationship to it structures the possible relationship Alex may imagine with him.  The 
loving community Alex envisions reclaims responsibility for the sociality that might 
emerge from his attentiveness rather than entering into a universal human community of 
realized potential.  His love is cosmopolitan for its capacity to free affective value in a 
way that moves beyond the patriotism Robbins and Foer otherwise cannot find a way 
beyond.   
Foer represents Alex’s desire to remember Grandfather as a loving relative as an 
illustration of the devastating effects of territorialized memory on personal relationships.  
Cathy Caruth argues that trauma “is not locatable in the simple violent or original 
event,” but materializes in its constant repetition through narrative (4).  Likewise, Alex 
observes that his representation of his act of bearing witness to Augustine’s testimony 
“felt like I was making them new again” (185).  In the discourse of trauma theory, 
testimony’s renewal of feeling produces empathy in readers and gives trauma narratives 
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an ethical imperative.  Testimony helps people both in and outside a community to keep 
in mind the reality of a violence felt to be unreal and to imagine a partial sense of 
solidarity with victims.  Alex reads the production of testimony very differently.  
Grandfather’s death is an unnecessary repetition of the inhumanity of the Holocaust that 
extends its violence onto bystanders in the present.  From his perspective, it prevents 
forgiveness and the production of new, more expansive, differently ordered, or 
cosmopolitan forms of sociality.  The way Alex figures his own repetition as an act 
necessary to maintain his friendship with Jonathan suggests his pain is not the result of 
guilt over Nazi massacres.  Instead, Alex suffers the violence produced through 
America’s political adoption of the Jew as the object of humanitarian sympathy in its 
own excursions into foreign spaces.  Feeling obligated to present Grandfather in the 
same company as Nazis is to Alex equally outrageous as Jonathan’s suggestion that he is 
guilty of American racism.  He repeats the experience not to preserve it for posterity or 
to enable others to feel its weight but as a self-sacrificial act for the sake of his friendship 
with Jonathan.  He bears the pain of memory so that Jonathan can enjoy the pleasure of 
feeling himself the victim in the hope that Jonathan will respond by feeling something 
for him.  Making new again in the form of testimony, as Alex understands it, should not 
require such pain.  Renewal is an opportunity filled with the potential for love.  Writing 
subverts hegemonic politics because it gives individuals “second chances” beyond 
history, for Alex to “be not like I am” but as he would like others to see him (144).  He 
refers to this flexibility as being “nomadic with the truth,” a felicitously cosmopolitan 
error (179).  If remembering Grandfather’s actions within received narratives of the 
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Holocaust divides Jonathan from Alex, then why not represent it and transform the 
feeling behind what is known in a positive way?  He views Jonathan’s disavowal of his 
feelings as an act of cowardice and a waste of potential because he demands a repetition 
of historical guilt when he can also perceive feelings of love in the present.  Jonathan’s 
refusal to cede an ethnically centered narrative of traumatization reifies the Holocaust as 
the source of identity in the present.  Invested with objectivity, Jonathan’s rendering of 
Holocaust memory forces upon Alex a disembodied feeling of responsibility for 
suffering, an inescapable sense of guilt, and silences the space in which their love could 
achieve expression.     
As a response to Alex’s call for a nomadic truth, Jonathan suggests in his novel 
that it is necessary for both to feel the consequences of their respective national and 
ethnic histories.  He illustrates his claim in a short anecdote about a vision or 
hallucination experienced by his grandfather Safran.  In the vision, a statue of Safran’s 
great grandfather, the Kolker, tells him about his marriage and the way his great 
grandmother grieved when he died.  His marriage was tragic, challenged by the 
uncontrollable moods he suffered following a traumatic head injury at the local mill. 
“We were supposed to sleep in separate rooms,” he tells Safran, “but every night” his 
wife just came to him anyway (264).  The wall was present in their lives, but only as a 
show for others.  The two “paid it no attention.”  The Kolker’s wife Brod patiently bore 
his abuse “and so many more, things I would never tell anyone, and she never even 
loved me.”  “Now that is love,” the statue concludes of Brod’s suffering on his behalf 
(264).  As an extended metaphor for globalization and the sort of relationship Jonathan 
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and Alex might have, the story is baldly apologetic for the suffering the world’s 
powerful have caused the weak.  The Kolker beat his wife mercilessly every night and 
she simply took it despite appearances because she had nowhere else to go.  Ukraine 
should expect to receive the same treatment from the U.S. if it is to become a modern 
developed nation.  Jonathan suggests his own refusal to love Alex by recognizing his 
interpretation of history, his right to claim the affective value of his labor upon their 
moment of contact, does not mean he does not love him.  The statue goes on to say that 
bearing the memory of traumatic loss is like living next to a waterfall.  At first all that 
the home’s residents can attend to is the maddening sound of the rushing water. Its noise 
pervades all aspects of life.  Eventually, though, the sound ceases to register.  It is still 
just as present but no longer has an effect on the lives of the residents.  In this way, Brod 
“wakes one morning, perhaps after years of pure and unwavering grieving, to realize 
she slept a good night’s sleep.”  Brod is still sad, still tied to her loss, but “grief is 
replaced with a useful sadness.”  The transition from overwhelming grief to useful 
sadness is the seed of love: “Every love is carved from loss.  Mine was. Yours is.  Your 
great-great-great-grandchildren’s will be.  But we learn to live in that love” (266).  By 
feeling that pain rather than altering its truth in a pleasing way, Jonathan suggests, Alex 
proves his love for him, even if it is one he can never enjoy and one that leaves him 
entirely dependent upon the mercy of a self-obsessed and violent master.  His sacrifice 
means that Jonathan gets the final say on how history can be recorded and strips Alex of 
all real power.  Alex can be himself, but only if being himself validates history and 
geopolitics as Jonathan understands them.   
 214 
 
 The novel’s final, unanswered letter, Grandfather’s suicide note, addresses 
Jonathan in order to break the structural dependence between America and Ukraine and 
Jonathan and Alex.  He tells Jonathan that although it is important to know what kind of 
man Alex is, Alex and his family “must begin again …..cut all of the strings … with 
everything they have ever known” (275).  His death marks an absolute break in Alex’s 
focus on America and the production of affective value for American attentive forms.  
Jonathan may have taught Alex to feel more and to be himself, but Grandfather realizes 
that he can only do either in a meaningful way if Alex can also claim the right to 
produce his own history.  The story Alex and Jonathan negotiate over is the vehicle for 
political solidarity, and its shape determines the shape of community that might emerge 
in the cosmopolitan space opened through their contact.  This community, and its 
political significance, is the true end of the affective labor in which Jonathan encourages 
Alex to engage.  Through their efforts to make sense of their strained relationship, Foer 
puts the movement of affective capital on display.  He even shows its rootedness in 
America, the exclusivity of identity, but cannot entirely admit the collusion between 
“feel more,” its promise of “just be yourself” and something like “work harder.”  The 
affective economy of his novel is a new way of communicating the American Dream, 
but this time to the world.  The real trauma Alex must endure becomes not the legacy of 
the Holocaust, the violence of USSR totalitarianism, or the crushing poverty that 
continues thanks to U.S. economic dominance, but simple the fact that he, like Ukraine 
itself, has not been true to himself.  That Foer imagines death and dissolution as the only 
resolution to the confrontation he stages upon Holocaust memory makes the promise of 
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this dream a renewal of imperialistic patriotism.  By encouraging us to focus on how the 
failure of Jonathan and Alex’s personal relationship feels, Foer distracts our attention 
from the way the history at the heart of its failure moves affective value from a global 
periphery towards its American center.  Yet, while the cosmopolitanism that might have 
been possible between Jonathan and Alex is doomed to failure, Foer’s representation of 
its failure does open the possibility to reconsider the basis for America’s interaction with 
the world, to feel its place in the world differently, in a way that might even lead to love. 
“What’s the Harm in a Little Imagination”: Sentimentality, Violence, and 
the Cosmopolitan Imagination in Karen Tei Yamashita’s Circle K Cycles 
 The inflexibility of Foer’s straw man, Jonathan, and the utter likeability of Alex 
make for a seductive critique of on outdated mode of American exceptionalism, one I 
argue is committed to the validity of the very same exceptionalism it dismisses.  The 
defining qualities of Foer’s America are not identifiable in terms of the surface of its 
globally exported cultural production, of its literature, films, or music.  Instead, the 
nation is of global significance to his cosmopolitanizing mission because he imagines it 
as the heart of universal liberal values that sustain the individual and promote the 
validity of unique human existences apart from consumer culture.  As the defender of 
human diversity, Foer’s exceptional America is the epitome of the Holocaust’s lesson 
learned and a model for Ukrainian political development, even though he invents 
entirely the contents of his Holocaust narrative.  His agonistic transfer of liberal values 
from Jonathan to Alex and Grandfather advertises the success of his brand of American 
globalization.  By helping Alex come to terms with his own self-worth, reinventing what 
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it means to be Ukrainian in terms of the value of American values, Jonathan frees him to 
make his world one Americans can take pride in living alongside, and that pride 
nationalizes cosmopolitanism using the affective labor of foreign bodies.  The success of 
Foer’s globalization of American exceptionalism depends upon the conflation of fiction 
and nonfiction throughout his novel, of Jonathan and Foer.  As I have argued, sustained 
attention to the artifice of his text shows Foer’s efforts to reincorporate Ukraine within 
an expanded sphere of more subtle American influence. 
 A similar rhetorical dynamic is at work in Karen Tei Yamashita’s mixed-media 
novel, Circle K Cycles, although she imagines American cosmopolitanism in the 
opposite direction: as a consumer culture independent of local values.  In it, Yamashita 
continually shifts between nonfictional travelogue, fictional immigrant stories, and found 
objects to create a document testifying to the poor state of race relations in Japan.   
Across the shifting genres, Yamashita develops two main plots and elaborates a set of 
philosophical reflections.  The first plot concerns her family’s stay in Tokyo and 
involves their everyday experiences as American consumers setting up their home or 
attending sold-out exhibition soccer matches.  They are at turns surprised by Japan’s 
excessiveness and pleased with the ease with which they become a seamless part of its 
daily life.  The second presents three narratives of different forms of violence against 
Japanese-Brazilian guest workers, who Yamashita refers to as just Brazilians because 
Japan only allows immigrants of Japanese ancestry.  Interspersed between the two are 
her meditations on recipes, newspaper headlines, and rules generalizing cultural 
behaviors, all of which comes together in the image of the Circle K convenience store to 
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create a neoliberal capitalist vision of cosmopolitanism as the ecstatic experience of free 
choice and roving consumption.  What I explore in this section is the question of why 
Yamashita juxtaposes her three fictional testimonies with the non-fiction travelogue and 
the meditations on globalization, both of which emphasize American transnational 
capital’s production of cosmopolitan sensibilities in a largely uncritical, celebratory 
manner.  By attending to the concept of attention economy and its relevance to the 
production of American humanitarian identities, I argue that, on the one hand, 
Yamashita relies upon her nonfiction to depict herself simultaneously as authentically 
Japanese and an outside American observer who doesn’t believe in racial essentialism to 
lend credibility to her fictions, and on the other, puts her fictional narratives of real 
events to use as the source of interest that sustains readers’ attentions throughout the 
self-indulgent and trivial accounts of her family’s extended vacation.  The need to 
investigate and document Japan’s internal affairs that her text creates justifies the 
lifestyle Yamashita and her family enjoy, along with their pleasurable experience of 
feeling cosmopolitan in Japan, and our attention to the images of suffering she creates in 
the novel produces the means to support it without addressing the matter of the suffering 
itself.  
The way Yamashita accounts for her own sense of self and situates it in relation 
to her project is a good case in point.  Although Yamashita does document the 
conditions of Brazilian guest workers extensively, and gives a discussion of Japanese 
immigration and employment laws, neither Brazilians’ struggles nor Japanese efforts to 
integrate Brazilian immigrants is the focus of her novel.  Instead, it is a deeply personal 
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story that takes the nation’s ongoing collective struggles as an illustration of her own 
conflicted identity.16  Her story of Brazilians and Japanese trying to make sense of their 
unlikely collision creates a powerful narrative persona.17  To tell the story of her 
personal interest in the conflict Circle K Cycles documents, Yamashita gives readers a 
brief history of her studies in Japan and later life in Brazil, her marriage to a Brazilian 
architect, and her transnational family.  During her undergraduate years in the early 
1970s Yamashita spent a semester abroad in Japan researching her family’s roots.  
Unlike Foer, she was not concerned primarily with uncovering the stories of individual 
relatives or finding ties to major historical events.  Instead, she explains, she wanted to 
connect her Japanese heritage with her sense of identity as a Japanese American, to 
understand “the essence, the thing that might survive assimilation and integration into a 
new culture and society, the thing that tied communities in the North to those in the 
South and to the Far East” (12).  Her desire was to understand her own sense of 
transnational identity as the center of a unified, cosmopolitan project of common 
humanity.  However, despite her clear interest in the idea that Japanese history and 
culture inform her personal identity, Yamashita vacillates between her desire to merge 
with the past and to define herself in terms of present-day liberal individualism, free 
from the limitations of racial, ethnic, or national authenticity.  Her desire for 
transnational authenticity to become the site of cosmopolitan unification continually 
returns her inquiry to the site of the nation, as it privileges cultural and political values 
she associates with the U.S. as the key to understanding the essential thing of a 
cosmopolitan common buried in illiberal Japan. 
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Through her research, Yamashita traced her ancestry “back fourteen generations” 
and established an undeniably pure racial pedigree (11).  Whenever she discussed her 
findings with Japanese locals, she invariably evoked the conclusion “you are a pure 
Japanese” (12).  At the same time, she “developed an intuitive grasp of mimicry” of 
traditional Japanese mannerisms, almost as if their memory resided in her blood (12).18  
Her pure ancestry facilitates her immediate performance of Japanese cultural norms and 
marks Yamashita as the sort of authentic commentator who can speak to outsiders of a 
culture’s most intimate issues.  Instead of fulfillment, Yamashita’s confirmation of 
Japan’s vital influence on her daily life and the welcome of locals became a source of 
nagging unease.  Her encounters with older generations of Japanese who include her on 
the basis of her appearance, speech, and mannerisms leave her confused, feeling “hurt 
and resentment.”  America is for her “a country where many people, including my own, 
had long struggled with the pain of racism and exclusion,” and as her investigation of 
Japanese Brazilian immigration reveals, these struggles continue unaddressed in Japan 
(12).  These conflicting feelings are provoked by her internalization of American liberal 
multiculturalism and the way its values have trained her to focus her attention on others.  
She feels her ability to reconnect so easily with her Japanese roots runs counter to these 
values.  Much to her frustration, she comes to the realization that despite thinking racial 
purity was “not something [she] valued or believed to be important,” she was none the 
less “trying hard to pass,” making her complicit to some degree with Japanese treatment 
of its immigrant population (12).  Yamashita, unlike her Japanese contacts, has a deep 
appreciation for the complexity of humanity as a result of her cosmopolitan life.  Her 
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deep attention to both Japan and Brazil does allow Yamashita to speak as an expert.  
However, despite her excellent qualifications to do so, she tends to rely more on the 
appeal of her family’s Brazilian heritage and her Japanese ancestry to authenticate her 
commentary on facets of Japanese culture that the Japanese are unable or unwilling to 
see.   
In the book’s prologue, Yamashita explains the Japanese foreign policy decision 
that inspired her interest in Brazilian guest workers.  In 1990, Japan began to allow first 
and second generation Japanese-Brazilian immigrants to return as guest workers on 
temporary visas of one to three years (13).  In an interview prior to publication, she adds 
that the government determines the length of work visas according to the number of 
generations since emigration from Japan (Gier and Tejeda).  At the same time, the guest 
labor law increased restrictions against immigrants of non-Japanese ethnicity.  The idea 
behind the program was to “replenish the loss of unskilled factory labor” and to “replace 
non-Japanese foreign workers with the more familiar faces of Japanese descendants who 
should … integrate more easily into Japanese life” (13).  The logic of the exclusion is the 
same as Yamashita’s own guiding impulse, to get in touch with that essential 
cosmopolitan thing that perseveres across generations and migrations.  She describes the 
work program as maintenance on a cultural time capsule.  As if forecasting the calamity 
of World War II Japan, “to save the race sent away colonies of their people to South 
America” where they could preserve its values and the biological purity of its race (33).  
Migration was like “sending people to the moon” and now Japan was calling “them all 
back to do the work of the nation” (33).  Yamashita’s anecdote is important because it 
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shows the extent to which she perceives the relationship between Japanese and Japanese 
Brazilians as determined by Japan’s exclusively racial understanding of both Japanese 
and Brazilian identity and tainted by paranoid suspicion of contamination.  Japanese 
Brazilians make better immigrants because they retain a typically Japanese appearance.  
In this sense, they have fulfilled the cultural mission Yamashita describes and can 
resume doing the dirty work native Japanese have no desire to do themselves without 
disrupting the visual composition of Japan’s workforce.  However, because they insist 
on offering only limited residency, the Japanese government adopts the contradictory 
and equally racist assumption that by merit of their time abroad, Japanese Brazilians 
have failed their mission and ceased to be purely Japanese.   They do not, however, 
perceive this same adulteration in Yamashita, who merely visits and does so from the 
U.S..  She does not invite unwanted attention and her presence promises economic 
returns for the nation.  
The displacement of attention from the real subject of exploitation and violence 
to a fictional creation of the author indicates a judgment on Yamashita’s part of the 
potential value of her subjects to create attention and a displacement of the text’s returns.  
According to trauma theory, a victim is traumatized because his or her capacity for voice 
is compromised.  It might produce sociality indirectly, by eliciting empathy in distanced 
readers, but a victim on display cannot claim this value in a way that leads to a 
recuperation of this sociality’s economization on its own.  Instead, testimony restores a 
victim to a state of abstract productive potential by generating an attention field around 
its image that redefines human worth as an object lesson saturated in pain and pity.  
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Since trauma theory assumes a victim’s voice cannot be heard correctly on its own, to 
attract profitable attention, that is, attention that restores productive capacities to victims, 
a testimony must piggy-back on the cultural or political reputation of its mediator.  In 
other words, the author of the text must command a certain level of social prestige.  In 
the present case, though, there is nothing in particular about Yamashita’s text, apart from 
her appeals to cultural authenticity, that promises to hold her readers’ attention.  She 
needs to transform testimony into spectacle in order to gain the prominence necessary to 
secure a return on attention sufficient to guarantee her effectiveness as a witness.  She 
does so by making her subjects fictional.  Fictionalization allows her to attribute 
whatever sentiment or political value she believes will strike a chord with readers.   
Boltanski argues that for the production and consumption of images of distant 
suffering to be moral, they must inspire action, even if only in the minimal form of 
communicating how the sight of suffering affects one.  For Boltanski, flat factual 
description is never adequate to the task of testimony because facts are never simply 
facts and their production as such requires an uneven distribution of humanity amongst 
non-suffering recorders and sufferers (24).  The need for elaboration should play to 
Yamashita’s favor.  She claims more authority when speaking of her own experiences 
and less when representing those of others with her clear generic distinctions she makes 
between her own travelogue and her testimonies, which she writes according to noir and 
sentimental romance conventions.  However, the tone she establishes in her fiction, 
which is important in gauging the emotional effect of each piece, is largely playful.  
Describing her aesthetic, Yamashita remarks that “If it’s possible to plummet sadness, in 
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its complexity, humor has a way of holding in hilarity the ache of a sob” ( Brada-
Williams 2).  From her comments, it is evident that she finds what she documents 
deplorable, but she indulges in fascination and intrigue for the pleasure of readers.  Her 
emphasis on stylistic play indicates the attitude readers ought to adopt in regard to the 
subject matter: it is serious enough to merit attention, but not so much so to demand 
action.  Instead, Yamashita’s attention produces an object readers can use to expand their 
sense of cosmopolitan solidarity without the risk of actual discomfort or sacrifice.  The 
text effectively informs her limited readership of the legal and historical contexts for 
Brazilians’ suffering and may broaden their sense of global awareness.  However, it does 
little to move beyond imagination and empathy in the form of meaningful action.  As Jo 
Littler suggests, humanitarian concern, like Yamashita’s, “acts, in marketing terms, as a 
kind of ‘brand extension’” for public figures and is an “extremely cost-effective” way to 
maintain a high attention profile (241).  It is no innocent coincidence that Circle K 
Cycles is generously sprinkled with advertisements.  Her text, as Jonathan Beller puts it, 
“sells eyeballs to advertisers,” economizing the humanitarian concern of her readers by 
directing a portion of their energies to the goods it puts on display (“Paying Attention”).  
The novel’s cultivation of humanitarian interest is intertwined with a simultaneous 
interest in cultivating cosmopolitan consumer identities. 
In a section titled “Touch Your Heart Circle K,” Yamashita composes a collage 
of advertisements, notices, and newspaper headlines that seem to be the source of her 
fictional testimonies.  While many are mundane descriptions of dating services or unique 
Japanese products, woven throughout are incidents attesting to racial violence.  
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Particularly, there recur police blotter descriptions of desperate Brazilians’ violent 
crimes.  Less frequent, but still noticeable, are direct commentaries on the controversial 
immigration policy and its effects that correspond to the plot of Yamashita’s fictions.  
For example, one snippet describes a Brazilian lawsuit against a Japanese employment 
service that embezzled their wages (46).  In another, Yamashita records an in-store 
announcement alerting Japanese shoppers that “Foreigners have entered the premises,” 
and encouraging them to “secure your personal belongings” (47).  Still another attests to 
the Emperor’s attempts at good-will ambassadorship, remarking during a visit to Brazil 
that he hopes guest workers make friends while they engage in productive work “before 
they return to their country” (49).  Another describes Japanese frustration at Brazilians 
“having barbecues” and their appeals to the police for intervention (50).  As the 
headlines prove, Japan is aware of its problem, its awareness just isn’t breaking the 
surface of its big cultural dialogues.  Racism is repressed but discussed everywhere.  The 
failure to add up the pieces of the puzzle Yamashita lays out shows the need for her 
outside, cosmopolitan perspective.  The combination of serious and hard-hitting 
information with comical translations of advertising slogans makes Yamashita a familiar 
and safe guide for voyeuristic American readers. 
Given that Yamashita is so determined to position herself within the discourse of 
American multicultural diversity and in opposition to outmoded Japanese racism, it is 
ironic that she develops her thoughts on Japanese, Brazilian and American culture, the 
three constituent elements of her transnational sense of self, through a set of rules 
generalizing the essential beliefs, values, and behaviors that define them.  According to 
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her lists, Japanese are obsessed with decorum, immersed in superstition, plagued by 
sexist workplace practices, and too politely introverted to dare object to consensus (107).  
Meanwhile, Brazilians are the polar opposite, an unruly, extroverted bunch of touchy-
feely anarchists who are self-indulgent while at play in their machismo culture but get 
discouraged easily when it comes to hard work (110).  The two make a hopelessly 
mismatched pair.  Not surprisingly, Yamashita also has strong feelings about Americans, 
who are more properly Ugly Americans, complete with a sense of entitlement, lack of 
awareness of the rest of the world, and an individualism she summarizes in the slogan 
“Just Do It” (112).  While there is certainly some truth to her descriptions, as well as a 
tongue-in-cheek humor, Yamashita uses her gallery of stereotypes as the explanatory 
model with which to explore racial tensions throughout the novel.  By identifying the 
faults of typical Americans, she implies she is their sensitive, accommodating, 
empathetic opposite, and an unbiased witness to the Japanese-Brazilian conflict.  
Supporting the rules themselves, she develops a brief example involving condominium 
life in which Japanese residents understand themselves as the natives and owners of the 
complex they inhabit and Brazilians as guests they accommodate.  These assumptions 
lead them to expect Brazilians to behave according to the standards of strict decorum 
Yamashita details in her Japanese list.  The Japanese demand for quiet after hours 
contradicts the compulsion to party that is the essence of her Brazilians, dooming the 
encounter to constant tension.  In this case, the Japanese residents come across as cold 
and uptight, but then, who wouldn’t object to neighbors who habitually “throw objects or 
trash out of apartment windows” (108).  The moral of her contrast is that both 
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nationalities are just living up to their natures; they are the products of an essentializing 
geographic, national culture rather than an essentializing biological race.  The problem 
Yamashita identifies is a lack of mobility and curious consumption of worldly products.  
The Japanese are being as welcoming as their culture allows and the Brazilians are 
already “as quiet as Brazilians can possibly be” (110).  Neither can stray from their own 
rigid set of rules. 
To solve their problems for them, Yamashita invents her own set of 
transcendental rules, named for the reassuring presence of Circle K’s familiar logo that 
she finds everywhere she looks.  These cosmopolitan rules begin simply, by asking 
readers to “Immigrate into your own country,” as she has done (114).  The rule treats all 
spaces as equally foreign.  The presence of Circle K is the common of humanity, a 
symbol of both our hunger for exotic, mass-produced commercial foods and our 
tendency to turn to whatever is most convenient, rather than what is most nourishing or 
healthy, in order to satisfy our urges.  It is the familiar food-court metaphor for 
cosmopolitanism, a wide array of superficial products that deliver a generalization of 
international identities ready for easy consumption.  With Circle K, the world is both 
excitingly foreign and a safe, familiar place just around the corner.  The underlying 
suggestion of the rule is that by setting into global motion the products and goods that 
animate the daily life choices of ordinary consumers, Circle K cosmopolitanizes all local 
sites of consumption to an equal degree; therefore, there is no necessary distinction 
between domestic and foreign, and one’s outlook becomes that of the curious 
cosmopolitan tourist across all global spaces.  The implications for witnessing here are 
 227 
 
clear: cosmopolitanism collapses the distance between Yamashita and the people she 
observes.  Likewise, readers who become cosmopolitan by consuming the text may 
attribute their own feelings to its characters as generalizations of what the people 
Yamashita actually observed also felt. 
The economic consumption inherent in the association of Circle K with 
citizenship echoes in Yamashita’s ensuing rules, which address consumption at a more 
literal level.  It is the duty of the Circle K citizen of the world to “Learn to cook your 
favorite meal” and “Ask the next question.”  These are the only rules and unlike 
Japanese, Brazilian, or American rules, none limits the identity one may possess within 
Circle K.  All one really needs is enough economic capital to make purchases without 
limit and the social capital to efface boundaries.  That Yamashita closes her meditation 
on a real conflict between Japanese and Brazilians with her rules guiding cosmopolitan 
consumption shifts the emphasis of her intervention.  Where the surface of the text 
describes their conditions, the affective tenor of her appeals evokes the satisfaction 
readers might feel after broadening their awareness.  The link between one’s favorite 
meal as the outcome of curiosity and the text’s images of violence stabilize the real 
inequalities of global politics within the comforting Circle K brand.  The assumption 
connecting Yamashita’s rules to her illustrations is that the curiosity she envisions, when 
directed toward those conditions that render the world a uniformly precarious, foreign 
place, will reward cosmopolitan subjects with the comforts of a nourishing meal.  This 
dynamic is what Chouliaraki calls ironic ethics, “a self-oriented morality, where doing 
good to others is about ‘how I feel,’ and must, therefore, be rewarded by minor 
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gratifications” (The Ironic Spectator 3).  Humanitarianism drives politics by carefully 
orchestrating the scene of affective production.  Individual imagination enables empathy 
and identification, which in turn are the foundations for cosmopolitan solidarity.  So, 
curiosity becomes of fundamental importance for Yamashita’s ideal subject, but her 
rules return the humanitarian interest that this curiosity might produce to the level of 
self-reflection rather than justice.  It is a way of manufacturing pleasing consensus out of 
the conviction that our empathy for her characters indicates a common human essence.   
If paying equal attention to the world normalized the political relations of its 
inhabitants, Yamashita’s liberal cosmopolitanism would be wildly successful.  However, 
simply taking notice of others and their interesting differences does not produce 
meaningful changes in their material lives or their capacity to improve their own 
standing.  What it actually does is render the world a valuable affective resource that can 
satisfy a hungry attention.  Consider Yamashita’s elaboration.  Where the first rule seeks 
to overcome the unequal distribution of rights that differentiates between nations and 
between classes within nations, the second theorizes belonging beyond the limits of 
economic transaction.  To belong, in a world continuously stratified by uniform, non-
threatening array of consumer choices, requires a cosmopolitan enthusiasm for 
investigation that takes as its object the global space of foreignness.  The success of the 
cosmopolitan subject depends on its reaction to those particular differences consumed in 
the course of life’s personal voyage.  The object of the consumer’s curiosity, the 
witnessed victim, compels those who read the text or consume within Yamashita’s 
global convenience store to do the work of value creation, taking the form of notice, on 
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her behalf.  So, in Circle K Cycles, Yamashita holds up Brazilians as an object lesson in 
the need for cosmopolitan curiosity for readers who labor upon their image in order to 
produce Yamashita as this ideal observer and to justify the expense of her trip.  Nativity 
is of no consequence within her attention economy, only the capacity to attract and hold 
attention, and just as with Foer, Yamashita’s fictional inquiry into violence becomes the 
evidentiary equivalent of her travelogue.  By imagining the lives of victims, she seasons 
her life with their suffering and allows others to do the same.  As fictions rather than 
people, they supply Yamashita’s text with sentiment, arousing empathy.  In the process, 
her Brazilians become disposable, or better yet, consumable, like snacks.  In the 
metaphorics of convenience store browsing that is the through-line of the novel, 
Brazilians are equally of value to her production of interest as the found objects 
Yamashita inserts alongside their stories. 
To make sense of the chaotic jumble of consumer choices in the constantly 
shuffling array of options within the global convenience store, one must fix preferences, 
in ways that can be internalized and reproduced.  Cooking is the ideal means to achieve 
this end.  One’s favorite meal incorporates the flavors of individual encounters and 
renders one’s own cosmopolitan identity the object of literal consumption for others.  
Just as appetites continually change, the hungry cosmopolitan palate demands new 
recipes for being.  Taken as a whole, Yamashita’s Circle K Rules exude a sense of 
playful optimism for the possibilities we find in what even she recognizes as a wildly 
stratified, unjust global society.  While it is possible that she means to use her personal 
experience as an elaborate demonstration of complicit critique, a la Linda Hutcheon, if 
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this is the case, it is not entirely successful given that the testimonies are at no point in 
conversation with the events of her travels and that her family’s pleasant vacation 
overwhelms her mediations on injustice.  They enjoy Japan and seem unaffected by or 
oblivious to the suffering Yamashita documents.  Nor does she offer any thoughts on 
how the Brazilians she depicts are supposed to find consolation, let alone fulfillment, in 
cooking a meal or asking a question, or perhaps worse, realizing that they feel out of 
place in the homeland whose memory sustains them.  Her consumerist cosmopolitan 
lives in a world of unfettered mobility in which one’s identity, tied as it is to flavorful 
consumption and self-gratification, never has to pause long enough on any single flavor 
or question to address that which is not pleasing.  Yamashita expects Brazilians to be 
flexible, to take on the spirit of a privileged cosmopolitan consumerism without the 
benefit of limitless income and political rights, while she enjoys plasticity, adopting and 
refusing what she will.  Her vision of consumer ambassadors is a delightful one, but one 
that is hardly sustained by the unsavory world whose exploitation makes her own 
enactment of Circle K Rules possible.  The curious openness is only possible when the 
real material conditions for the consumption it demands are not the object of the Circle 
K cosmopolitan subject’s persistent inquiries.    
I’ve described how Yamashita’s text sets up a complex rhetorical situation in 
which she gains credibility as a witness to Brazilian exploitation in Japan on the basis of 
her ability to claim a race-based Japanese identity and to disavow the essential value of 
race from the perspective of liberal multiculturalism.  In doing so, I argue, Yamashita 
puts to use the testimonies she includes in her novel to generate capital within an 
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attention economy that supports the production of herself as an author.  I want to 
conclude by looking at the testimonies Yamashita imagines in order to think about what 
she documents and how her interpretation of what she has learned effectively 
commodifies American humanitarian concern.   
Yamashita’s first testimony imagines the absolute failure of a Brazilian worker, 
Zé Maria (33-42).  Zé loses his hand while working a boring and repetitive job on an 
assembly line.  While recovering in the hospital, and after losing his job, Zé becomes 
involved with a relief worker who informs him of his basic rights, which include 
coverage under Japan’s public health care, worker’s compensation, and job security.  
Despite the abjection of the work experience Yamashita describes, throughout the 
episode, she emphasizes her belief that “No dekasegi [immigrant worker] is a poor 
victim” (34).  Although Zé is maimed because he works extensive hours without rest, it 
is his choice to do so and he makes better money than he could have imagined in Brazil.  
Working conditions are not ideal, but they should not be our primary concern.  What 
really matters is that Zé does not know how to take care of himself or how to access the 
support of public institutions, something Yamashita describes as “easy” (34).  He is a 
victim of his own lack of informed curiosity, of his failure to abide by Circle K Rule 
number 3.  The experience inspires Zé to partner with a wrongfully imprisoned Brazilian 
woman he meets through his own activist work to start a more responsible employment 
service.  The business quickly succeeds because Brazilians recognize that Zé is being 
honest with them about the risks of working in Japan and helps them to avoid his errors, 
 232 
 
at least until his partner embezzles the company payroll and flees the country.  In the 
end, Zé throttles an unsympathetic embassy worker and is deported to a Brazilian prison. 
In the second testimony, Yamashita presents a detective narrative about the 
murders of a single mother and her boyfriend Mario, whose bodies are discovered 
brutally slashed after the two also try to start another employment business with the 
backing of a Japanese investor.  The investigation of the crimes goes nowhere because 
the Japanese press suspects Mario’s brother – he is shiftless, frequently drunk, and prone 
to violent domestic outbursts – whereas local Brazilian reporters investigate their backer, 
who seems too calm and too reticent with them.  Throughout, the identity of the killer 
remains uncertain.19  Her investigators fail to solve the crime because they are stuck 
operating according to stereotypes about one another and themselves and consequently 
fail to ask the right kinds of questions.  The Brazilian psychologist who advised Mario 
over the phone believes the killer “may not have been Brazilian” because “a Brazilian 
would never use a knife” and the “effort to clean up after the killing, even to hide the 
crime, might not be in the Brazilian mind set” (120).  Likewise, the Brazilian reporter 
assumes the Japanese backer’s guilt because he tells her to let the police handle the 
investigation.  She takes his remark as an indication that he has something to hide and 
also as a sign of his typical Japanese distrust for women and Brazilians.  However, 
Yamashita shows that he might only be acting circumspectly.  In Japan, “reporters work 
in concert with the police, carefully agreeing to publish only information released by 
official police reports,” and speaking with unauthorized reporters could damage their 
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investigation (122).  The inability of the investigators to detach themselves from their 
given assumptions prevents resolution and justice. 
The dangers of a sentimentalized national imagination are clearest in 
Yamashita’s tragic tale of Miss Hamamatsu, a beautiful young Brazilian woman 
working under questionable circumstances in an illegal VHS reproduction center.  Miss 
Hamamatsu, “the full measure of occidental beauty, all gracefully accented in the 
exotic,” is the embodiment of the hope for cosmopolitan community founded on 
curiosity and sensory pleasure that the Circle K rules describe but is also obsessed with 
the idea of Brazil she consumes as she watches countless hours of Brazilian telenovelas 
on a wall of video monitors.  As she sits in her dark office, Miss Hamamatsu puts her 
imagination to work, dreaming “of working somewhere else, in the open, in an office 
that had a window at least and young men passing to and fro who would of course turn 
their heads to appreciate her beauty” (20).  She wants to be the object of attention rather 
than endlessly paying attention to her videos.  The tapes, whose data provides the 
endlessly repeated images that make up the walls of her office, endlessly flow together, 
one set immediately replacing another.  Not only is she not noticed, her attentiveness is 
unrequited.  Each repetition of the act of recording further removes the product from its 
originally transmitted form, introducing distorting noise into the picture until almost 
nothing remains visible.  Reflecting upon this, Miss Hamamatsu realizes that like the 
tapes she makes, her idea of home “was a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy, farther 
away than she could imagine” (20).  The episode Miss Hamamatsu watches tells a 
romantic story about Italian immigrants in 19th century Brazil.  O Rei do Gado, The 
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King of Beef, in an ironic reversal of Brazilians’ plight in Japan, wins Miss 
Hamamatsu’s sympathies by suffering a plague of squatters who refuse to leave the land 
he is using, which he only eventually reclaims through lengthy legal proceedings.20  In 
the process, he wins the heart of Pilar, the most beautiful of the squatter women.  The 
story shamelessly plays upon its poor female audience’s identification with Pilar.  
Watching the relationship unfold, Miss Hamamatsu felt “it was all so romantic” and 
wells up with a renewed hope for her own prospects: “it was her story too, the story of 
her Italian side,” and as a fellow immigrant, she too could hope to be rescued and 
become a modern day Queen of Beef (23).  She “appreciated the message of the 
downtrodden,” finding it similar to her own (27).  Just as she wants to control her body 
to generate a prosperous future, she feels the squatters “had every right to take over the 
land held by absentee landlords and make it productive” (27).  As a work of nationalist 
propaganda, however, O Rei do Gado steers the desire for justice it stirs in the hearts of 
viewers toward the banal fantasy of rescue by the show’s sexy king.   
Like Pilar, Miss Hamamatsu dreams she too “would one day meet a powerful 
and princely Japanese executive who would sympathize with her plight and fall madly in 
love with her” (27).  It seems, however, that at present her hope for a Japanese prince 
has taken the form of her employer, another Brazilian worker, Jorghino, who makes a 
point to stop by her corner to let his eyes wander “lovingly over her bottom” and to 
encourage her fantasies with visions of a glamorous and luxurious life of international 
celebrity as a model (26).  He describes her beauty as the source of wealth and 
independence for both of them, as a way to attain the better life she watches on display 
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in her videos.  Where she recognizes her body attracting his not wholly unpleasant 
attention, Jorghino proposes to economize that attention to liberate himself from 
financial mediocrity.  To him, Miss Hamamatsu’s good looks are an untapped “tropical 
gold mine,” and the rest of Japan “doesn’t even know it” (22).  Jorghino, however, is 
certain that he can exploit its potential without interference or competition.  While she 
dreams of a loving partner who will save her from poverty, Jorghino imagines the money 
he can make by convincing Miss Hamamatsu to pose nude for Brazilian magazines.  Her 
beauty will help lonely men imagine a fantasy similar to her own, that they too will be 
able to rescue a helpless, beautiful woman and find happiness.  “What’s the harm in a 
little imagination?” he asks (27).  The sentimentality of her optimistic dream of 
transfiguration into the Queen of Beef is interrupted by the harsh reality that the only 
way she can become what she desires is in the form Jorghino imagines.  He presents her 
with the reality that everyone must “start somewhere,” even if somewhere is being 
exploited in pornographic movies (27).  Under his direction, the Queen of Beef 
transforms from the sentimental image of a persecuted woman restored to a life of 
pleasure to the suggestion that Hamamatsu too could pose “naked except for a cowboy 
hat and boots,” becoming the beef itself served up for hungry male consumers (26).  The 
perversion of her dream in turn mutes the loneliness of male workers with overactive 
sexual imaginations and helps keep them in place in Japanese assembly lines.  The 
privileged cosmopolitan fantasy of constructing a better world wherever one finds 
oneself when transferred to middle- or lower-class contexts also keeps men fantasizing 
about a woman like Hamamatsu waiting for them while the fantasy of romantic rescue 
 236 
 
keeps a woman like her dependent upon the predations of men like Jorghino and gives 
the false sense of hope that a horrible beginning will naturally and inevitably lead to 
wonderful opportunities.  The injustice of her exploitation at Jorghino’s hands, however, 
mirrors the use to which Yamashita puts Brazilians in her novel.  They are the untapped 
resource she alone appreciates and their suffering becomes the main dish of her 
cosmopolitan spectacle that readers take pleasure in consuming. 
The net result of these testimonies is to shed light on some serious problems in 
Japan, many of which Brazilians seem to cause for themselves, but the humanitarian 
worth of Yamashita’s project is compromised by her stylistic decision to render her 
testimonies in fiction and to embed them in her own nonfiction.  The purpose of a 
testimony is to attract attention to an obscured or overlooked subject.  In the context of 
contemporary media, testimonies use subalterns to produce celebrity, or if not celebrity 
exactly, then notoriety, which from a practical economic standpoint amounts to the same 
thing.  Beller argues that “celebrity is not an individual but a social relation characterized 
by the accumulation of attention” (“Paying Attention”).  His observation has significant 
consequences for the rhetorical structure of testimonies.  In the case of Yamashita’s, by 
directing our attention to a state of affairs that on its own was incapable of producing 
value within an attention economy, she hopes to restore the political and economic value 
of Brazilian guest workers’ lives.  However, the big revelations of her exposé, apart from 
the attention-grabbing spectacle of mangled body parts, is that her guest workers are, in 
fact, hard at work, and reaping the economic benefits of that labor in what are generally 
pleasurable lives. 
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Since Yamashita’s intervention does little to direct attention toward the people 
whose lives she documents, these people are left to work out their problems within the 
unrepresented space in which she found them.  The struggle to hold onto “mere survival 
beyond the frame of representation,” especially when no one recognizes its value, is also 
work, as Beller notes.  In terms of humanitarian intervention and interest, the 
documentation of this sort of labor is exactly what justifies the allocation of resources 
necessary to achieve a better standard of living or meaningful reform.  In effect, the 
multi-media witnessing milieu Yamashita orchestrates transforms all individuals to an 
equal degree, into the status of a metaphorical consumer good that can add flavor to life 
when purchased and ingested, waiting on the shelves of the world’s Circle K stores.  The 
difficulty, of course, is that this transformation is not equal.  She undertakes it willingly 
and sees her self-inclusion in the global marketplace as a way of augmenting her already 
supple array of productive capacities, whereas the guest workers for whom she acts have 
to leave their country and accept the hard conditions they find in Japan because they 
have no other means of producing value.   
Yamashita, as the epitome of that cosmopolitan lifestyle, is perfectly situated to 
comment, a part of but not exclusively attached to any national community.  She 
organizes the complex textual screen of transnational awareness for her attentive readers.  
Her mobility and curiosity enable her to put into practice the liberal value for difference 
that defines multicultural tolerance.  A value for difference is one thing, but the 
multiculturalist discourse Yamashita evokes takes on a different sense.  As it circulates 
globally through her representation of curiosity and interest as the central values of 
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cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism becomes, ironically not a way to encourage interest 
in others, but to protect consensus, promoting tolerance rather than respect and 
superficial but safe encounters over risky engagements.  As if entertaining the very 
romantic idea at the heart of her other characters’ suffering, at the close of her book, 
Yamashita imagines a cosmopolitan vision of hybridity that speaks back to her earlier 
performance of purity and the feelings of alienation it evoked.  Marcolina, a non-
Japanese Brazilian woman who “was always fascinated by Japanese culture,” is the 
fulfillment of Yamashita’s Circle K Rules.  Led by her curiosity, she fills her life with 
emblems of Japanese culture, all the while believing “that in another life she must have 
been Japanese” (137).  It is only natural, Yamashita narrates, that Marcolina “always 
preferred the Japanese boys,” or Brazilians in Japan, and “learned to cook Japanese 
food” after marrying Paolo, a Japanese-Brazilian (137).  Unlike Marcolina, who is 
ethnically Brazilian, Paolo grew up immersed in stories of Japan but “never cared about 
Japanese culture the way she did.”  Instead, he feels at home in Brazil.  Each is racially 
marked as other to the community for which they feel interest.  Like Yamashita’s other 
characters, Marcolina and Paolo immigrate to Japan when he loses his job.  Marcolina, 
with her natural love and curiosity for all things Japanese, “adapted very quickly and 
learned enough Japanese to get around,” starting a successful childcare business (138).  
Paolo, however, has the typical dekasegi experience, working “all day and sometimes 
nights in a factory painting batteries,” and “thinks only about the day when he can return 
to Brazil.”  The two fulfill a desire for cultural home in the other, but both cannot share 
the experience of belonging with one another.  The example of Paolo’s pain at having to 
 239 
 
live a Japanese life in order to provide for his family while Marcolina flourishes in a 
foreign state reverses the logic behind the dekasegi program.  Paolo blends in perfectly 
where Marcolina stands out as foreign but isolates himself from the life of the 
community, unwilling to assimilate culturally.  Marcolina starts a business that improves 
the economy and provides her family with financial stability, completely internalizing 
Japanese values.  She is racially unacceptable, but otherwise fulfills the dekasegi 
mission.  Yamashita rewards Marcolina, who embraces the values of Circle K.  Her 
husband, however, lacks the capacity for expansive, imaginative consumption, probably 
because he is miserable and exhausted.  The lesson of the vignette is clear: cultural 
citizenship is a construct of the imagination, which is driven by acts of consumption.  
Marcolina is the better consumer of Japanese ideas and goods, and so becomes more 
effectively integrated within the Japanese economy than her homesick husband.  His 
longing to feel at home or to return to the place where his feeling of home resides, 
prevents him from taking pleasure in his cosmopolitan state.  Marcolina feels alive and 
useful, like she is where she belongs, but can only stay in Japan because of Paolo’s racial 
status.  While she remains so, he will always long for elsewhere, torn by the powerful 
feeling of a “saudade,” a “longing, homesickness, nostalgia” (134). 
For Yamashita, saudade is a uniquely Brazilian feeling for a universal human 
desire for what we lack, for “the familiar that is distant and out of reach” (135).  To feel 
a saudade is to become partially aware of the complexity of one’s attachments, 
enmeshed within a “net of sensations: joy for life, sadness for time passing, hope for the 
future” (135).  Saudade is the feeling we have as a result of our subjective production of 
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a relationship with places, people, ideas, and customs with which we have no means of 
direct contact.  It is the feeling Miss Hamamatsu experiences as she determines that O 
Rei do Gado tells her story and experience while at the same time realizing that the tape 
it plays from is a copy of a copy of a scripted performance of a fantasy.  To feel a 
saudade is to transform oneself as a subject as well as the object one perceives as 
informing subjectivity.  The place lives on in imagination or belief as that which drives 
life, taking one form in Paolo’s desire to return to his adopted native home of Brazil and 
another in Marcolina’s childhood dreams of feeling at home in a land she has never set 
foot in.  As Yamashita says, “saudade is made possible and complex by memory” and 
that memory is created just as much by global imagination as by concrete experience 
(135).  Watching life on video or collecting travel posters sets memory alight as much as 
blood ties, folktales, or direct contact. 
Like Foer’s nomadic truth that invents new possibilities for people to recall their 
interrelationships, saudades are “transformed by the imagination of a New World” (136).  
Part of that imagination is the wonder at the possibility of an entirely new and innocent 
place, but another is the reality of the after-effects of the horrendous and bloody violence 
enacted in the name of claiming that purity.  Like religious belief, it “links the past to the 
present and lives in the magical reality of everyday life” (136).  The attention economy 
is seductive from the perspective of power and wealth, but always is undergirded by 
labor held apart from the attentive gaze it seeks.  Its continual redefinition of memory 
and identity by feelings and experiences make possible the cosmopolitan spirit 
Yamashita finds already evident in the globalized world within which she travels.  But to 
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create the feeling of continuity across global space has meant that the spilling of 
innocent “blood and guts happened because of and for saudade” as it “continues to 
travel” beyond reach or limit (136).  The answer seems to be the object of one’s desires, 
that to which one seeks to pay attention.  To recognize the feeling of saudade beneath 
global movement and cosmopolitan identification is to universalize humanity around a 
universal need to fill always specific and incommensurable lacks – Marcolina needs 
what causes Paolo to feel apart but which lies somehow within him.  In Brazil, the 
craving for what one lacks that marks the saudade is dealt with by coming to feel at 
home where one is.  To do so is to “matar a saudade” or to kill it (135).  Given the 
bloody history of cultural particularism and the racist violence she imagines in her novel, 
Yamashita leaves readers with the question, “What saudade must be killed to belong, to 
make a home, to realize desire?” (136).  Although her own rules imagine moving about 
the world as an experience filled with wonder, it is one always countered with pain and 
suffering.  To feel at home in cosmopolitan space, it seems, means making someone else 
feel unwelcome.  But is it really necessary for the world’s immigrants to metaphorically 
kill their affective ties to distant homelands in order to succeed at being cosmopolitan?  
Or does it merely make them better assets for the global market?  Although nearly 
unmentioned in the novel, for Americans, whose spirit Yamashita condenses into the 
slogan, “We are the world,” this realization carries with it damning consequences: we 
may exuberantly celebrate our global mobility, our ability to put on the appearance of 
fitting in anywhere we like, to identify with the circumstances with all types of people in 
all places, but beneath the festive images of a cosmopolitan marketplace alive with 
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empathy and compassion lies the reality of how others, whose voice we cannot yet admit 
to hearing, feel about our presence. 
Notes 
1  Within politically powerful societies, there is the tendency to conflate an inability of 
less powerful foreign subjects to accurately narrate their own traumatic experiences with 
the authenticity of victimhood.  For example, Slavoj Žižek argues that “the very factual 
deficiencies of the traumatized subject’s report on her experience bear witness to the 
truthfulness of her report, since they signal that the reported content “contaminated” the 
manner of reporting it” (Violence 4).  The consequence of this conflation within 
humanitarian texts is that our process of recognition deliberately prevents unsightly 
victims from contributing to the narration of any national identity.  The victim, like Brik, 
may serve as an emblem for national vengeance or justification for the domination of 
dehumanized others, but does not possess the ability to adequately narrate his or her 
condition and history, or to reconstruct a stable, cohesive identity. 
2  For a discussion of the definitions and distinctions between modes of legal testimony, 
see Kusch, 336–8. 
3  Carr places the burden of responsibility for the testimony’s reception principally upon 
its writer, whose ethos encourages readers to approach a narrator metonymically or 
allegorically. Beverley, however, associates this sort of writerly agency with 
ethnography and oral history, whereas he finds testimony narratives depend heavily on 
“the intentionality of the narrator” (“Margin” 14). Neither critic accords authority for a 
text’s meaning to its readers, however. 
4  Warner’s reading of publics is indebted to Saussurian linguistics.  In addition to his 
destabilization of the sign, Saussure also suggested that linguistic structures predate the 
existence of any individual who makes use of them.  Linguistic possibility “is already 
determined in advance” and “the community, as much as the individual, is bound to 
language” (71).  A specific language structures the possibilities by which its users can 
manifest themselves.  “A language,” he writes, “is always an inheritance from the past” 
that one “can conceive in the imagination, but no one has ever observed it taking place”; 
linguistic structures are always already in place (71). 
5  Most critics assume Alex discovers he is Jewish.  Menachem Feuer argues that Alex’s 
grandfather is “not really an anti-semitic Ukrainian; he’s a self-hating Jew, who to the 
very end of the novel insists that he was protecting Alex, perhaps from finding out that 
he was Jewish, not that he murdered his best friend” (46).  See also Berger, 156; Codde, 
679; Collado-Rodriguez, 67.  There is plenty of textual evidence contradicting these 
readings, particularly Grandfather’s explanation that “Just because I was not a Jew, it 
does not mean that it did not happen to me” (246).  Instead, he tells Alex, he lied about 
the past because “a father is always responsible for how his son is” and he wanted 
Alex’s father to “live a good life, without death and without choices and without shame” 
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(247).  He lies in order to escape what Michael Andre Bernstein calls “backshadowing,” 
the passing of judgment on individuals’ or characters’ actions in the past based on 
knowledge of what was then the future (16). 
6  Hardt and Negri argue information is the product of affective labor.  Generally, we 
think of the facts pertaining to something as the basis for its value.  Michael Goldhaber 
makes a compelling case that the reverse is more accurate, that information is abundant 
and attention is the scarce resource.  Consequently, the attention paid to information is 
what holds value, and information, texts, and cultures must compete for individuals’ 
attentions. 
7  Everything is Illuminated follows a narrative structure Lauren Berlant identifies as 
“infantile citizenship,” in which the innocence of an infantile character is a means to 
expose the contrast between some utopian fantasy and reality in order to reframe “the 
machinery of national life” (29).  In reality, Trochenbrod, as the town is named on maps, 
was the only exclusively Jewish village in Europe.  Between 1942 and 1944, the town, 
which had about 6000 residents, was literally destroyed – all its wooden buildings were 
burned to the ground and its one paved road pulled up.  Records suggest that as many as 
60 of the town’s residents, Foer’s grandfather Safran among them, may have survived.  
For a more comprehensive history of the town and pictures of it in its prime and at 
present, see Avrom Bendavid-Val’s The Heavens Are Empty: Discovering the Lost Town 
of Trochenbrod. 
8  Notably, Francine Prose wrote of the novel, “Not since Anthony Burgess's novel ‘A 
Clockwork Orange’ has the English language been simultaneously mauled and energized 
with such brilliance and such brio.” Similarly, Laura Miller writes in Salon that Alex’s 
“version of English resembles an out-of-control garden hose turned on full-force and 
allowed to thrash away on a summer lawn” for an effect so compelling, his sections “far 
outbalance the book’s weaknesses.” 
9  I read this passage as a clear indication that Alex is disappointed because Jonathan is 
not a romantic hero, is not someone endowed with the superhuman beauty and capacities 
that underwrite his fantasy of an escape to a better life than the one he knows in Ukraine.  
Contrary to my reading, Aliki Varvogli argues that Alex is let down by Jonathan’s 
appearance because it indicates how “the myth of America has invaded all corners of the 
earth,” or that Ukraine is already just like America (84).  That Alex’s attempts to read 
Odessa’s landscape of former Soviet concrete-block housing complexes onto New York 
refutes this suggestion.  America differs profoundly from Ukraine but does not 
correspond to the fairy tale Alex feeds off of, at least not in Jonathan’s nerdy 
appearance. 
10  Lauren Berlant notes that within trauma theory, “the present is seen as a symptom, the 
detritus of the significant relation between lived and remembered pasts and occluded 
futures” (848).  Trauma theory privileges the significance of the past to such an extent 
that actions in the present can be felt by those associated with trauma to have little affect.  
(Whether this means those claiming it feel history will never change for them or by those 
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witnessing who feel victims will always feel a trauma foremost among their 
experiences).  Testimony, addressed globally as the record of an event without bounds, 
consists of the recognition that one’s desire to recognize all people as included within 
human community is frustrated perpetually by our equally entrenched desire to orient 
ourselves to others in terms of owned experiences, histories, or memories.  Testimony, 
by my reading, is a desire for an impossible cosmopolitanism in the face of violence or 
that fails to be extinguished by violence.   
11  Derrida defines forgiveness as an exceptional relationship founded on the 
impossibility of the circumstances it demands.  Wrongdoing requires retribution, 
compensation, reformation, and reconciliation.  These acts constitute the process of 
ordinary justice and are “an economic transaction” that returns dialogue to the level of 
justice initiated and mediated by the state rather than through the agency of the victim 
(“On Forgiveness” 34).  As an economic transaction, forgiveness is further compromised 
by the political sites from which victim and perpetrator address one another.  By 
attempting to enter into a dialogue or relationship of forgiveness, both parties are 
fundamentally transformed by the attitude or recognition of the other “it is no longer the 
guilty as such who is forgiven” but rather that the address of guilt no longer entirely 
applies to one now partially included within that of forgiveness (35).  Not surprisingly, 
like cosmopolitanism, Derrida’s forgiveness is both necessary and impossible. 
12  Departing from the norm, Lisa Propst does not read Alex’s confession as an 
admission of Jewishness, but an expression of remorse over his complicity with the 
Ukrainian murder of Jews.  As she observes, Alex’s frantic speech makes the “outside of 
words become their insides as if the men were losing the boundaries that demarcate their 
identities” (41).  Despite the tension in the idea of two men coming together in a way 
that dissolves all boundaries between them, Propst does not tie her observation to 
sexuality, but rather offers that their unbounded state opens up a space in which moral 
judgment is suspended (43). 
13  Foer’s text illustrates the violence inherent in assuming the identity between an event 
and inherited national character, imagining coincidence between American, Jewish, and 
Ukrainian uses of traumatic Holocaust memory, through the relationship between his 
narrators, Jonathan and Alex.  The struggle between the two over how to record their 
experience represents, as Naomi Mandel suggests, an irreconcilable problem of how to 
remain faithful to the event, in Badiou’s sense of the word.  Under the harsh illumination 
of their mutual journey, Mandel suggests, “the distinctions between those who 
murdered, those who betrayed, and those who survived fade,” and “fiction comes to the 
fore as the object of fidelity and the site of justice” (250, 251).  The Holocaust itself may 
not become knowable, but the conjunction of failures to live up to the other’s conception 
of its essence generates a moment in which healing might occur.  Mandel makes a great 
argument for the tension between fidelity to history and the aims of fiction.  The 
realization of this healing, I argue, however, is contingent upon both characters assuming 
Jonathan’s liberal values as the universal given grounding the cosmopolitan solidarity 
emerging atop the forgiven breach. 
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14  Alex’s call for decency to all people on the basis of the ability to perceive them as 
deserving universal human decencies echoes nearly every argument for a liberal concept 
of cosmopolitanism.  One of the more direct articulations of this idea comes in 
Robbins’s introduction to Cosmopolitics, in which he suggests that “if you can say yes to 
the nation, you can also say yes to units larger than the nation” and, alluding to Benedict 
Anderson’s claim that the nation is the imaginary effect of individuals’ engagement with 
print capitalism, that “If people can get as emotional as Anderson says they do about 
relations with fellow nationals they never see face-to-face, then now that print-capitalism 
has become electronic- and digital-capitalism, and now that this system is so clearly 
transnational, it would be strange if people did not get emotional in much the same way 
… about others who are not fellow nationals” (5, 7). 
15  Although, of course, Foer is not giving license to any sort of imaginative play with 
history. 
16  Jinqi Ling argues that Yamashita’s novel has two primary humanitarian aims: to 
expose Japan’s exploitation of mass media to create a “misrepresentation” of its 
economy as one offering “opportunity for the hard pressed Japanese Brazilians” and to 
critique “bureaucratic concealment, by both governments” (65).  I agree that these do 
seem important goals of the book, but his suggestion that Yamashita’s “conscious 
decision to authorize facts and to demystify fictions, from the intersection of her role as 
a narrating subject and her actual participation in the migration process” exaggerates 
what she is able to accomplish (64).  As Yamashita herself notes, she is “not a war 
refugee but really a pretty privileged and blessed person” (Brada-Williams 2).  While 
Yamashita does document her own life of continual movement and competing cultural 
claims, her travel is not the equivalent of that experienced by global migrant workers, 
nor does she experience any real risk of violence or poverty during her travels. 
17  Lilie Chouliaraki argues that this dynamic within humanitarian texts invites readers to 
identify with the ecstatic pleasure of the cosmopolitan author rather than suffering 
cosmopolitan victims and redefines cosmopolitanism as the pursuit of self-actualization 
rather than justice (“Cosmopolitanism as Irony” 79).   
18  This idea of cultural memory suggests an entirely more extensive idea of inter-
generational structures of care than that which Stiegler advocates.  The biologism 
Yamashita describes here is reminiscent of the immortal cellular transmission of identity 
Freud describes in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 
19  Ling suggests the crime had two perpetrators: Mario and Fatima, the two victims.  As 
he reads the scene, “it can … be concluded that Mario and Fatima [because of the long 
hours they each worked], though drawn together by emotional need, could not sustain 
their relationship in the midst of the mounting economic pressure and growing 
psychological consequences of living as dekasegi in Japan” (76).  This may or may not 
be the case.  The criminal’s identity is not the point of Yamashita’s story, which is 
instead about the crime of suspicion and the need for cosmopolitanism.   
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20  This is essentially a reproduction of the plot of the Mexican American novel, The 
Squatter and the Don. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: AMERICAN OBSOLESCENCE AS COSMOPOLITANISM 
 
 In Chapter 2, I described David Foster Wallace’s writing as an appeal to 
masculine nationalism as a necessary corrective to the influences of globalized media 
upon the life of the American nation.  For him, television’s expansion of free choice and 
content options was a threat to America’s virility that a turn to serious fiction might 
correct by presenting models for right living and active decision making.  I close by 
considering the different possibility for America and the white male American as its 
representative in the apparently already materialized global society Dave Eggers depicts 
in A Hologram for the King (2012).  In the novel, the fate Wallace feared is an 
accomplished fact.  Its protagonist, Alan Clay, is a worn down middle-aged relic of 
America’s glorious past.  He reflects obsessively on the years following the War when 
American men did meaningful work, building actual things that really mattered, and 
when an American’s presence commanded special attention worldwide.  In the present, 
Alan finds himself sapped of the energy to do anything decisive by his faltering career, 
diminished by the continual offshoring of factory work that he helped oversee and by a 
mysterious lump on his neck that embodies America’s enervation within the global 
economy.  Drifting purposelessly through life, Alan has taken on the job of selling a 
massive IT contract to Saudia Arabia’s King Abdulla Economic City and is frustrated 
that he cannot get an audience with the King and that his millennial co-workers are 
shiftless and unmotivated. 
 The problem America and Alan face in Egger’s novel is the systematic 
destruction of the basis for masculine individuality accomplished through globalization’s 
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offshoring of industrial labor and the decline of manual labor that technological 
development has rendered irrelevant.  Alan is paralyzed in his personal life, unable to 
perform sexually or effectively parent his college-aged daughter, because without a 
meaningful job tied to the production of a material product, he is left to explore his 
feelings.  Alan’s introspection produces only a profound sense of inadequacy.  His 
feelings, rather than a productive source of inspiration that might motivate him to do 
something different with his life, are the problem.  Too much concern for them leads to 
the state of flaccid passivity that has led to his mismanagement of the resources of the 
companies whose outsourcing he has overseen during his career. 
If he had not been so obsessed with feeling like a man, Eggers suggests, he might 
have acted the part of one and put his foot down to save American labor.  Instead, men 
who no longer have to work with their hands and make actual decisions have forgotten 
the value and thrill of the pursuit of freedom through individual responsibility.  “The age 
of machines holding dominion over man,” thinks Alan, “was the down fall of a nation 
and the triumph of systems designed to thwart all human contact, human reason, 
personal discretion and decision making” (146).  All people want is to give over the 
right, or responsibility, to make choices.  This is the problem of offshoring as well.  
America has come to depend on the steady delivery of products it has no role in making.  
The nation, Eggers seems to say, cannot stand firm and do the hard work worthy of 
commanding the world’s attention.  His own impotence is a case in point.  With nothing 
real to sell, or whose manufacture he can oversee, Alan has no purpose in life and cannot 
muster the stamina to pleasure the women who throw themselves at him in the novel.  
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Instead, he depends helplessly on Hanne, a Danish consultant, to supply him with mind-
numbing alcohol and Zahra, a Saudi surgeon, to remove the benign lump he insists saps 
him of his vitality.  His dependence on foreign women to mobilize him is yet another 
sign of his failure to be the man America really needs. 
That the novel is meant to whip apathetic readers into a state of fervor, to inspire 
them to act where Alan has failed to, is evident in the novel’s two key moments.  In the 
first, Alan recalls the moment in which the spirit of his close friend broke.  A fellow 
salesman, Terry had worked for months to secure a contract for his company to install 
glass for the World Trade Center, only to lose the bid at the last moment to a rival 
American company which is outsourcing its production to a Chinese company to whom 
Terry’s own company has licensed its patented process.  The moment is so crushing for 
Eggers because in it, the symbol of America’s economy is produced by its greatest 
competitor, making it a sign of the nation’s vacuousness.  Alan’s reflection on the 
injustice of it all reminds him of the point at which he should have acted decisively to 
restore the honor of American industry.  In KAEC, in the present, things are more 
resigned.  Americans may continue to do excellent and rewarding work, but not on 
behalf of the nation.  Instead, as a decorated and successful architect informs him, “in 
the U.S. now there’s not that kind of dreaming [about the biggest and tallest] happening.  
It’s on hold.  The dreaming’s being done elsewhere for now” (151).   
That his work can only be useful when backed by the resources and energy of 
someone else, someone foreign or female, is a conclusion to which Alan becomes 
increasingly accustomed.  When, repreating the failure of his friend Terry, King 
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Abdullah awards his contract to a Chinese firm Eggers implies is also using American 
technology to undercut American bids, rather than return home to set his life in order, 
Alan pleads his case to the King’s assistant.  With a wave of relief, he realizes that in the 
end, “He wasn’t being sent away, after all …. he would stay” and the King and his 
economy would find something for him to do (331).  This posture of ingratiating 
servitude, of manufactured occupation, is the future America has to look forward to 
unless it manages to act decisively, the novel concludes. 
We could easily respond to Eggers’s polemic with a return to the masculinity and 
nationalism he poses as an alternative to obsolescence.  A reconsolidation of the national 
economy might improve the lives of Americans in the short term.  While there is 
certainly some truth in Eggers’s assessment of the devastation caused to America’s 
working class by globalization, his argument that what America needs is a return to 
masculine assertiveness and brash salesmanship is less than compelling.  Instead, might 
it not be more productive to take the state of the nation, in which a man like Alan can 
approach foreigners with humility and vulnerability, and refashion its collective identity?  
Does America need to be the center of the world the globalization it has helped to set in 
motion might create?  Contrary to the appeal of Eggers’s story, I find the idea of a less 
domineering, less decisive, and more sensitive American a positive development, even if 
it might mean something less than absolute domination of the world’s economy.  As 
Alan reflects, a part of why he is in such dire straights is that he was, for so long, able to 
exist under the assumption that he would always be able to get hold of any resources he 
might need to fulfill his dreams.  He never imagined he might have to do work, meaning 
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work he did not find pleasurable or fulfilling, work that is labor, to get there.  What his 
vulnerability makes possible is a new, and I think, more cosmopolitan way for America 
to proceed, one in which Americans do not simply command the attention of the world, 
but must work in concert with them to make something within a shared space.  One kind 
of American nationalism may be obsolete, but that does not mean the downfall of the 
nation or the end of meaningful being for Americans living in a globalized world. 
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